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Almost three million subprime loans were originated  in 2006, bringing
the total value of outstanding  subprime loans over a trillion dollars. A few
months later the subprime crisis began, with soaring  foreclosure rates and
hundreds of billions, perhaps trillions,  of dollars in  losses to borrowers, lend-
ers, neighborhoods, and cities, not to mention broader  effects on the U.S. and
world economies.  In  this Article, I focus on the subprime mortgage contract
and its central  design  features. I argue that these contractual  design  features
can be explained as a rational  market response to the imperfect rationality  of
borrowers.  Accordingly, for many subprime borrowers, loan contracts were
not welfare maximizing. And to the extent that the design of subprime mort-
gage contracts contributed to the subprime crisis, the welfare loss  to borrow-
ers-substantial in itself-is  compounded  by  much  broader social costs.
Finally, I  argue that a better understanding  of the market failure that pro-
duced these inefficient contracts should inform the ongoing efforts to  reform
the regulations  governing the subprime market.
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INTRODUCTION
Almost  three  million  subprime  loans  were  originated  in  2006,
bringing the total value of outstanding subprime loans over  a trillion
dollars.'  A few months  later the subprime  crisis  began, with soaring
1  See Yuliya Demyanyk  & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding  the Subprime Mortgage Crisis,
22 REv. FIN. STUD.  (forthcoming 2009)  (manuscript at 6 & n.6,  7 tbl.1,  on file with authors)
(analyzing data covering approximately 85 percent of securitized  subprime loans.  In 2006,
75  percent  of  subprime  loans  were  securitized,  and  the  authors'  data  set  included
1,772,000 subprime loans originated in 2006, implying a total of 1,772,000 /  (0.85 * 0.75)  =SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CONTRACTS
foreclosure  rates and hundreds of billions-perhaps trillions-of dol-
lars in  losses to  borrowers, lenders, neighborhoods,  and  cities, not to
mention broader  effects  on  the  U.S.  and world  economies.2  In  this
Article,  I focus on the subprime mortgage contract and its central de-
sign features.  I  argue that for many borrowers  these  contractual  de-
sign features were not welfare maximizing.  And to the extent that the
design of subprime  mortgage  contracts  contributed  to  the subprime
crisis,  the  welfare  loss  to  borrowers-substantial  in  itself-is  com-
pounded  by much  broader social  costs.  Finally, I argue  that a better
understanding  of the  market failure  that produced  these  inefficient
contracts should inform the ongoing efforts to reform the regulations
governing  the subprime market.
During  the five  years  preceding  the  crisis,  the subprime  market
experienced  staggering  growth  as  riskier  loans were  made  to  riskier
borrowers."  Not surprisingly, these  riskier loans came at the price of
higher interest rates  that compensated  lenders for the increased  risk
that they undertook.4  But high prices themselves  are not the central
problem;  the problem  is  that lenders hid  these  high  prices and bor-
rowers underappreciated  them.  In  the prime market, the  traditional
loan is a standardized  thirty-year fixed-rate  mortgage  (FRM).  Lenders
could have  accounted for the increased risk of subprime loans by sim-
ply  raising  the  interest  rate  on  the  traditional  FRM.  Yet  the  typical
subprime  loan  is  a  far  cry  from  an  FRM.  The  subprime  market
2,779,608);  see  also State of the  U.S. Economy and Implications for the Federal Budget: Hearing
Before the H.  Comm.  on  the Budget, 110th  Cong. 10  (2007)  [hereinafter  Hearing] (prepared
statement of Peter Orszag, Director,  Congressional  Budget Office)  ("By  the end  of 2006,
the outstanding value of subprime  mortgages totaled more  than $1  trillion and accounted
for about 13 percent of all home  mortgages.").  The Center for Responsible Lending esti-
mates  that as of November  27,  2007,  there were  7.2 million  outstanding subprime  loans
with an estimated  total value of $1.3  trillion.  A Snapshot of the Subprime Market,  Center
for Responsible  Lending, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/quick-ref-
erences/a-snapshot-of-the-subprime.html  (last  visited  Mar.  1,  2009)  [hereinafter  CRL
Snapshot].
2  See  CONG.  BUDGET  OFFICE,  THE  BUDGET  AND  ECONOMIC  OUTLOOK:  FISCAL YEARS
2008 TO  2018,  23  (2008)  [hereinafter  CBO  OUTLOOK],  available at http://www.cbo.gov/
ftpdoc.cfm?index=8917&type=l  (noting estimates of between $200 billion and $500 billion
for total subprime-related  losses and noting  the additional-and  potentially substantial-
indirect adverse effects of the subprime crisis on  the economy);  see also Henry M.  Paulson,
Jr., U.S.  Sec'y of the Treasury,  Remarks  on Current Housing  and Mortgage Market Devel-
opments  at  the Georgetown  University  Law  Center  (Oct.  16,  2007),  available at http://
www.treasury.gov/press/releases/hp612.htm  (noting that foreclosures  on  subprime loans
increased more than  200 percent between  2000 and 2006 and discussing the broad impact
of these foreclosures  on  the economy).
3  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert,  supra note  1  (manuscript at 5,  7  tbl.1);  Center  for
Responsible  Lending, Mortgage  Lending  Overview,  http://www.responsiblelending.org/
issues/mortgage/  (last visited  Mar. 1,  2009).
4  See Lauren  E. Willis,  Decisionmaking  and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Preda-
tory Lending: Price,  65  Mn.  L.  REV.  707, 720-21  (2006)  (describing the development  of risk-
based pricing  in  the mortgage market).
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boasted a broad variety of complex  loans with multidimensional  pric-
ing structures.  Hybrid  loans, combining fixed  and variable  rates, in-
terest-only  loans,  and  option-payment  adjustable-rate  mortgages
(ARMs)-each product  type  with  its  own  multidimensional  design-
were all common  in the  expanding  subprime market.  Many of these
contractual  designs were  not new; they were  known in the prime mar-
ket since  the  early  1980s.  But it was  in  the  subprime  market where
they first  took center  stage.5
Common  subprime  mortgage  contracts  share  two  suspect  fea-
tures.  The first is cost deferral.  (Of course, any loan contract involves
deferred costs; I am referring to deferral  of costs beyond that which  is
necessarily  implied  by  the  very  nature  of a  loan.)  The  traditional
prime mortgage  required  a 20 percent down payment, which  implies
a loan-to-value  (LTV)  ratio of no more than 80  percent.  In  the sub-
prime market, in  2006, over  40 percent of loans had LTVs exceeding
90 percent.  Focusing on purchase-money loans in 2005, 2006, and the
first half of 2007, the median subprime borrower put no money down,
borrowing  100  percent  of  the  purchase  price  of  the  house.  The
schedule  of payments  on the  loan  itself exhibits  the  same  deferred-
cost  characteristic.  Under  the  standard  prime  FRM,  the  borrower
pays  the  same  dollar amount each  month-a flat payment  schedule.
Under a conventional  ARM, where the monthly payment is calculated
by adding a fixed number of percentage points to a fluctuating index,
the dollar amount paid varies from  month to month but without any
systemic  trajectory.  The  majority  of subprime  loans,  on  the  other
hand, exhibited  an increasing payment schedule:  they set a low inter-
est  rate  for  an  introductory  period-commonly  two  years-and  a
higher interest  rate  for the  remaining  term  of the  loan.  Other sub-
prime  loans  exhibited  an  even  steeper  payment  schedule.  Interest-
only  loans  and  payment-option  ARMs  allowed  for  zero  or  negative
amortization  during  the  introductory  period,  further  increasing  the
step-up  in  the monthly payment after the introductory period ended.
A direct  implication  of an  escalating-payments  contract  is  the  "pay-
ment shock," which  occurs when a rate reset leads to a significant, up
to  100  percent, increase in the monthly payment.
The second suspect feature of subprime contracts is their level of
complexity.  While  the traditional  FRM sets a single, constant interest
rate,  the  typical  subprime  mortgage  includes  multiple  interest  rates,
some of which are implicitly defined by nontrivial formulas that adjust
5  A note on  terminology: The residential mortgage market  is divided into the prime
segment and the nonprime segment.  The  nonprime segment is further divided  into sub-
prime  (higher risk) and Alt-A (lower  risk),  although the line between subprime  and Alt-A
is  not always  clear.  See infra Part I.A.  Many of the  contractual  design  features studied  in
this Article were  common in both the subprime and Alt-A segments.  For expositional con-
venience,  I will sometimes refer  to these  two  segments  together as  "subprime."
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rates  from  one  period  to  the  next.  The  typical  subprime  loan  also
features a host of fees-some applicable at different time periods dur-
ing the loan term, some contingent on various exogenous changes  or
on borrower behavior.  The numerous fees associated with a subprime
loan fall under two categories:  (1)  origination  fees, including a credit
check fee, an appraisal fee, a flood certification fee, a tax certification
fee, an  escrow analysis  fee, an  underwriting  analysis  fee, a document
preparation fee, and separate fees for sending emails, faxes, and cou-
rier  mail;  and  (2)  post-origination  fees,  including  late  fees,  foreclo-
sure fees, prepayment  penalties, and dispute-resolution  or arbitration
fees.  These  fees can  add up to thousands  of dollars, or up to 20 per-
cent of the loan amount.  The  prepayment  option, of special  impor-
tance  in  the  subprime  market, further  complicates  the  valuation  of
these contracts.  So does the  (implicit) default option.  Finally, since a
borrower must choose among many different, complex products, each
with a different set of multidimensional  prices and features,  the com-
plexity of the  borrower's  decision  is  exponentially  greater  than  the
already high  level  of complexity of a single  contract.6
What explains  these  contractual design features?7  I  begin by ex-
ploring  possible  rational-choice  explanations.  Consider  the  cost-
deferral feature.  A common explanation for deferred-cost contracts  is
based  on  the  affordability  argument.  Many  subprime  borrowers,  at
the  time  they  took  out their loans,  were  liquidity  constrained:  they
could  afford  only  a  small  down  payment  and  a  small  monthly  pay-
ment.  The catch, of course, is that a small down payment and a small
initial monthly payment imply higher monthly payments in the future,
after the initial  rate resets  to the post-introductory level.  Accordingly,
the rationality of the affordability argument depends  on the ability of
the  borrower to  either make  the  high future  payment  or to  avoid it.
And so the argument splits into two sub-arguments:  the "make" argu-
ment  and the  "avoid"  argument.  The  "make"  argument  is  that  the
borrower will anticipate being able to make the higher payment if she
expects  her income  to increase  substantially  by the end of the intro-
ductory period.  Some subprime borrowers rationally expected such a
substantial  increase  in  income;  many others did not.
Next,  the  "avoid"  argument:  the borrower  will  be  able to  avoid
the higher payment if she expects to prepay the mortgage  before the
6  Truth in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524-25  (July 30,  2008)  (to  be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226)  ("[P]roducts  in the subprime  market tend to be complex, both  relative
to  the  prime market and  in absolute  terms .... ").
7  As  noted  above,  these contractual  design  features  appeared  in  the  prime  market
well  before the  subprime expansion.  The explanations  considered  below  apply to  prime
mortgages  that share the deferred-cost  and high-complexity features.  These explanations
also reveal  why these existing design  features rose  to prominence  in the subprime  market
and, as argued  below, even  facilitated the subprime  expansion.
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introductory  period  ends.  The  prepayment  option depends  on  the
expected  ability to sell  the house,  on the expected  availability of refi-
nance  loans with  attractive  terms, and  on the expected  ability to sell
the house  at  an  attractive  price.  Attractive  refinancing  and  sale op-
tions will  be available  if (1)  the borrower's credit score  improves;  (2)
market interest rates fall; or  (3)  house prices increase.  Some borrow-
ers  rationally  expected  that  such  positive  realizations  would  enable
them  to refinance  their  deferred-cost  mortgage  and  avoid  the  high
long-term  costs.  For many other borrowers,  these expectations  were
overly  optimistic.
An  alternative, rational-choice  explanation  portrays the deferred-
cost mortgage  as an investment vehicle  designed to facilitate  specula-
tion on real estate prices.  If house prices rise,  the speculator will sell
the house  (or refinance) and pocket the difference between the lower
buy price and the higher sell price, without ever paying  the high long-
term cost of the deferred-cost loan.  If house prices fall, the speculator
will default on the mortgage, again  avoiding the high long-term  cost.
Of course,  default  is  not a  cost-free  proposition, but  as  long  as  the
probability of a price increase  is high enough,  the upside benefit will
offset the downside risk.  Some subprime borrowers were surely specu-
lators.  Many others, however, were not.
I  now  turn  to  the  second  identified  design  feature:  complexity
and  multidimensionality.  First  consider  the  multiple,  indirectly  de-
fined interest rates.8  The  index-driven  rate adjustments  of an ARM-
further complicated  by maximum adjustment caps-can be explained
as  a means  to  efficiently allocate  the  risk of fluctuating interest  rates
between lenders and borrowers.  This explanation, however, was more
powerful  when  interest-rate  risk  was  shared  by  the  lender  and  bor-
rower.  During the subprime expansion, when securitization  was prev-
alent, this  risk  could  have  been-and  sometimes  was-passed  on  to
diversified  investors.  Next consider the proliferation  of fees common
in subprime mortgage contracts.  A rational-choice  model can explain
at least some  of these  fees.  Charging  separate  fees  for separate  ser-
vices  allows  each  borrower  to  pick and  choose  between  the  offered
services  according  to  her individual  preferences.  But  this  efficiency
story applies only to optional services; it does not apply to the numer-
ous  non-optional,  yet  separately  priced,  services  such  as  the  credit
check  and  document  preparation.  Another  explanation  views  the
proliferation  of fees  as reflecting  efficient  risk-based pricing.  For ex-
ample, delinquency  imposes a cost on lenders.  Late fees and foreclo-
sure  fees allocate  this cost to  the delinquent borrowers.  Absent such
fees, nondelinquent  borrowers would  bear a  large  share of the  costs
8  To  the extent that interest-rate  complexity  is an  artifact  of the deferred-cost  fea-
tures,  the preceding  discussion  applies  here as well.
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imposed by delinquent borrowers, as lenders would raise interest rates
to compensate  for the forgone  fees.  Again, this explanation  is  plausi-
ble for certain  fees but not for  others.
The  rational-choice  theories  explain  some  of the  observed  con-
tractual  designs  in some  contexts.  They  do not, however,  provide  a
complete account:  a rational-choice  model  does not fully explain the
prevalence of cost deferral and the exceedingly high level of complex-
ity.  To fill this explanatory  gap, I develop a behavioral-economics  the-
ory  of the  subprime  mortgage  contract.  I  argue  that  the  design  of
these  contracts can be explained  as a rational market response  to the
imperfect rationality of borrowers.  Myopic borrowers unduly focus on
the  short-term  dimensions  of the  loan  contract  and  pay  insufficient
attention to the long-term dimensions.  Optimistic borrowers underes-
timate  the  future  cost of the  deferred-cost  contract.  They  overesti-
mate  their  future  income.  They  expect  to  have  unrealistically
attractive refinance  options.  Or, they overestimate  the expected  value
of a bet placed  on  the real estate market, perhaps  because  they irra-
tionally expect that a  10 percent price increase  last year will be  repli-
cated  next  year.9  If myopic  and  optimistic  borrowers  focus  on  the
short  term  and  discount  the  long term,  then  lenders  will  offer  de-
ferred-cost  contracts  with  low  short-term  prices  and  high  long-term
prices.
A  similar argument  explains  the  complexity  of subprime  mort-
gage  contracts.  Imperfectly  rational borrowers  will  not be able  to ef-
fectively  aggregate  multiple  price  and  nonprice  dimensions  and
discern from them the true total cost of the mortgage product.  Inevi-
tably, these  borrowers will  focus on  a few salient dimensions.  If bor-
rowers cannot process complex, multidimensional  contracts and  thus
ignore less salient price  dimensions, then lenders will offer complex,
multidimensional  contracts,  shifting  much  of the  loan's  cost  to  the
less salient dimensions.10
While  focusing  on  only  one  part of the  subprime  picture-the
design  of subprime  loan contracts-this Article  develops  an alterna-
tive account of the dynamics that led to the subprime crisis.  One com-
mon  account  focuses  on  unscrupulous  lenders  who  pushed  risky
9  See Ben S.  Bernanke, Chairman,  Bd. of Governors of the  Fed.  Reserve  Sys.,  Speech
at the Women in Housing and Finance and Exchequer  Club Joint Luncheon, Washington,
D.C.:  Financial Markets, the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy  (Jan.  10, 2008),  avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080110a.htm  [here-
inafter  Bernanke  January  2008  Speech]  (suggesting  that  the  ARM  design  responds  to
optimism  about house  prices).
10  See  Edmund  L.  Andrews,  Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread:
Analysis Finds Trail of Warnings on Loans, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  18,  2007, at Al  (quoting Edward
M.  Gramlich,  the  former Federal  Reserve  governor,  asking  "Why are the  most  risky loan
products  sold  to  the  least sophisticated  borrowers?  .. .The question  answers itself-the
least sophisticated  borrowers are probably duped into taking  these products.").
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credit  onto  borrowers  who  were  incapable  of  repaying."  Another
common  account  focuses  on  irresponsible  borrowers  who  took  out
loans they could not repay.12  Both accounts capture some of what was
going  on during  the subprime  boom, but both  accounts  are  incom-
plete.  In  many cases  borrowers were  not reckless;  they were  imper-
fectly  rational.  And  in  many  cases  lenders  were  not  evil;  they  were
simply responding  to a demand for financing  that was driven  by bor-
rowers'  imperfect  rationality.
This Article highlights a demand-side  market failure:  imperfectly
rational borrowers  "demanded" complex deferred-cost loan contracts
and lenders met this demand.  But the failures in the subprime mort-
gage  market were  not limited to  the  demand side.  In fact,  a supply-
side  market failure  explains why lenders willingly catered  to  borrow-
ers'  imperfectly  rational  demand  even when  the  demanded product
designs  increased  the default  risk borne  by lenders.1- 3  The main  cul-
11  There  are numerous accounts  of abusive  practices falling under the general head-
ing  of predatory  lending,  many  of them  predating  the  recent  subprime  crisis.  See U.S.
DEP'T  OF Hous.  &  URBAN  DEV.,  UNEQUAL  BURDEN:  INCOME  & RACIAL  DISPARITIES  IN  SUB-
PRIME  LENDING  IN  AMERICA  1  (2000),  available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/unequal-full.pdf  (documenting  "the  rapid growth  of  subprime lending  during  the
1990's"  and calling for increased  scrutiny of subprime  loans  due to "growing  evidence of
widespread predatory practices in  the subprime  market").  While there is surely some over-
lap  between  the  contractual  design  features  studied  in  this Article  and  the  problem  of
predatory lending, the extent of the overlap  is unclear, largely because there is no agreed-
upon definition  of predatory lending.  See U.S. DEP'T  OF HoUs.  &  URBAN  DEV.  & U.S. DEP'T
OF  THE  TREASURY,  CURBING  PREDATORY  HOME  MORTGAGE  LENDING  17  (2000),  available at
http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html  [hereinafter  HUD-TREASURY
REPORT].  Yet, two observations  can be made: First, the more severe instances  of predatory
lending go far beyond manipulation of contractual design.  Second, the identified  contrac-
tual design  features  are more  ubiquitous  than at least the more  severe  manifestations  of
predatory  lending.  Cf.  Todd J.  Zywicki  & Joseph  D.  Adamson,  The Law  &  Economics of
Subprime Lending, 80 U. COLO, L. REv.  1, 11-20  (2009)  (discussing the relationship  between
predatory lending and  subprime lending).
12  In  some cases,  borrowers  engaged  in outright fraud.  SeeJennifer  E.  Bethel, Allen
Ferrell  & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising  from the 2007-2008 Credit
Crisis 17  (Harvard  Law  & Econ. Discussion  Paper  No. 212; Harvard  Law  Sch.  Program  on
Risk  Regulation  Research  Paper  No.  08-5,  2008),  available  at  http://ssm.com/ab-
stract=1096582  (citing  evidence  of  widespread  fraud  in  the  application  and  appraisal
processes  among early payment default loans).
13  An immediate  response is that lenders priced the increased risk.  And there is some
evidence  of such pricing.  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert,  supra note  1  (manuscript at 5).
But this response  is  misleading.  The evidence  shows  that subprime  risks  were  not accu-
rately priced.  See U.S. SEC.  & ExCH.  COMM'N, SUMMARY  REPORT  OF  ISSUES  IDENTIFIED  IN THE
COMMISSION  STAFF'S  EXAMINATIONS  OF  SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES  34-35  (2008),  avail-
able  at  http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexaminationO70808.pdf  [hereinafter
SEC  RATING  AGENCIES  REPORT]  (finding that rating agencies  underestimated  risks associ-
ated with subprime  mortgage-backed  securities); Bethel et al.,  supra note  12.  Bethel, Fer-
rell, and Hu  argue that even sophisticated market participants had limited experience  with
and understanding  of the assets  (subprime  residential  mortgages)  underlying the  securi-
ties  (RMBSs and CDOs), and what risks these assets generate when pooled and securitized.
In addition, credit-rating models underestimate  the correlation of defaults and thus under-
state risk.  Moreover, major investment banks are under investigation  by the SEC, the FBI,
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prit is securitization-the  process of issuing securities backed  by large
pools of mortgage obligations.  Securitization created a host of agency
problems,  as  a series  of agents-intermediaries  tasked  with  originat-
ing loans, pooling and packaging  them  into mortgage-backed  securi-
ties,  and  assessing  the  risk associated  with  the  different  securities-
stood between  the principals,  the investors who ultimately funded the
mortgage  loans,  and  the  borrowers.  The  compensation  of  these
agents-intermediaries  was  not  designed  to  align  their  interests  with
those of the principals-investors:  their fees were based on the quantity,
not quality, of processed  loans.  As a result, the agents-intermediaries
had strong incentives  to increase  the volume of originations,  even  at
the expense  of originating low-quality,  high-risk loans,  by promoting
mortgage products that, with  high levels of complexity and cost defer-
ral,  created  the  appearance  of affordability.1 4  Moreover,  it  is  likely
and  state  attorneys general  with  respect  to  pricing of RMBSs  and CDOs,  suggesting that
mispricing may be the result of  malice, not only incompetence.  See Bethel et al.,  supra  note
12,  at  2;  see also SEC  RATING  AGENCIES  REPORT,  supra, at  12  (citing an  analyst  from one
rating agency who  wrote  in an e-mail  that "her firm's model  did not capture  'half  of the
deal's risk");  Carrick  Mollenkamp  et al.,  Behind AIG's Fall, Risk  Models Failed to Pass Real-
World Test, WALL  ST. J.,  Nov. 3, 2008,  at Al  (discussing the failure of AIG's  risk models and
quoting Warren  Buffett: "All  I can  say  is,  beware  of geeks  ...  bearing  formulas.").
14  See Scott Woll,  The Buildup to a Fall, MORTGAGE  BANKING,  Nov.  2007,  at 50, 53-54
(describing  how  lenders  and  securitizers  profiting  from  increased  loan  volume  "started
looking at new ideas  [to increase  loan volume]  ....  What followed was  the largest intro-
duction of new products to the mortgage market in decades."); see also  Zywicki  & Adamson,
supra note  11,  at 51-53  (discussing  agency  costs  in  the  subprime  market);  Frederic  S.
Mishkin, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve  Sys., Speech at the U.S. Monetary
Policy  Forum,  New  York,  New  York:  Leveraged  Losses:  Lessons  from  the  Mortgage
Meltdown  (Feb. 29, 2008),  available  at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
mishkin2008O229a.htm  (arguing  that  rating  agencies,  underwriters,  and  CDO  mangers
were  driven  by  fees).  But see Gary B.  Gorton,  The  Subprime Panic 27-31  (Nat'l  Bureau  of
Econ.  Research,  Working  Paper  No.  14398,  2008),  available at http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w14398  (arguing  that agency  costs  were  not that  large,  as  many  agents  along  the
securitization  chain retained  substantial  risks on  their balance sheets).  On the compensa-
tion structure and  incentives of loan  originators,  see  Ben S.  Bernanke,  Chairman, Bd.  of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve  Sys., Testimony Before  the Committee on Financial Services,
U.S. House of Representatives:  Subprime Mortgage  Lending and  Mitigating Foreclosures
(Sept.  20,  2007),  available  at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
bernanke20070920a.htm  (noting that since originators profited from  fees and yield-spread
premiums,  they were  more  interested  in increasing  loan volume  than  in  increasing  loan
quality).  On  the compensation  structure  and incentives  of the  rating agencies  charged
with  assessing  the  risk  associated  with  mortgage-backed  securities,  see  SEC RATING  AcEN-
CES  REPORT,  supra note  13 (finding inadequate  rating procedures  and conflicts of interest,
which led  to underestimation of risk, which  in  turn contributed  to the failure of investors
and investment banks to press originators for safer loans);Jan A. Kregel,  Changes in the U.S.
Financial  System  and the Subprime Crisis 16  (Levy  Econ.  Inst. of  Bard Coll.,  Working  Paper
No. 530, 2008),  available  at http://ssrn.com/abstract=123937  (noting how rating agencies
that provided  more lax assessment of subprime risks got more  business-and more fees-
from securitizers).  These  interinstitutional  agency costs  come on  top of the intrainstitu-
tional  agency  costs  stemming  from  the  imperfect  alignment  of incentives  between  each
one of the financial intermediaries and its employees.  See, e.g.,  Martin Wolf, Why Regulators
Should Intervene in Bankers'Pay,  FIN. TIMES,  Jan.  16,  2008,  at 13  (discussing the  conflicts  ofCORNELL LAW  REVIEW [Vol.  94:1073
that  even  sophisticated  investors  and  financial  intermediaries  were
caught up in the frenzy of the  real  estate boom and underestimated
the  risks  associated  with  the  mortgage  products  that they  were  ped-
dling.'5  The multibillion dollar losses  incurred by these sophisticated
players provide  (at least suggestive)  evidence that imperfect rationality
was not confined  to  the demand  side of the subprime market.' 6
The  proposed  behavioral-economics  theory offers  a  more  com-
plete  account  of the  dynamics  in the  subprime  market  and  of how
these dynamics shaped  the design of subprime loan contracts.  These
contractual design features have substantial welfare implications, espe-
cially when understood as a market response to the imperfect rational-
interest  that exist  within lending  institutions).  Beyond  these  more subtle-albeit finan-
cially substantial-agency  costs, there is evidence that some agents-intermediaries  withheld
information  from  principals-investors.  See Bethel  et al.,  supra note  12,  at  2  (noting  that
investment banks are  under investigation  by the SEC, the  FBI,  and state attorneys  general
for withholding information affecting  credit  risk from rating agencies  and investors).
15  See Bethel et al., supra note  12, at 27  ("The market appears  to have  not fully antici-
pated the  probability or effect of correlated  market events or the very small probability  of
an extremely  negative outcome.");  Martin  S. Feldstein, Housing, Credit Markets and the Busi-
ness Cycle 3-4  (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.  13471,  2007),  available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w3471  (arguing  that investors  underestimated  and mis-
priced  risks);  Gorton, supra note  14,  at 26  (arguing that the  complexity  of the securitiza-
tion process led to a loss of information along the securitization  chain); Joseph R. Mason &
Joshua Rosner,  Where Did The Risk  Go? How Misapplied Bond Ratings Cause Mortgage Backed
Securities and Collateralized  Debt Obligation Market Disruptions 35-36  (SSRN  Working Paper,
2007),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027475  (arguing that  investors  and  invest-
ment banks falsely believed  that pooling mortgages diversifies risk).  Much of this underes-
timation  of risk  harkens  back  to  optimism  about  house  prices.  See,  e.g.,  Thomas  L.
Friedman,  Op-Ed., All Fall Down, N.Y. TIMES,  Nov.  26,  2008,  at A33  (citing Michael  Lewis,
The End of Wall Street's Boom,  PORTFOLIO.COM,  Dec.  2008, http://www.portfolio.com/news-
markets/ national-news/  portfolio/ 2008/11 /11  /The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom  (reporting,
based on a telephone  conversation between hedge fund investor Steve Eisman and a Stan-
dard  & Poor's employee,  that S&P's  models assumed  that home  prices would keep going
up)); Kristopher S.  Gerardi et al., Making Sense of the Subprime Crisis I  (Fed. Reserve  Bank of
Boston,  Public  Policy  Discussion  Paper  No.  09-1,  2008),  available at http://www.bos.frb.
org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdpO9Ol.htm  (finding that  analysts in  2005  understood  the
risks of a steep  decline in house  prices but believed that the probability of such a decline
was very low); see also, e.g.,JuLIO  ROTEMBERG,  SUBPRIME  MELTDOWN:  AMERICAN  HOUSING AND
GLOBAL  FINANCIAL  TURMOIL  1  (2008)  (quoting  a  letter  that Fannie  Mae  CEO  Franklin
Raines  sent  to  shareholders  in  2001:  "Housing  is  a safe,  leveraged  investment-the  only
leveraged investment  available  to most families-and  it is one of the  best returning  invest-
ments to make  ....  Homes will continue  to appreciate  in value.  Home values are expected
to  rise even  faster  in this decade  than  in  the  1990's.").
16  See Bethel et al.,  supra note  12,  at 21,  81  tbl.2  (summarizing the tens of billions of
dollars worth  of subprime-related  write-offs by banks;  citing an estimate of $150  billion  in
writedowns  as of February  2008 and a forecast  that this amount  will more  than  double);
Press Release,  Standard  & Poor's, Subprime  Write-Downs  Could  Reach  $285  Billion,  But
Are Likely  Past The Halfway  Mark  (Mar.  13, 2008),  available at  http://www2.standardand
poors.com/portal/site/sp/en/us/page.article/4,5,5,1,1204834027864.html  (discussing
Standard  & Poor's  increased estimate of writedowns at $285 billion,  up from  $265 billion
earlier  in  the year).  These  losses do not provide  conclusive  evidence  that sophisticated
players made  mistakes;  they could be  the realization  of the large  (!)  down-side  risk in  an
(ex  ante) rational  bet.
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ity  of  borrowers.  First,  excessive  complexity  prevents  effective
comparison  shopping and thus  hinders competition in the subprime
mortgage  market.  Second, deferred-cost  features are correlated  with
increased levels of delinquency and foreclosure, which impose signifi-
cant  costs not only on borrowers  but also on surrounding communi-
ties,  lenders,  loan  purchasers,  and  the  economy  at  large.  Third,
excessively  complex  deferred-cost  contracts  have  adverse  distributive
consequences,  disproportionally  burdening financially weaker-often
minority-borrowers.  Finally, concentrating  a  loan's cost in less  sali-
ent or underappreciated  price dimensions  artificially inflates  the  de-
mand  for  mortgage  financing  and,  indirectly,  for  residential  real
estate.  The  proposed  theory  thus  establishes  a  causal link  between
contractual  design,  on  the  one  hand, and  the  subprime  expansion
and  the  real  estate  boom,  on  the other.  Accordingly,  the subprime
meltdown  that followed  this expansion can also be attributed, at least
in part, to the  identified contractual  design  features. 17
Importantly,  the  identified  contractual  design  features  and  the
welfare  costs associated  with  them are  not the result of the less-than-
vigorous competition in the subprime market.  In fact, enhanced  com-
petition would likely make these design  features even  more pervasive.
If borrowers focus on the short term and discount the long term, then
competition  will force lenders to offer deferred-cost  contracts.  And if
17  See Andrey  Pavlov  &  Susan  Wachter,  Subprme Lending and House Price Volatility  2
(Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law  & Econ., Research  Paper No. 08-33,  2008),  available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1316891  (establishing a link between the use of aggressive mort-
gage  lending instruments  and  house price  volatility).  While  contractual  design  contrib-
uted to  the subprime  expansion,  there are other factors  that  likely played a more  central
role  in generating the subprime expansion.  One such factor is the advent of new technol-
ogy that enabled efficient risk-based  pricing.  See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING  OFFICE,  REPORT TO
THE  CHAIRMAN  AND  RANKING  MINORITY  MEMBER,  SPECIAL  COMMITITEE  ON  AGING,  U.S.  SEN-
ATE,  GAO-04-280,  CONSUMER  PROTECTION:  FEDERAL  AND  STATE  AGENCIES  FACE  CHALLENGES
IN  COMBATING  PREDATORY  LENDING  21  (2004)  [hereinafter  GAO  CONSUMER  PROTECTION
REPORT],  available at www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.  Another  factor  is  the increase
in the supply (or availability)  of funds brought about  by securitization  and the global  sav-
ing glut.  See generally Atif Mian  & Amir Sufi,  The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion:
Evidence  from the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.  Research, Working Pa-
per No.  13936,  2008),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1072304  (arguing that the ex-
pansion in mortgage credit to subprime  zip codes and its dissociation from income growth
is  closely  correlated  with  the  increase  in  securitization  of subprime  mortgages);  Ben  S.
Bernanke, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve  Sys.,  Remarks  at the Sandridge
Lecture,  Virginia Association  of Economics,  Richmond, Virginia:  The  Global  Saving Glut
and  the  U.S.  Current  Account  Deficit  (Mar.  10,  2005),  available at http://www.feder-
alreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/200503102/  (discussing  how  the  global  saving
glut reversed  the  flow of credit to developing  and  emerging-market  economies).  A  third
factor is the increase in supply of funds for risky  investments caused by investors'  underesti-
mation of risk.  See Feldstein,  supra note  15.  It  is important  to  emphasize  that the  main
purpose of this Article  is to explain  the contractual  design  features common  in subprime
mortgages-not  the subprime  expansion  itself-although,  as  argued  above,  contractual
design did contribute  to the subprime  expansion.
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borrowers faced with complex, multidimensional contracts ignore less
salient price  dimensions, then competition will  force lenders  to offer
complex,  multidimensional  contracts and  to shift much of the loan's
cost to  the less salient price dimensions.  Thus, ensuring robust com-
petition  in  the  subprime  mortgage  market  would  not  solve  the
problem. 8
The subprime crisis has spurred a plethora of reform proposals.' 9
One of these proposals has recently matured into law,  as the Federal
Reserve  Board  (FRB),  in July  2008,  issued  a  new  set  of regulations
governing  mortgage  lending.20  The  behavioral-economics  theory de-
veloped  in  this Article  can  be  used  to evaluate  the  existing and pro-
posed  regulatory  solutions  and  to  devise  potentially  superior
solutions.  In  this  Article,  I  focus  on disclosure  regulation.  I  argue
that the centerpiece  of the current disclosure  regime, the Annual Per-
centage  Rate  (APR) disclosure, has the potential to undo the adverse
effects  of imperfect  rationality,  including  the  identified  contractual
design features  and the  welfare  costs they impose.
The  APR  disclosure  was  the  most important  innovation  of the
Truth  in  Lending  Act  (TILA)  of 1968.21  A  normalized  total-cost-of-
credit measure,  the APR was  designed  to assist borrowers in compar-
ing among different loan products.  In theory, the APR should solve-
or at least mitigate-both  the complexity problem and the cost-defer-
ral  problem.  Complexity  and multidimensionality  pose  a problem  if
they hide the true cost of the loan.  The APR responds to this concern
by folding  the multiple  price dimensions  into a single  measure.  The
APR should similarly help  short-sighted  borrowers grasp  the full cost
of deferred-cost loans, as the APR calculation  assigns proper weight to
Is  Cf  Oren  Bar-Gill,  The Behavioral  Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92  MINN.  L. REv.
749,  751  (2008)  [hereinafter Bar-Gill,  Consumer Contracts] (explaining that competition will
not always alleviate mistakes in the consumer-contracts market);  Oren Bar-Gill,  Seduction by
Plastic,  98 Nw.  U. L.  REv.  1373,  1388  (2004)  [hereinafter Bar-Gill,  Seduction]  (arguing that
consumers'  underestimation  of their future  borrowing leads to  inefficiencies "that cannot
be  cured even by  perfect competition");  Oren Bar-Gill  & Elizabeth Warren,  Making Credit
Safer, 157 U.  PA. L.  REv.  1, 69  (2008)  (noting that competition  in the credit markets creates
valuable  products and  features while  also creating  an "array of risky products and  unsafe
features").
19  Mortgage  reform  bills  recently  proposed  in  Congress  include  Emergency  Home
Ownership  and Mortgage  Equity Protection  Act of 2007,  H.R. 3609,  110th  Cong.  (2007);
Home  Owners'  Mortgage  and  Equity Savings Act, S.  2133,  110th  Cong.  (2007);  Helping
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2007, S.  2136,  110th Cong. (2007);  Home
Owners Mortgage  and Equity Savings Act,  H.R. 3778,  110th  Cong.  (2007).
20  See Truth in  Lending,  73  Fed. Reg. 44,522,  44,524-25  (July 30,  2008)  (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226);  see also Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-289,  § 2502(a),  122  Stat. 2654, 2855-57  (to be  codified at 15  U.S.C.  § 1638(b)(2)).
21  Truth  in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321,  § 107, 82 Stat. 146,  149  (1968)  (codified
as amended at 15  U.S.C.  § 1606 (2006))  (defining the APR); Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L.
No.  90-321,  §§  121-31,  82 Stat.  146,  152-57  (1968)  (codified  as  amended  at  15  U.S.C.
§§  1631-49  (2006))  (requiring  disclosure  of the  APR).
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the  long-term  price  dimensions.  Moreover,  since  the  APR-in  the-
ory-strips  away  any  competitive  advantage  of excessive  complexity
and  cost deferral,  lenders will  have  no reason  to  offer loan contracts
with  these  design features.
The  APR can  solve  these  problems,  but only  if it  lives up  to  the
expectations  of the Congress  that enacted  it, namely, if it provides  a
timely, true measure of the total cost of credit and borrowers  rely on it
in choosing among different loan products.  The current APR disclo-
sure does not live up to these  expectations.  First, the APR disclosure
often  comes  too  late to be  useful for comparison  shopping.  Second,
the APR  does  not  measure  the  total  cost  of credit.  Numerous  fees
paid by mortgage borrowers  are excluded from  the regulatory  defini-
tion of a  "finance charge"  and are  thus ignored  in  the APR  calcula-
tion.  Moreover,  the  current  APR  calculation  assumes  that  the
borrower will  hold  the loan for the nominal  loan period,  commonly
thirty  years.  The  actual  duration  of  a  mortgage  loan  is,  however,
much shorter than  thirty years:  closer to five  years on  average  in the
subprime market.  Most borrowers  refinance  and  prepay  (or default)
long before the thirty-year mark.  By ignoring the possibility of prepay-
ment (and default)  the current APR disclosure fails to reflect the true
total cost of the loan.  The distortion  was  especially large during the
recent subprime expansion, when for many loans the prepayment  op-
tion constituted a substantial value component.  When  a borrower ex-
pects  to  prepay  a  deferred-cost  loan  by  the  end  of  the  low-rate
introductory period,  it makes  little sense for this borrower  to rely on
an APR that presumes continued  payments at the high post-introduc-
tory rate.
Since  the APR disclosure  often came  too late and did not reflect
the true  cost of credit, borrowers  stopped relying on the APR as  the
main  tool  for comparison  shopping  among  loan  products.  As  the
APR  lost the  trust of borrowers,  it also  lost the  ability to  serve  as  an
effective  antidote  to  imperfect  rationality.  Recent  reforms  and  ex-
isting reform  proposals address  some of the shortcomings  of the APR
disclosure.  The  timing-of-disclosure  problem was  addressed and par-
tially solved  by the FRB's  new mortgage  regulations22 and by the  re-
cently  enacted  Housing  and  Economic  Recovery Act. 23  I  commend
these reforms but argue that more should be done.  Elizabeth Renuart
and Diane  Thompson  recently addressed  the  problem of an  insuffi-
ciently  inclusive  APR.  They  advocate-in  the  most recent and  most
22  See Truth in  Lending, 73  Fed. Reg.  at 44,524  ("The final  rule requires creditors  to
provide transaction-specific  mortgage  loan disclosures such  as the APR and payment sched-
ule for all home-secured,  closed-end loans  no later than three  business days  after applica-
tion, and before the consumer  pays any fee except  a reasonable  fee for the  review of the
consumer's credit  history.").
23  See Housing  and Economic  Recovery Act of 2008  § 2502(a).
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comprehensive  proposal  to  create  a more  inclusive  APR-a broader
definition  of  a  "finance  charge,"  one  that  that would  cover  all,  or
most,  of the  costs  paid  by  borrowers.2 4  The  analysis  in this  Article
supports  the spirit of the  Renuart-Thompson  proposal while  simulta-
neously  recognizing  that  a  comprehensive  cost-benefit  analysis  may
justify keeping certain  price dimensions  outside  the scope  of the  "fi-
nance  charge" definition.
Recent reforms and existing reform proposals do not address the
exclusion  of the prepayment option (nor the default option) from the
APR definition.  I explain  how the APR calculation would  have  to be
adjusted  to  incorporate  the  prepayment  option.  I  acknowledge  the
costs  of making  these  adjustments,  and  I urge  policymakers  to  care-
fully weigh  these costs against the potentially substantial benefits of an
APR that accounts  for the  prepayment option.  If borrowers  ignored
the traditional  APR  figure  because  it excluded  the  prepayment  op-
tion, they should embrace an APR that incorporates that option.  And,
as the APR reclaims  its  rightful position at the forefront  of the  mort-
gage disclosure regime, borrowers, and society, will again benefit from
the  APR's  unique  ability  to  undo  the  adverse  effects  of imperfect
rationality.
While  this  Article  focuses  on  the  subprime  mortgage  market,
much of the analysis applies with equal force to the other segments  of
the residential  mortgage  market-the Alt-A segment and  even  to the
prime segment.  There,  too,  highly complex, deferred-cost  contracts
began  to  appear  in  increasing  numbers,  alongside  the  traditional
FRM.  In  fact, the  most extreme  forms of cost deferral-the  interest-
only and payment-option  mortgages-were  more common  in the Alt-
A and prime  segments.  Moreover,  it was  in the Alt-A and prime seg-
ments where  introductory  rates were  substantially  below  the fully-in-
dexed market rate.25  While  the crisis began with subprime, it did not
end  there.  Defaults  and  foreclosures  are  also  already  appearing  in
substantial numbers  in the Alt-A  and even prime  markets.26
24  See Elizabeth Renuart & Diane E. Thompson,  The Truth, The Whole Truth, and Noth-
ing but  the Truth: Fulfilling the Promise of Truth in Lending, 25 YALE  J. ON  REG.  181  (2008).
Renuart and Thompson,  however, are not the first  to recognize  that the APR is not suffi-
ciently inclusive, nor are they the first to propose a more inclusive APR.  See HUD-TREASuRy
REPORT,  supra note 11, at 69  (proposing that the law be amended  "to require that the full
costs of credit be  included  in  the  APR");  William  N.  Eskridge, Jr.,  One Hundred Years  of
Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological  Dynamics
of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA.  L.  REv.  1083,  1166  (1984)  (proposing, over
twenty  years  ago, a more  inclusive  APR).
25  See CHRISTOPHER  L.  CAGAN,  FiRsT Am.  CORELOGIC,  INC.,  MORTGAGE  PAYMENT  RESET:
THE  ISSUE  AND  THE  IMPACT  2  (2007).
26  See Stan J. Liebowitz,  Anatomy  of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage Meltdown,  in
INDEP.  INST.,  HOUSING AMERICA:  BUILDING  OUT OF  A  CRISIS  (Randall  G. Holcombe  & Benja-
min  Powell  eds.,  forthcoming July  2009),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1211822
(explaining that ARM  defaults and foreclosures  are as prevalent in the prime market as  in
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This  Article  proceeds  as  follows.  Part  I  provides  some  back-
ground on the subprime mortgage  market.  Part II describes  the cen-
tral design features of subprime mortgage contracts.  Part III evaluates
the rational-choice  explanations for  the identified  contractual  design
features, emphasizing the limits of these rational-choice  theories.  Part
IV develops  an alternative,  behavioral-economics  theory that fills  the
explanatory gap left by the rational-choice  accounts.  Part V describes
the welfare  costs of the identified contractual  design features.  Part VI
considers  policy implications.
I
THE SUBPRIME  MORTGAGE  MARKET
A.  Defining  Subprime
What is a subprime mortgage?  In theory, subprime loans are sold
to riskier borrowers. 2 7  While low-risk borrowers get low price-specif-
ically,  low-interest-rate  prime  loans-high-risk  borrowers  get  high
price-specifically,  high-interest-rate  subprime loans. 28  But this defi-
nition  establishes  a  misleading  dichotomy.  The  risk  associated  with
different borrowers  varies  along a continuum, and, accordingly, loan
prices  vary along a continuum.  Still,  it is helpful  to focus on  a subset
of high-risk, high-price loans, even if the line that divides this category
of loans from the neighboring, lower-risk, lower-price category is both
arbitrary and  blurry.  The  mortgage  industry itself follows  this rough
categorization.  And  so  do  policymakers.  The  recent  credit  crisis  is
dubbed  the subprime  mortgage  crisis, and  legislators  and  regulators
are working to fix  the problems in  the subprime  market.
While the boundaries  of the subprime segment are arbitrary and
blurry,  the  industry,  researchers,  and  regulators  have  been  using
more-  or  less-common  definitions  of subprime.  According  to  one
rough  division,  borrowers  with  FICO scores-a  common  measure  of
creditworthiness-below  620  are  considered  subprime  borrowers.29
the subprime market);  Gorton, supra note 14, at 21  ("Problems  in  the Alt-A market are still
mostly in  the future,  and it is  likely that  this market will  also shut down.").
27  1 say "in  theory" since  many low-risk  borrowers  end  up with  high-price  subprime
loans.  See infra Part III.A.
28  An  important legal antecedent  to the subprime  market was  the Depository  Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control  Act of 1980 that "preempted state  interest caps
and allowed  lenders  to charge  higher  interest rates."  See Zywicki  & Adamson, supra note
11,  at 6.
29  See, e.g.,  Iw L. ZELMAN  ET  AL.,  CREDIT SUISSE,  MORTGAGE  LIQUIDITY DUJOUR:  UNDER-
ESTIMATED  No  MORE  13  (2007)  [hereinafter  CREDIT  SUISSE  REPORT]  (noting  that prime
conforming conventional  loans are  "typically  limited to  buyers  with  [FICO]  scores  above
620");  Kristopher  Gerardi,  Adam  Hale Shapiro  & Paul  S.  Willen,  Subprime Outcomes: Risky
Mortgages, Homeownership Experiences, and Foreclosures  5  (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston, Work-
ing  Paper  No.  07-15,  2007),  available at http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/wp/wp2007/
wp0715.htm  ("In  the United States,  a subprime  borrower  today typically refers  to  an indi-
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Of course, a borrower's FICO score is only one of several factors deter-
mining risk level.  Thus, industry participants consider additional risk
factors, such as the loan-to-value  ratio, when classifying  a loan as sub-
prime. 3 0  Moving  from  risk  factors  to  price,  a  common  subprime
threshold  is a loan APR that is three points  (or more)  above the trea-
sury rate for a security of the same maturity; the three-point threshold
defines  "higher-priced  loans" under the  Home  Mortgage  Disclosure
Act  (HMDA) .3   In  its  new  subprime  mortgage  regulations  the  FRB
adopted  a  slightly  different  definition  of  "higher-priced  mortgage
loans,"  setting  the  threshold  APR  at  1.5  points  above  the  "average
prime  offer rate."
32
B.  Subprime  Mortgage  Loans: The Numbers
The subprime  mortgage market  has grown  substantially  over the
past few years  (an increase  ending in  2006).  In 2001,  about 985,000
first-lien  subprime  loans were  originated,  while  in  2006  that number
was approximately 2,780,000  and represented over 20 percent of total
loan-origination  volume.33  According  to  the  Congressional  Budget
vidual  with  a  FICO  score below  620, who  has become  delinquent on  some  form of debt
repayment in the previous 12 to 24 months, or who has even filed for bankruptcy in the last
few years.").
30  CREDIT  SUISSE  REPORT,  supra  note  29,  at 21.  In 2006,  the average  FICO  score of a
borrower on a first-lien  subprime loan was 618.1.  See Demyanyk & Van  Hemert, supra note
1  (manuscript at 7 tbl.1).  These data reflect the  trend of making subprime  loans  to high-
FICO-score  borrowers who  exhibit risk factors other than  an impaired credit history, such
as  borrowers who do not wish  to produce  a down payment  ("zero-down borrowers"),  bor-
rowers  who do not wish to fully disclose  their income  and financial  wealth  ("no-doc" and
"low-doc borrowers"),  and  borrowers seeking  a  high  LTV  loan.  See  Gerardi  et al.,  supra
note 29, at 6-7.
31  See Michael  LaCour-Little,  Economic Factors  Affecting Home Mortgage  Disclosure  Act Re-
porting, 29 J.  REAL  EST.  REs.  479,  506  n.3  (2007).
32  Truth  in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,531-32  (July 30,  2008)  (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 226)  (stating that "[t]he definition of 'higher-priced  mortgage loans'  appears
in  § 226.35(a)"  and  that  the  average  prime  offer  rate  is  derived  from  the Freddie  Mac
Primary  Mortgage  Market  Survey ®).
33  See Demyanyk  &  Van  Hemert,  supra note  1.  The  authors'  data  include  452,000
loans  in 2001  and 1,772,000  loans  in  2006.  Id. (manuscript at 7 tbl.1).  These  data cover
approximately 85 percent of securitized subprime loans.  Id. (manuscript at 6).  In 2001,  54
percent of subprime  loans were  securitized,  implying a  total of 452,000  /  (0.85  * 0.54)  =
984,749.  See id. (manuscript at 6 n.6).  In 2006,  75  percent of subprime loans were securi-
tized, implying a total of 1,772,000  /  (0.85  * 0.75)  = 2,779,608).  See id.; see also CBO OUT-
LOOK,  supra note  2, at 23-24  ("The number  of subprime mortgages  has grown  rapidly in
recent years:  In 2005 and  2006, such loans made  up about  one-fifth of all originations of
home mortgages  (in dollar terms)  ...  ."); Zywicki  & Adamson,  supra note 11,  at 20  (noting
that subprime mortgage  originations increased  from $65 billion  in 1995  to $332 billion in
2003);  Christopher J. Mayer,  Karen  M.  Pence  & Shane  M.  Sherlund,  The Rise in Mortgage
Defaults 3  (Bd. of Governors of the  Fed. Reserve  Sys.,  Fin. & Econ.  Discussion  Series Paper
No.  2008-59,  2008)  (recording  LP  data  showing a rise  in subprime originations  from  1.1
million in 2003  to 1.9 million  in 2005); CRL Snapshot, supra  note  1 (noting  that subprime
originations  accounted  for  28  percent  of  total  loan  volume  in  2006).  Focusing  on
purchase loans, subprime  originations have also grown  substantially.  See CREDIT  SUISSE  RE-
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Office  (CBO),  subprime  mortgages  "accounted for about  13 percent
of all  home  mortgages  at the  end of  [2006]."34  The Alt-A  market-
covering  "medium risk" loans between subprime and prime-also ex-
perienced significant growth, expanding from 2 percent of total origi-
nations  in 2003  to  13  percent of originations in  2006.
35
The average size of a subprime loan has also increased.  In 2006,
the average  size  of a first-lien  subprime  loan  was  $212,000,  up from
$126,000  in  2001.36 In terms of loan purpose, in 2006, 42.4 percent of
first-lien  subprime loans were purchase  loans, and 57.6 percent were
refinance  loans.37  The  average  subprime  borrower had  a debt-to-in-
come ratio of approximately 40 percent and a FICO score of 618.1.38
The median subprime borrower had a FICO score of 620.39  The me-
dian Alt-A borrower  had a FICO score of 705.40
C.  Market Structure
1.  Participants
Traditionally, a single entity, commonly the neighborhood bank,
was  the only party, other than the borrower, in the mortgage  transac-
tion.  This bank would  originate  the  loan, provide  the funds for the
loan, and service  the loan.  In  the modern mortgage  market, the dif-
ferent  roles-origination,  financing,  and  servicing-are  often  per-
PORT,  supra note 29,  at 4  (noting that the share of subprime purchase  loans grew  to ap-
proximately 20 percent in 2006); Mayer et al.,  supra,  at 6  ("  [P] urchase loans (as opposed to
refinance  loans)  rose from  30  to 42  percent as a share of subprime  originations over  the
2003-2006  period  .... ").
34  CBO  OUTLOOK,  supra note  2,  at  24.
35  Truth  in Lending,  73  Fed. Reg. at 44,533;  see also Mayer  et al.,  supra note  33, at 3
(explaining that "Alt-A originations grew ...  from 304,000 in 2003 to 1.1  million in 2005").
36  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert, supra note  1  (manuscript at 7  tbl.  1).
37  See id. Of the 57.6 percent of refinance  loans in 2006, 51.4 percent were refinance/
cash-out loans,  and 6.2 percent were  refinance/no-cash-out loans.  Id. At the peak of the
subprime  expansion, in 2004,  only 35.8 percent of first-lien subprime  loans were purchase
loans, and 64.2 percent were refinance loans.  See id. (including both cash-out and no-cash-
out loans  in  the  refinance  percentage);  see also MICHAEL  FRATANTONI  ET  AL.,  MORTGAGE
BANKERS  ASS'N,  THE  RESIDENTIAL  MORTGAGE  MARKET AND  ITS  ECONOMIC  CONTEXT  IN  2007,
at 24  (MBA  Research  Monograph  Series,  2007)  (showing  subprime  originations  by loan
purpose and type); LaCour-Little,  supra note 31,  at 498  (noting that a little  more than half
of the  loans  in  2004-2005  were  refinancing  loans).  See generally Yan Chang  & Frank  E.
Nothaft, Demystifying the Refi-Share Mystery,  29 J. REAL  EST. REs.  511  (2007).  The importance
of this distinction is highlighted  by the finding that the average  number of mortgages per
borrower, per property  is  close to three.  See Gerardi et al.,  supra note  29, at 4-5,  14  (em-
phasizing  the importance of distinguishing subprime  loans made for initial purchase  from
subprime  refinances of existing mortgages and finding that "the average number of mort-
gages over the life  of completed  homeownerships  is  2.7").
38  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert, supra note  1  (manuscript at 7  tbl.1).
39  See Mayer  et al.,  supra note 33,  at 6.
40  Id.
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formed  by  different  entities.4'  I  focus  on  the  parties  involved  in
origination and financing since  they exert  the most influence  on  the
design of the mortgage  contract.42
In  the subprime  (and Alt-A)  market, mortgages were  originated
mainly  by depository institutions-that  is,  banks or bank subsidiaries
and affiliates-and  by  mortgage  companies,43  with  the  bulk of loan
volume  originated  by  mortgage  companies. 44  Another  important
group of participants  in  the mortgage  origination process  is the bro-
kers:  "Mortgage  brokers  act  as  intermediaries  between  lenders  and
borrowers, and for a fee, help connect borrowers with various lenders
that may provide  a wider selection of mortgage products. '45  In 2006,
brokerages accounted for  58 percent of total  origination activity.46
Traditionally, depository institutions originated loans and funded
them  with  the  deposits  they  held.  During  the  subprime  expansion,
origination volume  shifted  to mortgage  companies  with  no indepen-
dent means to fund the originated loans.  These mortgage companies,
and increasingly  also  depository institutions,  sold the  loans that they
originated  to  Wall  Street  investment  banks  that  pooled  the  loans,
41  See Paulson, supra note 2  ("A mortgage loan is likely to be originated, serviced, and
owned  by  three  different entities.  Originators  often  sell  mortgages  to  securitizers  who
package them into mortgage-backed securities, which are then  divided and sold again  to a
global network of investors.").
42  On the role of servicers, see,  for example,  Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportu-
nism  by Mortgage Servicers, 15  HOUSING  POL'Y  DEBATE  753,  755  (2007).
43  U.S. GOV'T  ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE,  REPORT  TO  THE  CHAIRMAN,  SUBCOMMITTEE  ON
HOUSING  AND  TRANSPORTATION,  COMMITTEE  ON  BANKING,  HOUSING,  AND  URBAN  AFFAIRS,
U.S.  SENATE,  GAO-06-1021,  ALTERNATIVE  MORTGAGE  PRODUCTS:  IMPACT  ON  DEFAULTS  RE-
MAINS  UNCLEAR,  BUT  DISCLOSURE  OF  RISKS  TO  BORROWERS  COULD  BE  IMPROVED  7  (2006)
[hereinafter  GAO  AMP  REPORT]  ("Borrowers  arrange  residential  mortgages  through  ei-
ther mortgage lenders or brokers.  The funding for mortgages can come from federally or
state- chartered banks, mortgage  lending subsidiaries  of these banks or financial  holding
companies,  or independent  mortgage  lenders, which  are neither  banks  nor  affiliates  of
banks.").  Indirect originations also played an important role.  See LaCour-Little, supra note
31,  at 498 ("A little less than one-third of all loans were originated through indirect, whole-
sale  channels, which  include  mortgage  brokers,  certain  correspondent  lending  relation-
ships, builder programs  and the  like.").
44  Robert B.  Avery, Kenneth  P. Brevoort & Glenn  B. Canner, Opportunities  and Issues in
Using HMDA Data, 29 J.  REAL  EST.  RES.  351,  353  (2007)  ("Depository  institutions account
for the bulk of the reporting institutions, but mortgage  companies report  the majority of
the applications and loans.  In 2005, for example,  nearly 80% of the 8,850 reporting insti-
tutions were depository institutions but together they reported only 37%  of all the lending-
related activity.  Mortgage  companies accounted for 63%  of all  the reported lending; 70%
of  these  institutions  were  independent  and  not  related  in  any  way  to  a  depository
institution.").
45  GAO AMP  REPORT, supra note 43.  Brokers also play a more direct role via indirect
originations.  See LaCour-Little,  supra note  31,  at 498.
46  Press Release,  Access Mortgage  Research  & Consulting, Inc., New Broker Research
Published  (Aug. 17,  2007),  available at http://accessmtgresearch.com/?p=40  ("[T] he aver-
age firm produced  $32.4  million  (151  loans)  .. .conforming loans accounted for 48%  of
brokers'  production  volume;  the  most used  wholesalers  were  Countrywide  (for  conven-
tional  loans)  and New Century  (for subprime  loans)  . . ").
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carved  up  the  expected  cash  flows,  and  converted  these  cash  flows
into bonds  that were secured  by the mortgages. 47  At the peak of the
subprime expansion, most mortgages were financed  through this pro-
cess of securitization.48  As a result, the  "owners" of the loans are  the
investors  who purchased  shares in  these  Mortgage  (or Asset)  Backed
Securities  (MBSs  or ABSs).
The  loan  originators  have  direct control  over the  design of the
mortgage  contract.  The investment banks and their clients also influ-
ence the design of mortgage contracts, as the demand for MBSs-and
thus the price that the investment banks are willing to pay the origina-
tors for the loans-depends  on  the contractual  design.
2.  Competition
The  degree  of competition  in a  market can  affect  the design  of
the products and contracts sold  in this market.  The loan origination
market  appears, at first blush,  to be  fairly  competitive.  In  2006,  the
top fifteen  subprime lenders divided  among themselves  80.5 percent
of the market, with no lender holding more than a 13 percent share.49
The Department of Housing and Urban Development's  (HUD)  list of
lenders  that specialize  in subprime  lending  named  210 lenders  (al-
though  not all  of these  lenders  offer loans nationally).50  Barriers  to
47  See,  e.g.,  Kathleen  C.  Engel  &  Patricia  A.  McCoy,  Turning a Blind Eye:  Wall Street
Finance of Predatory  Lending, 75  FORDHAM  L.  REV.  2039,  2045  (2007).
48  See CREDIT  SUISSE  REPORT,  supra note  29, at  11  (finding  75  percent securitization
rate); Demyanyk  & Van Hemert,  supra note  1  (manuscript at 6 n.6)  (reporting securitiza-
tion rates of 76 percent and 75 percent in 2005 and 2006, respectively).  For a good exposi-
tion on securitization, see Engel  & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2045-48.  See generally Bethel  et
al.,  supra note  12.
49  See CREDIT SUISSE REPORT, supra note 29, at 22 (noting that the market shares of the
top subprime lenders in 2006 were: Wells Fargo  13.0%,  HSBC Finance 8.3%, New Century
8.1%,  Countrywide  Financial  6.3%,  CitiMortgage  5.9%,  WrMC  Mortgage  5.2%,  Fremont
Investment 5.0%,  Ameriquest  4.6%,  Option One  4.5%,  First  Franklin  4.3%,  Washington
Mutual  4.2%,  Residential Funding  3.4%,  Aegis Mortgage  2.7%,  American  General  2.4%,
Accredited  Lenders 2.3%, and that the top fifteen  lenders commanded 80.5%  of the mar-
ket).  Similar numbers are reported by other sources.  See,  e.g.,  2  MARKET SHARE  REPORTER:
AN ANNUAL  COMPILATION  OF  REPORTED  MARKET  SHARE  DATA  ON COMPANIES,  PRODUCTS,  AND
SERVICES:  2008,  at 704-05  (Robert S.  Lazich,  ed., 2008)  (reporting  that the top ten lenders
commanded  less  than 58.8  percent of the market with  no  single lender  controlling more
than  8.3 percent of the  market,  based on  a conservative  combination of the  two  sources
cited in Market Share Reporter).  The 2005 figures are similar.  See 2 MARKET  SHARE  REPORTER:
AN  ANNUAL  COMPILATION  OF REPORTED  MARKET  SHARE  DATA  ON  COMPANIES, PRODUCTS,  AND
SERVICES:  2007,  at 719  (Robert  S.  Lazich  ed.,  2007)  (reporting  that the  top  ten  lenders
commanded  less  than  51  percent  of the  market  with  no  single  lender  controlling more
than  9 percent of the market).  These  numbers represent the  outcome of a consolidation
process.
50  See Randall  M.  Scheessele,  HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List, HUD
USER,  Mar.  16,  2007,  http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html  (describing  the  2005
list).  Many other lenders, while  not specializing  in subprime lending, also offer subprime
loans.  See Avery et al.,  supra note 44, at 353 (noting that there were 8,850 Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act  (HMDA)  reporting institutions  in 2005).
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entry in this industry have been substantially reduced with the growth
in  securitization,  which  enables  entry  by  new, small  lenders. 5'  The
internet  has  enhanced  competition  by  reducing  shopping  costs. 52
The  FRB, at least, characterized  this market as competitive. 53
Nevertheless,  because  many consumers  engage  in  limited shop-
ping, several  observers  have  expressed  concerns  about  the  level  of
competition  in the subprime  market.54  The increasing complexity of
mortgage  products renders  comparison  shopping more  difficult and
limits  the efficacy  of the shopping  that does occur.55  In fact, limited
shopping  may be a  rational response  to its reduced efficacy.  The  re-
sult  is  imperfect  information  and  imperfect  competition.56  HUD's
proposed  amendments  to  its  Real  Estate  Settlement Procedures  Act
(RESPA)  regulations  are motivated  by the  need  to enhance  competi-
tion  in  the  mortgage  market.57  And  two  recent studies-one  by the
Government Accountability Office  (GAO)  and another by the Federal
Trade  Commission  (FTC)  and  the  Department  of Justice  (DOJ)-
have  expressed  concerns  about  the  level  of competition  in  the  real
51  See Engel  &  McCoy,  supra note  47,  at  2041  ("[S]ecuritization  funds  small,  thinly
capitalized lenders and brokers,  thus enabling them to enter the subprime market.  These
originators are more  prone to commit loan  abuses because  they are less heavily regulated,
have reduced  reputational  risk, and operate  with low capital, helping  to make them judg-
ment-proof.").
52  See,  e.g.,  LendingTree.com,  Lender  Ratings,  http://www.lendingtree.com/stm3/
lenders/scorecard.asp  (last visited  Mar.  10,  2009)  (listing  over 250 affiliated  lenders).  Al-
though clearly not  all of these lenders offer  subprime  loans, and those who  do might not
offer loans  nationally.
51  Truth  in Lending,  73 Fed.  Reg. 1672,  1674  (proposed Jan. 9, 2008)  (to be codified
at  12  C.F.R.  pt.  226)  ("Underwriting  standards  loosened  in  large  parts  of the mortgage
market in  recent years  as lenders-particularly nondepository  institutions, many of which
have since  ceased  to exist-competed  more aggressively  for market share.").
54  See,  e.g., MarshaJ. Courchane,  Brian J. Surette & Peter M.  Zorn,  Subprime Borrowers:
Mortgage Transitions and Outcomes, 29 J.  RiAL  EsT.  FIN.  & ECON.  365, 371-72  (2004)  (find-
ing, based on  a survey study, that subprime  borrowers search  less and are less informed).
55  See Willis,  supra note 4, at 726-27.  The limits of advertising in the subprime market
further  increase  the  cost of  comparison  shopping.  See Truth  in  Lending,  73  Fed.  Reg.
44,522,  44,524  (July 30,  2008)  (to  be codified at 12  C.F.R. pt. 226)  ("[Plrice  information
for the subprime  market  is  not widely  and  readily available  to  consumers.  A consumer
reading a newspaper,  telephoning brokers  or lenders, or searching the Internet can  easily
obtain  current prime interest rate quotes for free.  In contrast, subprime rates,  which  can
vary significantly based on the individual borrower's  risk profile,  are not broadly advertised
and are usually  obtainable only after application  and paying  a fee.").
56  See  Eskridge,  supra note  24,  passim  (stating  that  imperfect  information,  largely
driven  by  limited  shopping,  has  lead  to  monopolistic  competition,  rather  than  perfect
competition); Willis,  supra  note 4,  at 749 (arguing that lack of sufficient disclosure and low
levels of financial  literacy among borrowers make shopping extremely difficult).
57  See Real Estate Settlement  Procedures Act  (RESPA):  Rule  to Simplify and Improve
the Process of Obtaining Mortgages  and Reduce  Consumer Settlement Costs,  73 Fed. Reg.
68,204,  68,207  (Nov.  17,  2008)  (to  be  codified  at 24  C.F.R.  pts.  203,  3500)  (describing
"important changes  that should increase consumer  understanding and competition  in the
mortgage  marketplace").
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estate brokerage  industry, which,  as explained above,  plays an impor-
tant role  in  the  loan origination process. 5 8
As  noted above,  contractual  design  is  not determined  solely  by
the loan  originator, and  thus, competition,  or  lack thereof, in  other
markets  may have  played  an important  role.  In particular,  securitiza-
tion enhanced competition  in  the loan-origination  market but simul-
taneously transferred  some control over contractual  design away from
the originators and into  the hands of securitizers.  The securitization
market appears  to have  been relatively  competitive.  In  2007, the  top
ten securitizers-Lehman  Brothers, Bear Stearns,  Morgan Stanley, JP
Morgan,  Credit  Suisse,  Bank  of America  Securities,  Deutsche  Bank,
Royal  Bank of Scotland  Group,  Merrill  Lynch, and Goldman Sachs-
controlled 73.4 percent of the market, with no single bank controlling
more than  10.8 percent of the market.59
D.  Regulatory  Scheme
The  regulatory  authority  over  mortgage  lending  is  divided  be-
tween  the federal and state levels and among several regulators at the
58  See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY  OFFICE,  REPORT  TO  THE COMMITTEE  ON  Fi-
NANCIAL  SERVICES,  HOUSE  OF REPRESENTATIVES,  GAO-05-947,  REAL  ESTATE  BROKERAGE:  FAC-
TORS  THAT  MAY  AFFECT  PRICE  COMPETITION  (2005);  U.S. DEP'T  OF JUSTICE  &  FED.  TRADE
COMM'N,  COMPETITION IN THE REAL  ESTATE  BROKERAGE  INDUSTRY:  A REPORT  BY THE  FEDERAL
TRADE  COMMISSION  AND  THE  U.S.  DEPARTMENT  OFJUSTICE (2007),  available  at www.ftc.gov/
reports/realestate/V050015.pdf  [Hereinafter  DOJ  &  FTC  REPORT].  There  are  about
98,000 brokerage  firms;  they employ around  2.5  million  real  estate  licensees.  See DOJ  &
FTC  REPORT,  supra, at  31.  Of these  firms,  60  percent  have  fewer  than  five  agents and
operate  locally,  and only  about  5  percent  have  more  than  fifty  agents.  See  id.  Indeed,
competition among brokers  is primarily  local;  on the  national  level  in  2004,  the top  ten
firms accounted for only 9.1 percent of the market share, while at the local level,  top firms
often  control  much  larger market  shares.  See  id.  For example,  in  Des  Moines,  Iowa,  a
single  firm accounts  for over half of all  residential  real  estate transactions.  Id. at 31-32.
The  primary  barrier  to  entry in  the  brokerage  market is  the  licensing process  (which  is
more stringent for brokers than  it is for agents).  Id. at 33.  Competition  is, however, lim-
ited by cooperative  participation  in  multiple listings services  (MLS)  that are  typically oper-
ated  by  local  groups  affiliated  with  the  National  Association  of Realtors.  See  id. at  10.
Access  to the  MLS  is  limited  to members, who  use the database  to list homes  for sale  on
behalf of sellers and to  search for  homes on  behalf of buyers.  Id. While  the  MLS limits
both access and competition, it also reduces costs for brokers and customers.  Id. at 12-14.
Competition is also limited by state law.  Ten states ban  rebates, which are  often a key tool
in price competition.  Id. at 49.  Several states  also have  minimum-service  laws, which limit
the extent to which brokers  can compete  by offering  a range of service  packages.  Id. at 53.
Lastly,  competition  is  restricted  by  licensing requirements  on  for-sale-by-owner  websites.
Id  at 62.  For further discussion, see Eskridge, supra  note 24, at 1148-49; Matthew Magura,
How Rebate Bans, Discriminatory  MILS  Listing Policies, and Minimum Service Requirements Can
Reduce Price Competition for Real Estate Brokerage Services and  Why  It Matters (U.S. Dep't  of
Justice  Econ.  Analysis  Group,  Discussion  Paper  No.  07-8,  2007),  available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=997137.
59  See Bethel  et al.,  supra note  12,  at 81  tbl.  2.
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federal level. 60  Federal banking agencies-the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB),  the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency  (OCC),  the Of-
fice  of Thrift Supervision  (OTS),  the Federal Deposit Insurance  Cor-
poration  (FDIC),  and  the  National  Credit  Union  Administration
(NCUA)-regulate  depository institutions.  The Federal  Trade  Com-
mission  Improvements Act of 1980 authorized  the Federal Reserve  to
identify  unfair  or  deceptive  acts  or  practices  by  banks and  to  issue
regulations prohibiting them.61  Moreover,  the federal  banking agen-
cies can use § 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prevent unfair
or deceptive acts or practices under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, whether or not there  is an FRB regulation  defining the par-
ticular  act  or  practice  as  unfair  or  deceptive. 62  Focusing  on  high-
priced mortgage loans-that is, loans with an APR that is three points
(or more)  above the treasury rate for a security of the same maturity-
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)  grants the
FRB  broad  powers  to  police  unfair  or deceptive  lending practices.63
The FRB also promulgates disclosure  regulations under TILA.64  Addi-
tional disclosure regulations  are promulgated by HUD under RESPA,
which  governs  the loan-closing  process.65
Nondepository  institutions-that  is,  nonbanks,  including  mort-
gage  companies, brokers,  and advertisers-fall  under the jurisdiction
of the FTC.  The FTC described  its  own authority  as follows:
The FTC enforces a number of federal  laws governing home equity
lending, including  [TILA]  and  [HOEPA],  which amended TILA to
address  certain  practices  for  high-cost  home  equity  loans.  The
Commission  also  enforces Section 5 of the Federal Trade  Commis-
sion  Act  ("FTC  Act"),  which  more  generally  prohibits  unfair  and
deceptive  acts  and  practices  in the marketplace.66
60  William  Eskridge  ably summarizes  the  history of mortgage  lending regulation  in
the U.S.  See Eskridge,  supra note  24.
61  15  U.S.C.  §§  57b-1  to  -4  (2006).
62  See Comptroller  of the Currency,  Administrator  of National  Banks, Guidance  on
Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, Advisory Letter No. AL 2002-3  (Mar. 22, 2002),  avail-
able  at  http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/advisory/2002-3.doc;  see  also Julie  L.  Williams  &
Michael  S.  Bylsma,  On the Same Page: Federal Banking Agency  Enforcement of the FTC Act  to
Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices  by  Banks, 58  Bus.  LAw.  1243,  1244  (2003).
63  See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg.  44,522, 44,527  (July 30, 2008)  (to be codified at
12  C.F.R. pt. 226); Raphael  W. Bostic et al.,  State and Local Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: The
Effect of Legal Enforcement Mechanisms, 60J. EcoN. & Bus. 47,  49  (2008); Willis, supra note 4,
at 744-54.
64  See,  e.g., sources  cited supra note 21.
65  See Real Estate Settlement  Procedures Act (RESPA): Rule  to Simplify and  Improve
the Process of Obtaining Mortgages and Reduce  Consumer Settlement Costs,  73 Fed. Reg.
68,204  (Nov.  17,  2008)  (to be  codified at 24  C.F.R. pts. 203,  3500).  RESPA applies  to all
"federally related  mortgage  loans," a somewhat broader category  than  loans originated by
depository institutions.  24 C.F.R.  § 3500.5(a)  (2008).
66  Letter  from Donald  S. Clark, Sec'y,  U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n,  to Jennifer L.John-
son, Sec'y, Bd. of Governors  of the Fed. Reserve Sys.  1 (Sept. 14, 2006),  available  at http://
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At the state  level, mini-FTC statutes prohibit unfair and deceptive
acts and  practices.  Likewise,  mini-HOEPA  statutes,  as  well  as  other
statutes,  ban or restrict specific  practices,  such  as  prepayment  penal-
ties  and balloon clauses.67  There  is substantial  variation in  the scope
and enforcement  of state-level  laws. 68  Because some states  clearly go
further  than  federal  regulators  in  their  attempts  to  protect  borrow-
ers,69  there  have  been heated  preemption  battles,  especially with  the
OCC  and other federal  banking agencies.  State law  is being  increas-
ingly preempted  by federal  law.70
E.  Summary
The  subprime  mortgage  market  experienced  significant  growth
between  2000  and  2006.  This  rapid growth stopped  in  2006,  and in
2007,  when  the  subprime  crisis  erupted,  the  market  basically  shut
www.federalreserve.gov/SECRS/2006/November/20061121/OP-1  253/OP-1 253_53_1.pdf
[hereinafter FTC Comment]  (commenting on  the  FRB's hearing  notice, published  in the
Federal  Register,  regarding the Home  Equity  Lending Market).
67  See  Bostic  et  al.,  supra note  63  (describing  the  mini-HOEPA  statutes  and  older
anti-predatory  lending  laws  restricting  the  use  of  prepayment  penalties  and  balloon
clauses).
68  See id.; Anthony  Pennington-Cross  & Giang Ho,  The Termination of Subprime Hybrid
and Fixed Rate Mortgages  8-9  (Fed. Reserve  Bank of St. Louis, Research  Div., Working Paper
No.  2006-042A,  2006),  available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2006/2006-042.pdf,
Ctr. for Responsible  Lending, CRL  State Legislative Scorecard:  Predatory Mortgage  Lend-
ing, http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/mortgage/statelaws.html  (last visited Mar.
12,  2009).
69  See Bar-Gill  & Warren,  supra note  18,  at  79-83;  see  also Eggert,  supra note  42,  at
774-75  (noting  that many states  have  implemented  regulations  that are  more  stringent
than  the regulations  promulgated  by HUD under  RESPA).
70  SeeJulia  Patterson  Forrester, Still Mortgaging  the American Dream: Predatory Lending,
Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74  U.  CIN.  L.  REv.  1303  (2006);  Christopher  L.
Peterson,  Preemption, Agency  Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal
Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 Am.  U.  L. REv.  515  (2007);  see also Bar-
Gill & Warren, supra note 18,  at 79-83.  Despite  the increasing federal preemption  on the
substantive  law dimension, state agencies  enforce the  state  or  federal  law on lenders and
brokers  that  fall outside  the jurisdiction  of the federal  banking agencies.  See GAO  AMP
REPORT,  supra note  43, at 9-10.
State regulators  oversee independent lenders and mortgage brokers and do
so  by generally requiring business licenses that mandate meeting net worth,
funding, and  liquidity  thresholds.  They  may also mandate  certain  experi-
ence, education,  and operational  requirements  to engage  in mortgage  ac-
tivities.  Other  common  requirements  for  licensees  may  include
maintaining  records  for  certain  periods,  individual  prelicensure  testing,
posting  surety bonds, and participating  in  continuing education  activities.
States  may also examine independent lenders and mortgage brokers to en-
sure compliance with licensing requirements, review their lending and bro-
kerage  functions for  state-specific  and  federal  regulatory compliance,  and
look for unfair or unethical  business practices.  When such practices  arise,
or are brought  to  states'  attention  through  consumer  complaints,  regula-
tors and State Attorneys General may pursue actions that include  licensure
suspension  or revocation,  monetary fines, and lawsuits.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
down.71  Still, the proposed analysis is more than a historic account of
a  market  that  was.  First, while  few  new  subprime  loans  are  being
originated, many subprime loans are still outstanding.  The proposed
analysis hopes  to contribute  to an assessment of the welfare costs that
are and will be generated by this stock  of loans.  Second, the analysis
suggests  policy  reforms  that  can  prevent  a  second  subprime  crisis,
when subprime lending resumes.  Third, the proposed analysis  is rele-
vant  to the still-operating  Alt-A and prime  markets,  as loan contracts
in  these  markets  share  certain  design  features  with  subprime  con-
tracts.  Finally, an  analysis  of the subprime  market holds  general  les-
sons concerning the interaction  between market forces  and borrower
psychology-lessons  applicable  to other consumer credit markets and
even  to noncredit  markets.
II
THE  SUBPRIME  MORTGAGE  CONTRACT
The  traditional,  prime  mortgage  contract  is  a  relatively  simple,
fixed-rate,  thirty-year  loan for  80 percent,  or less,  of the  home price
(that  is,  a  down  payment  of at least 20  percent  is required). 72  The
typical  subprime  mortgage  contract  is  very different from  this  tradi-
tional benchmark.  In this  Part,  I describe  the  two  main  design  fea-
tures that distinguish  the common  subprime mortgage contract from
the  traditional  prime  FRM:  deferred  costs  and  a  high  level  of
complexity.
A.  Deferred  Costs
The common subprime loan defers  costs via three contractual de-
sign  features:  small  down  payments  and  high  LTVs,  escalating  pay-
ments, and prepayment  penalties.
71  See,  e.g.,  Ben  S.  Bernanke,  Chairman,  Bd. of Governors  of the  Fed. Reserve  Sys.,
Testimony Before  the Committee on  the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives:  The Eco-
nomic Outlook  (Jan.  17,  2008),  available  at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/tes-
timony/bernanke20080117a.htm  (noting the "virtual shutdown of the subprime mortgage
market").
72  See,  e.g.,  FTC Comment,  supra note  66,  at 5  (describing  the traditional  mortgage
contract);  see also GAO  CONSUMER  PRomcITION  REPORT,  supra  note  17,  at  21  ("Because
subprime loans involve  a greater variety and complexity of risks, they are not the uniformly
priced  commodities  that  prime  loans  generally  are.");  Willis,  supra note  4,  at  715-18
(describing the traditional mortgage  that dominated the market until the end of the twen-
tieth  century);  Kristopher  Gerardi,  Harvey  S.  Rosen  &  Paul  Willen,  Do Households Benefit
from Financial  Deregulation  and Innovation? The Case of the Mortgage Market 1 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ.  Research,  Working  Paper  No.  12967,  2007),  available at http://www.nber.org/pa-
pers/w12967  ("Gone  are  the  days  when  most  households  got  a  cookie-cutter,  30-year,
fixed-rate, level-payment  mortgage  .... ").
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1.  Small Down Payments and High LTVs
The down payment, while not a component of the loan contract,
is  a  component  of the  payment stream  that home  buyers  face.  This
payment stream consists of a "time zero" payment, the down payment,
and  the  payment  schedule  specified  in  the  loan  contract.  This
broader,  payment-stream  perspective  is  helpful:  First,  because  from
the buyer's perspective, it makes little difference  if a payment is made
to the seller or to  the lender.  Second, because in many cases, a close
(formal or informal)  relationship  between  the  seller and  the  lender
allows payment  shifting between  these  two parties.73
One way to defer the costs associated with a home purchase  is  to
reduce the down payment.  Indeed,  the size of the average  down  pay-
ment declined during the subprime expansion.  Traditionally, a home
buyer was  required  to  make  a  down  payment  equal  to  (at least)  20
percent of the purchase  price.74  In  2005 and  2006,  the median  sub-
prime home buyer put no money down, borrowing  100 percent of the
purchase  price of the  house.75  Down  payments were  a  bit higher in
the Alt-A market, with  a median  value  of 5  percent in  2006.76
The  flip  side  of  the  down  payment  is  the  LTV  ratio.  In  a
purchase loan,  a  10 percent  down payment is equivalent  to  a 90 per-
cent LTV.  But the LTV measure  is more general, and it applies also to
refinance loans.  A higher LTV means lower cost (or higher benefit in
the case  of a cash-out  refinance  loan)  in the present and higher cost
in the future.  While  the traditional mortgage  has an LTV ratio of (at
most)  80  percent,  over  40  percent  of subprime  loans  originated  in
73  See Eskridge, supra note  24, at 1124-27.
74  See,  e.g.,  FTC  Comment,  supra note  66, at 5  (describing  the  traditional  mortgage
contract).
75  See Mayer et al., supra note  33, at 33 tbl.2B;  see also FTC Comment, supra note 66,  at
10 n.45  (indicating that, in the few years prior to 2005, over 40 percent of first-time  home
buyers  did  not make  any down  payment  at all);  Gerardi  et al.,  supra note  29, at  44  tbl.2
(finding-using  the  HUD-list definition  of "subprime" and  Massachusetts  data-that  the
average  LTV of an initial-purchase  subprime loan rose  from 0.76 in  1988  to 0.84  in 2007
and that the median  LTV rose from 0.80 in  1988  to 0.90 in 2007); Amy Hoak,  100% More
Difficult: First-Time Home Buyers Struggle to Find  Down-Payment Money,  MARKETWATCH,  Mar. 9,
2008,  http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/first-time-home-buyers-struggle-find/
story.aspx?guid=%7B4BF19BC-C4EE-4107-ACFC-F6524E878D5A%7D)  (stating  that  for
the period  between July  2006  and June  2007,  the  National  Association  of Realtors  esti-
mated that 45 percent of first-time  home buyers  opted for 100  percent financing).
76  Mayer  et al.,  supra note 33, at 33  tbl.2B.
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2006 had combined LTVs  exceeding 90  percent.77  LTVs were some-
what lower  in  the Alt-A market.78
2.  Escalating  Payments
The  traditional  FRM  features  a  constant  payment  stream
throughout the loan period.  In contrast, the typical subprime and Alt-
A loans stipulate  monthly payments  that increase  in magnitude  over
the  loan  period.  In  2006,  only  19.9  percent  of first-lien  subprime
loans were  FRMs. 79  The vast majority of loans were  ARMs or hybrid
mortgages  with  an initial fixed-rate  period followed  by an adjustable-
rate  period.  According  to  the  FRB,  approximately  three-fourths  of
originations  in securitized  subprime  "pools"  from 2003 to  2007 were
ARMs  or  hybrids  with  two-  or  three-year  "teaser"  rates  followed  by
substantial  increases  in  the  rate  and  payment  (so-called  "2-28"  and
"3-27"  mortgages). 80  In 2006, the average  initial rate was 8.4 percent,
while the average long-term  rate, calculated as the sum of the relevant
index (most  commonly the  6  months LIBOR)  and  the contractually
specified  margin,  was  11.4  percent.8'  The expected  increase  in  the
77  See Ben S.  Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the  Fed. Reserve  Sys.,  Speech
at the  Independent  Community Bankers  of America Annual  Convention,  Orlando,  Flor-
ida: Reducing  Preventable  Mortgage Foreclosures  (Mar. 4, 2008),  available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke200803O4a.htm  [hereinafter  Bernanke
March  2008  Speech]  (basing  this figure  on  information about loans  in  securitized  pools
from First American  LoanPerformance).  The relevant measure is the  combined LTV, which
includes both the first- and  second-lien mortgages.  The  first-lien  mortgage often  has an
LTV  of 80  percent,  but  the  borrower  then  takes  a  second-lien  mortgage-a  piggyback
loan-that further  increases  the  combined  LTV.  If the  first-lien  mortgage  has  an  LTV
above 80  percent, the borrower is  generally required  to purchase  Private  Mortgage  Insur-
ance  (PMI)  to  protect  the lender  from default  losses.  See U.S.  Dep't of Hous.  & Urban
Dev.,  PMI  Act  Information,  http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/res/respapmi.cfm  (last
visited  Mar.  13,  2009).  The  insurance  premium  for the PMI  is  often financed  through  a
second mortgage,  further increasing the  LTV.
78  Mayer et al.,  supra note  33, at 33 tbl.2B.
79  See Demyanyk  & Van Hemert,  supra note 1  (manuscript at 7  tbl.1)  (counting only
non-I/O, nonballoon  FRMs);  see also Pennington-Cross  & Ho, supra note  68, at 1  (finding
that, between  2003  and 2005, "the ARM  market share for securitized  subprime  loans has
ranged  from just approximately 60  percent to over  80 percent").
80  See Truth in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,540  (July 30,  2008)  (to be codified at
12  C.F.R. pt. 226).  Many ARMs,  including prime  ARMs,  have  a teaser  rate in  effect until
the first rate adjustment, when the ARM rate jumps to the fully indexed (that is, index plus
margin) level.  SeeJoe Peek, A  Call to ARMs: Adjustable Rate Mortgages in the 1980s, NEw ENG.
ECON.  REV.,  Mar.-Apr.  1990, at 47,  54.
81  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert, supra note 1  (manuscript at 7  tbl.1)  (reporting  the
average initial rate,  8.4 percent, and the average  margin, 6.1  percent).  The average  long-
term  rate is the sum of the margin and the index.  The average value of the most popular
index, the  6 month LIBOR, was  5.3 percent in  2006.  See ARM  Index Values-2006 Fannie
Mae  LIBOR,  https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/refmaterials/libor/index.jsp  (last  visited
Mar.  13,  2009);  see also Mayer et al.,  supra note  33, at 11  (noting that, between  2003  and
2007,  the  initial  (teaser)  rate  on  subprime  hybrids  remained  relatively  constant,
"hover[ing]  in  the  range  of 7.5  to  8.5  percentage  points").  The  fully indexed  rate  was
lower than the initial rate  in 2003 and early  2004 when short-term  interest rates were low.
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monthly payment  at the end of the low-rate  introductory  period  was
substantial.82  Monthly payments  escalated  even more steeply in Alt-A
(and prime) mortgages, where teaser rates were set further below the
market  rate.83  These  contracts  stipulated  an  increase  of up  to  100
percent, or $1,500  on average,  in the monthly payment at the  end of
the introductory period.84  According to one estimate, rate resets have
increased  borrowers'  annual  mortgage  payments  by  about  $42
billion.85
The  escalating-payments  feature was  most pronounced  in  inter-
est-only  (I/O)  mortgages  and  payment-option  (or  simply,  option)
mortgages.8 6  Under an I/O mortgage the borrower pays only interest
during the introductory period, generally one to ten years, and begins
paying  the principal  only after the  introductory  period  ends.87  The
most popular I/O mortgages are hybrid loans, where the introductory
interest rate  is  fixed  and  the  postintroductory  interest  rate  is  varia-
ble.8 8  In  2006,  approximately  20  percent  of subprime  originations
and over  40 percent of Alt-A originations were I/O mortgages.89
Id.  In 2005,  the fully indexed rate was nearly 350 basis points above  the initial rate.  Id.  In
2006  and early 2007, the  fully indexed rate was closer to 300 basis points above  the initial
rate.  Id.
82  The  actual payment shock experienced  on  2005 and 2006  2-28  mortgages  turned
out to be less severe, thanks to relatively low market interest rates and correspondingly low
index  values  in  2007  and  2008,  when  the  interest  rates  on  these  loans  reset.  Still,  the
average  monthly payment increased  by more than 10 percent at reset.  See Bernanke  March
2008  Speech, supra note 77  (stating that even with  the currently  low LIBOR, a typical reset
would raise the monthly payment by more  than 10 percent); Paul Willen, Would More  Disclo-
sure of Loan Terms Have Helped? 10  (presentation  at  FTC  Mortgage  Conference,  May  29,
2008),  available  at  http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/mortgage/presentations/willen_
paul.pdf (finding that payment shock for a  typical subprime borrower  in 2007 was  15 per-
cent).  Moreover,  recent increases  in  the market  interest  rate are  pushing  monthly pay-
ments on these mortgages even higher.  In any event, contractual  design  is determined by
the ex ante expected  payment shock at origination,  not by the ex post actual payment shock
realized  two years later.  An industry study assessing, as of December 2006, subprime ARMs
originated between  2004  and 2006  calculated an  approximate monthly payment increase
of $400.  See CAGAN,  supra note  25, at 44.
83  See CAGAN,  supra note  25,  at  13  tbl.4  (showing "red" nonsubprime  loans with  less
steep  resets  than the "orange" subprime  loans).
84  See id. at 13  tbl.4  (estimating a 97 percent increase);  id. at 44 (estimating  payment
increases  exceeding  $1,500).
85  See id.  The  $42  billion  figure  covers  the entire  residential  mortgage  market, not
only the subprime and Alt-A segments, but ARMs and resets were common mainly in  these
two segments.
86  I/Os are also "option  loans" in  the sense  that the borrower  has an option  to pay
only interest instead  of the fully  amortized payment.
87  See FTC  Comment,  supra note  66, at 6-7  ("I/O  loans  provide for  an  initial loan
period during which  borrowers  pay only the interest that is accruing on the loan balance.
When  the initial  period  expires,  the borrower's payments  expand  to  pay both  principal
and interest.").
88  See id. at 7  (describing  hybrid-rate  I/O loans  as "[p1articularly  popular").
89  See CREDIT  SUISSE REPORT,  supra note  29, at 28  (showing that I/O loans constituted
$171  billion of the $824  billion in subprime loans);  see also Mayer et al.,  supra note  33, at 7CORNELL LAW REVIEW
An even more extreme  escalating-payments  contract is the option
ARM.  As described  by the FTC,
[o]ption  ARMs  . . . generally  offer borrowers  four  choices  about
how much  they will pay  each month during the loan's introductory
period.  Borrowers may pay:  (1) a minimum payment amount that is
smaller than  the amount of interest accruing on  the principal;  (2)
the  amount  of  interest  accruing  on  the  loan  principal;  (3)  the
amount of principal and interest due to fully amortize the loan on a
15-year payment schedule;  or (4)  the amount of principal and inter-
est due to fully amortize the loan  on a 30-year payment schedule.
Option  ARMs  vary  in  the  length  of the  introductory  periods
they offer.  Some, especially in the subprime market, have introduc-
tory  periods  of  only  one  year,  six  months,  or  even  one  month.
When the loan's introductory term expires, the loan is recast, amor-
tizing  to  repay principal  and the variable  interest rate  over  the  re-
maining term of the loan.90
While I/O mortgages are zero-amortization  loans, option ARMs imply
negative  amortization  by allowing below-interest monthly  payments.91
Accordingly, at the end of the introductory  period, or even earlier, a
borrower  might  end up  owing  more than  the  value  of the  home.92
This might happen even when home prices are steady or rising, but,
of course, it is more  likely to happen when home prices are falling.9 3
Option ARMs were rare in the subprime market but quite popular  in
the Alt-A market.  By  2006 and 2007, more  than  25 percent of Alt-A
loans  were  option  ARMs.94  Overall,  in the  Alt-A  market  in 2006,  a
large majority of originations were nontraditional mortgage  products,
allowing borrowers to defer principal or both principal and interest.
9 5
("Forty percent of Alt-A mortgages  involved  only interest payments without any scheduled
principal  repayment  (only about 10  percent of subprime mortgages have such an interest-
only feature).").
90  FTC Comment, supra note  66, at 7  (footnotes omitted).
91  See id. at 9  ("Generally,  when  a consumer has  made  only the  minimum  payment
[on an option ARM],  the loan 'negatively  amortizes,'  so that the amount the person owes is
increased  by  the  difference  between  the  interest  accruing  and  the  minimum  amount
paid.").
92  Id.
93  See  CGAAN,  supra note  25,  at 56  tbl.30  (finding  that, as  of December  2006,  22.4
percent of subprime ARMs  originated  between  2004  and 2006  had zero  or negative  eq-
uity).  Another  5  percent  drop  in  house prices,  as  happened  after  December  2006,  in-
creases the  22.4  percent figure to  36 percent.
94  See Mayer et al.,  supra note 33, at  13-14;  see also CREDrr  SUISSE  REPORT,  supra note
29,  at  26,  28  (finding, based  on  nonagency  MBS data,  that in  2006,  option  ARMs  com-
prised  approximately  0.5  percent  of  the subprime  market  and  30 percent  of  the Alt-A
market).
95  Truth  in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,541  (July 30,  2008)  (to be codified at 12
C.F.R  pt. 226)  (stating that, according to one estimate,  78 percent of Alt-A originations in
2006 were either I/O  or option mortgages).  Looking more  broadly at the entire residen-
tial  mortgage  market,  the  Government  Accountability  Office found  that  "[flrom  2003
through  2005, AMP  originations  grew  threefold, from less  than  10 percent of residential
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These deferrals led to substantial increases-exceeding  100 percent in
some  cases-in the  monthly payment  at the end of the  introductory
period.
96
3.  Prepayment Penalties
Another deferred-cost component, common in subprime and Alt-
A contracts, is  the prepayment  penalty-a  penalty imposed  on a bor-
rower who repays the loan before the maturity date.  About 70 percent
of subprime loans and about 40 percent of Alt-A loans included a pre-
payment penalty.97  The penalty amount is usually expressed  as a per-
centage of the outstanding balance  on the loan, up to 5 percent,98 or
as the  sum of a specified  number of months,  commonly six  months,
worth  of interest payments.  This is a significant  amount.  For exam-
ple,  a  3  percent  penalty  on  a  $200,000  balance  amounts  to  $6,000.
The  economic importance  of prepayment  penalties  to lenders  is un-
deniable.  They generate substantial revenues.  For example, Country-
wide's revenues from prepayment penalties amounted  to $268 million
in 2006.99
Prepayment penalties can be viewed as a necessary supplement to
the escalating-payments feature: if borrowers prepay before the end of
the  low-rate  introductory  period and  thus  avoid  the  high  post-reset
mortgage originations  to  about 30 percent.  Most of the AMPs  originated  during this pe-
riod consisted of interest-only  and payment-option  ARMs."  GAO  AMP REPORT,  supra note
43, at  3.  Likewise,  the  Mortgage Bankers  Association  (MBA)  noted  that "[ilnterest  only
(1O)  loans, with both adjustable- and fixed-rates, and payment option loans that allow neg-
ative amortization,  have become  a very important part of the  [residential  mortgage]  mar-
ket."  FRATANTONI  ET AL.,  supra note  37, at 3.
96  See GAO  AMP  REPORT,  Supra note  43,  at  14  (describing  an  example  with  a  128
percent increase in the monthly payment at the end of the 5-year payment option period);
FTC Comment, supra note  66, at 9 (referring  to "payment shock").  With an option ARM,
the payment  increase  might occur before  the end of the introductory  period.  The loan
contracts  allow for  negative amortization but set a maximum  allowable  negative amortiza-
tion  cap of 110  percent or  115 percent.  When  this cap is  reached-and  this can happen
before the end of the introductory period-monthly mortgage  payments will increase.  See
LaCour-Little,  supra note 31,  at 484;  FTC Comment, supra note  66, at 9.
97  See Mayer  et al.,  supra note  33,  at 7; see also Demyanyk  & Van Hemert, supra note  I
(manuscript at 7  tbl.1)  (showing that in  2006,  71  percent of first-lien  subprime  loans  in-
cluded  a prepayment  penalty).  Prepayment penalties  are most common  in  hybrid  loans:
70 percent of hybrids have prepayment penalties, as compared to FRMs, only 40 percent of
which  have prepayment  penalties.  See Pennington-Cross  & Ho, supra note  68, at 11-12.
98  See MICHAEL  D.  LARSON,  Mortgage  Lenders Want a Commitment-and They're Willing to
Pay You for It, BANKRATE.COM,  Aug. 26,  1999, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/mtg/
19990826.asp  (describing one contractual  design  that specifies  a penalty  of 3  percent of
the outstanding  balance  for prepayment  in the first year, a 2  percent penalty for prepay-
ment  in the second year, and a  1 percent penalty for prepayment  in  the third year).
99  Gretchen  Morgenson,  Inside the  Countrywide Lending Spree,  N.Y.  TIMEs,  Aug.  26,
2007,  §  3, at 1;  see also ERic  STEIN,  COAL.  FOR  RESPONSIBLE  LENDING,  QUANTIFYING  THE  EcO-
NOMIC  COSTS  OF  PREDATORY  LENDING  7-9  (2001),  available at http://www.responsiblelend-
ing.org/pdfs/QuantlO-01.pdf  (estimating  prepayment  penalty  revenues  at  $2.3  billion
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rates,  then  the  escalating-payments  feature  becomes  moot.  Prepay-
ment penalties make it more difficult for borrowers  to evade the esca-
lating  payments. 00   Prepayment  penalties  surely  played  this
supporting role  in some escalating-payments  contracts.  But in many
other escalating-payments  contracts  this  prepayment-deterrence  role
was  more  minor.  Prepayment  penalties  are  generally  limited  in
time-that is,  the  prepaying borrower  will  only  pay  a  penalty if she
prepays within the specified period.' 0'  Further, in many contracts the
prepayment-penalty  period expired before  the end of the low-rate in-
troductory period. 1 0 2  Of course,  prepayment-penalty  periods stretch-
ing beyond  the  end  of the  introductory  period  are  not necessary  to
sustain an escalating-payments  contract.  There are other reasons why
a borrower may decide  to keep  making the escalating  payments even
if prepayment is not subject  to  a  contractual penalty.
Prepayment penalties are also an independent deferred-cost com-
ponent, regardless  of their  role  supporting  the  escalating-payments
feature.  First, to the extent  that it fails to deter prepayment, the pre-
payment penalty  is a significant cost that is deferred until the time of
prepayment.  Second,  this  long-term  cost is associated  with a reduc-
tion in the short-term  cost of the loan.  Specifically, loans with prepay-
ment  penalties  have  lower  interest  rates  and  thus  lower  monthly
payments.1 0 3  Prepayment  penalties  thus  produce  the  temporal-shift
characteristic  of deferred-cost contracts:  pay less  now, pay more later.
B.  Complexity
In addition  to a variety of features that defer costs, subprime and
Alt-A mortgages  are  also characterized  by a  high level  of complexity.
The complexity of these loan  contracts is  the product of a prolifera-
tion of fees and other price dimensions combined with elaborate rules
100  See Hearing,  supra note  1,  at 11  (explaining  how  prepayment penalties  "protected
lenders  from  the potential churning  of mortgages  with very  low initial  rates");  Zywicki  &
Adamson,  supra note  11,  at  18  (noting  that  lenders  needed  prepayment  penalties  to
recoup  their upfront costs  because  subprime  borrowers  often financed  closing costs  and
had low introductory  rates).
101  See Michael LaCour-Little  & Cynthia Holmes, Prepayment Penalties  in Residential  Mort-
gage Contracts:  A  Cost-Benefit Analysis, 19  HOUSING  POL'x  DEBATE  631,  635  (2008).
102  See Mayer et al.,  supra note 33, at 12 ("[P]repayment penalties were scheduled  to be
in  effect after  the end of the teaser period for only 7  percent of the subprime short-term
hybrids originated from 2003  to 2007, and over these years the share originated with such a
provision  dropped from  10  to 2  percent.").
103  See Gregory Elliehausen,  Michael  E. Staten  & Jevgenijs  Steinbuks,  The Effect of Pre-
payment Penalties on  the Pricing of Sut'prime Mortgages, 60 J.  ECON.  &  Bus.  33,  34  (2008);
LaCour-Little  & Holmes,  supra note  101,  at 642;  Chris  Mayer, Tomasz  Piskorski  & Alexei
Tchistyi, The  Inefficiency  of Refinancing:  Why Prepayment  Penalties Are Good  for  Risky
Borrowers  18  (Apr. 28,  2008)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://wwwl.gsb.co-
lumbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3065/Inefficiency%20ofo20Refinancing.
pdf.
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governing  the  application  of these  multiple  prices.1 04  Beyond  mul-
tidimensional  pricing,  the  prepayment option and  the  (implied)  de-
fault  option  increase  the  complexity  of  valuing  these  mortgage
products.  Finally, since complexity should be measured at the market
level-not at the contract  level-the existence of numerous  complex
products  exponentially  increases  the complexity of the  choice  prob-
lem that a borrower faces.
1.  Interest Rates
The  traditional FRM  has a single  interest rate  that implies a con-
stant monthly payment.  The  typical subprime mortgage,  the 2-28 hy-
brid, has an initial rate that applies for the first two years of the loan.
After the  two-year  introductory period  expires,  the  loan becomes  an
ARM with  an interest rate  calculated  as the sum  of a specified  index
and a preset margin-a calculation that is repeated at the end of each
adjustment  period.  To  make  things  even  more  complex,  the  loan
contract  commonly  specifies  caps  that  can  limit  the  magnitude  of
both  the periodic and  total rate  adjustment.
10 5
Other products are  even  more  complex.  As  detailed  above, op-
tion ARMs commonly specify four different options for each  monthly
payment.10 6  These  payment  options  are  not  predetermined  sums;
nontrivial  calculations  are  necessary  to  figure  out  what  the  options
are.  Moreover,  these  contracts,  while allowing negative amortization,
typically cap  the level  of permissible negative  amortization,  recasting
the loan-even  before the end of the introductory period-if this cap
is  reached.
2.  Fees
Beyond the multiple interest rates, the typical subprime and Alt-A
loan  boasts  a  long  list of fees.  These  fees  can  be  divided  into  two
categories: origination fees and postorigination  fees.  Origination fees
are paid at closing-that  is, at the consummation  of the credit transac-
tion.  Before closing  a  loan contract,  the lender  obtains information
104  See GAO CONSUMER  PROTECTION  REPORT,  supra note  17, at 6,  21  (emphasizing "the
complexity of mortgage transactions" and the "greater variety and complexity of risks" asso-
ciated with subprime  loans as compared  to prime loans); JAMES  M.  LACKO  & JANIS  K.  PAP-
PALARDO,  FED.  TRADE  COMM'N,  IMPROVING  CONSUMER  MORTGAGE  DISCLOSURES:  AN
EMPIRiCAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT  AND PROTOTPE  DISCLOSURE  FORMS,  at ES-11 (2007)  (ex-
plaining  that subprime  borrowers  have  more  difficulty  answering  questions  about  their
loans than  prime  borrowers); Renuart & Thompson,  supra note  24, at  196  ("The lender-
created complexity of mortgage loans now exceeds what most consumers,  even highly edu-
cated consumers, are capable of comprehending.");  Zywicki  & Adamson, supra note  11,  at
55-56  (explaining that subprime loans are more complex  than  prime loans, and that it  is
more  likely that a subprime borrower will  misunderstand  her loan  terms).
105  See  Peek, supra note  80, at 53.
106  See supra Part II.A.2.
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about the  risk that it is about to  undertake.  Specifically,  the  lender
performs  credit checks and obtains appraisals.  The lender  also com-
missions various  inspections, examinations, and certifications,  includ-
ing  pest  inspection,  title  examination,  flood  certification,  and  tax
certification  (for information  about  the  borrower's  outstanding  tax
obligations). 107  Lenders  charge  the  borrower separate  fees  for each
of  these  information-acquisition  services.  For  example,  LandSafe,
Countrywide's  closing-services  subsidiary,  charges  a  $36  fee  for  the
credit check, a $26 fee for flood certification, and a $60 fee for the tax
certification. 08  In 2006, Countrywide's  appraisal fee revenues totaled
$137  million, and its credit report fee revenues totaled $74 million.10 9
Separate fees are charged for analyzing the acquired information.
These include  escrow analysis fees, which cover  the cost of determin-
ing  the  appropriate  balance  for  the  escrow  account  and  the  bor-
rower's  monthly  escrow  payments,  and  underwriting  analysis  fees,
which  cover  the  costs  of analyzing  a  borrower's  creditworthiness.' 1 0
Still more fees are charged for insuring against identified risks, includ-
ing premiums  for credit insurance,  title insurance,  and private  mort-
gage  insurance  (PMI). u"
Also at closing, the lender charges fees for administrative  services
associated with the  loan-origination  process,  such  as preparing docu-
ments, notarizing documents,  and sending e-mails, faxes, and courier
mail.' 12  For example, some Countrywide loans included fees of $45  to
ship  documents  overnight  and  $100  to  e-mail  documents.113  And
then there are the general  fees: for loan origination, loan processing,
signing documents,  and closing  the loan. 1 4  Some subprime lenders
charge up to fifteen different origination  fees, and these fees can add
up to thousands of dollars or up to 20 percent of the loan amount.' 
1 5
107  See Elizabeth Renuart, An  Overview of the Predatory  Mortgage  Lending Process, 15 Hous-
iNG  POL'y DEBATE  467,  493  (2004).
108  Morgenson,  supra note 99.  As Morgenson points out, "It's a big business:  During
the last  12  months,  Countrywide  did  3.5  million  flood certifications,  conducted  10.8  mil-
lion credit checks and 1.3  million appraisals,  its filings show."  Id.
109  Id.
110  Pamela Reeves,  Many Settle for Really Bad Terns to Get a House, ScuPPs  HOWARD  NEWS
SERVICE, July  19,  2001;  Mortgage  Ctr.,  Inside Scoop-Current Tips: Junk Fees-What You
Don't  Know  Can  Hurt You,  http://www.mtgctr.com/tips/default.asp?gaid=4  (last visited
Apr. 9,  2009).
1M1  See Renuart, supra note 107, at 493; Willis, supra note 4, at 725.  According  to one-
now dated-estimate,  financed credit insurance  costs borrowers  $2.1  billion each year.  See
STEIN,  supra note  99, at 5-7.
112  Renuart, supra note  107,  at 493.
113  Morgenson,  supra note 99.
114  Renuart, supra note  107,  at 493.
115  See Willis,  supra note  4, at 786;  see also HUD-TREASuRv  REPORT, supra  note 11,  at 21
(noting origination  fees  of up  to  10  percent of the  loan  amount, "far exceed[ing]  what
would be expected or justified based on economic grounds").  According to HUD, borrow-
ers  are  paying excess  fees  averaging  $700  per mortgage.  See News  Release,  U.S.  Dep't of
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These fees are often financed into the loan amount and form the ba-
sis for additional  interest charges.1
16
In addition to the multiple fees charged at closing, the loan con-
tract  specifies  a  series  of future, contingent  fees,  including  late fees,
foreclosure fees, prepayment penalties, and dispute-resolution  or arbi-
tration fees. 
1 7  Again,  these fees can be substantial.  Prepayment pen-
alties  and  foreclosure  fees  can  amount  to  thousands  of dollars.118
Late fees  can amount  to 5  percent of the  monthly payment. 11 9
3.  Prepayment and Default
Mortgage contracts in the United States commonly allow the bor-
rower to prepay the loan before it matures.  The exercise price of this
prepayment  option can  be either zero, when there  is  no prepayment
penalty,  or  positive,  when  a  prepayment  penalty  is  included  in  the
contract.  The  prepayment  option  may  seem  straightforward  at first
glance, but it adds  a substantial  dose  of complexity  to  the mortgage
contract.  To  accurately  value  the  contract,  the  borrower  must  esti-
mate  the  likelihood  and  timing  of prepayment,  which  depend  on  a
host of future market  conditions  and  personal  circumstances.  Even
with these estimates, calculating the optimal timing for prepayment  is
nontrivial.  A  commonly  used  rule  of thumb would  have  borrowers
prepay when the expected savings from refinancing to a lower-interest
loan  exceeds  the  transaction  costs  associated  with  terminating  one
loan  and  originating  another  (including  the  prepayment  penalty).
But this rule of thumb turns  out to be  a very  poor approximation  of
the optimal prepayment decision.  The reason is that the rule ignores
the option value of rejecting the current refinancing offer, even when
Hous.  & Urban  Dev.,  HUD Proposes  Mortgage Reform  to Help  Consumers Better Under-
stand Their Loan, Shop for Lower  Costs (Mar.  14, 2008),  available  at http://www.hud.gov/
news/release.cfm?content=pr08-033.cfm.  According  to  Michael  Kratzer,  founder  of
FeeDisclosure.com,  a website  intended to help consumers reduce fees on mortgages, of the
estimated $50 billion in transaction  fees paid by mortgage borrowers  (not only in  the sub-
prime and  Alt-A  markets),  $17  billion  consist of junk fees,  like  $100  e-mail  charges,  $75
document preparation fees, and  $25  FedEx charges.  See Gretchen  Morgenson,  Clicking the
Way  to Mortgage Savings, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  23,  2007,  § 3, at  1.  Kratzer  estimates  that 'junk
fees"  have  risen 50 percent in  recent years.  See Gretchen  Morgenson,  Given a Shovel, Dig-
ging  Deeper Into Debt, N.Y. TIMES, July  20,  2008,  at Al.
116  See Willis,  supra note  4, at 725.  According  to one, now dated, estimate,  exorbitant
fees-defined as fees exceeding  5 percent of the loan amount and fees reflecting no tangi-
ble benefit to borrowers-cost borrowers $1.8  billion each year.  See STEIN,  supra note 99, at
7.
117  See Willis,  supra note  4, at 725.
118  See supra Part II.A.3.
119  See  Freddie  Mac,  Glossary  of  Finance  and  Economic  Terms,  http://www.fred-
diemac.com/smm/g-m.htm#L  (last visited Mar.  13,  2009);  see also Morgenson,  supra note
99  (noting  that,  in  2006,  Countrywide's  revenues  from  late  charges  amounted  to  $285
million).
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expected  benefits exceed  transaction  costs,  and waiting for even  bet-
ter refinancing  opportunities in  the  future.
Accounting for this option value complicates the optimal prepay-
ment decision.  In  fact, the  optimal  prepayment  problem  is  so com-
plex  that  it  can  be  solved  only  by  high-powered  computers
implementing sophisticated numeric algorithms.1 20  In addition to the
explicit prepayment  option, every mortgage  contract  includes  an im-
plicit default  option.  The  borrower  can  always  walk  away  from  the
mortgage.  Of course,  exercising  the  default  option  has  a  price,  in-
cluding  lost  equity,  a  damaged  credit  rating, and the  risk  of losing
other assets (if the loan is not a no-recourse loan).  As with the prepay-
ment option, valuing  the  default option  is a complex  task.
4.  A  Complex Array of Complex Products
A  typical  subprime  or  Alt-A  contract  is  multidimensional  and
complex.  Complexity,  however, should not be evaluated at the single-
contract level.  From a functional perspective, it is more informative to
evaluate the complexity of the decision that a borrower faces.  Borrow-
ers must choose  among  numerous  mortgage  products.  To make  an
informed  choice,  a  borrower  must read  and  understand  numerous
complex  contracts.  This  process  would  be  challenging  even  if the
competing contracts shared the same dimensions and varied only with
respect  to  the  values  assigned  to  each  dimension.  But,  in  the  sub-
prime and Alt-A markets,  the borrower must compare  different com-
plex contracts, each with its own set of multidimensional  prices and its
own  rules for determining when  the different prices apply.  Consider
a borrower  facing a 2-28 hybrid and an option ARM:  The 2-28 has an
introductory period and an initial rate.  The option ARM has a differ-
ent introductory period during which  four different payment options
are available.  The 2-28 specifies an index and a margin for the postin-
troductory  period with  certain  caps  on rate  adjustments.  The  option
ARM  specifies  a different index, a different margin, and different ad-
justment caps.  The complexity of this choice is evident.  In reality the
borrower  must choose between  more than  two products.12 1
120  See Sumit Agarwal, John C. Driscoll & David Laibson,  Optimal Mortgage Refinancing:
A  Closed Form Solution 5-6  (Nat'l  Bureau  of Econ.  Research,  Working  Paper  No.  13487,
2007),  available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13487.
121  See WILLIAM  C.  APGAR, JR.  &  CHRISTOPHER  E.  HERBERT,  U.S.  DEP'T  OF Hous. & UR-
BAN  DEV.,  SUBPRIME  LENDING  AND  ALTERNATIVE  FINANCIAL  SERVICE PROVIDERS:  A LITERATURE
REVIEW  AND  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS  § 2.2.3  (2006)  (describing "the bewildering  array of mort-
gage products  available").
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C.  Summary
In  this Part,  I described  several common  contractual design fea-
tures  of subprime  and  Alt-A  mortgages. 12 2  It should  be noted  that
these  design features  are  not an  innovation  of the  subprime  expan-
sion.  For  example,  relatively  complex  ARMs  with  a  deferred-cost
structure,  created  by  lower  initial  rates  and  higher  long-term  rates,
have been offered in the prime market since the early  1980s.123  While
cost deferral and high levels of complexity are not unique to subprime
loans, these design features have been enhanced  in subprime and Alt-
A contracts.  Since  complex deferred-cost loans have been  around for
a while,  they cannot be the only-and they are probably not even  the
main-cause  of the subprime  expansion  and the  ensuing  subprime
crisis.  But, as I argue below, they did play an important role in the rise
and  fall  of the  subprime  market.  It should  also  be noted  that sub-
prime  and  Alt-A  contracts  are  continuing  to  evolve.  Specifically,  in
response to the subprime crisis and the enhanced regulatory attention
that followed  in its wake,  lenders are redesigning  their contracts and
eliminating  some  of the features  described  in this  Part.
124
III
RATIONAL-CHOICE  THEORIES  AND  THEIR  LIMITS
Why were  subprime mortgage  contracts designed  to defer costs?
Why was the total cost of the loan divided into so many different inter-
est  rates  and  fees?  I  begin,  in  this Part,  by critically  evaluating  the
standard rational-choice  explanations for these contractual design fea-
122  I do not purport to cover all the  design  features that appear in the wide variety of
subprime mortgages.  For example, I did not discuss low-doc and no-doc loans.  Unlike the
traditional mortgage transaction,  many subprime  mortgages are based on little or no docu-
mentation of income and assets.  In 2006, 62.3 percent of first-lien subprime loans were no-
doc or low-doc loans.  See Demyanyk and Van Hemert, supra note  I  (manuscript at 7 tbl. 1);
see also CREDIT  SUISSE  REPORT,  supra note 29, at 4  ("Roughly 50%  of all subprime  borrowers
in  the past  two  years  [i.e.,  2005-2006]  have  provided  limited  documentation  regarding
their incomes.").  Further, "[w]hile  many believe  that buyers  choose  to provide limited or
no documentation  for convenience  rather than  necessity,  a  study by the  Mortgage Asset
Research  Institute sampling  100  stated income  (low/no documentation)  loans found that
60%  of borrowers  had 'exaggerated'  their  income by more  than  50%."  CREDIT  SUISSE  RE-
PORT,  supra note  29,  at 5.
123  See Peek,  supra note  80, at 50,  54;  see also Zywicki  and Adamson,  supra note  11,  at
5-7  (explaining how legal reform  in the early 1980s-specifically the Alternative  Mortgage
Transaction  Parity Act of 1982-lifted  severe  restrictions on  the design of mortgage con-
tracts).  Moreover, deferred-cost  loans are common  in other countries  (interest-only mort-
gages  are standard  in  the United  Kingdom)  and in  other sectors  (corporate  bonds are
designed  as interest-only  loans).
124  See CREDIT  SUISSE  REPORT, supra note 29, at 1 ("Major  lenders such  as Countrywide,
Option  One  and Wells  Fargo  have  already  announced plans  to  discontinue  certain  high
CLTV and stated income loan programs.... ."); Morgenson,  supra  note 99  (reporting that
on February 23,  2007 Countrywide stopped offering no-doc loans for more than 95 percent
of a home's appraised  value, and  on  March  16,  2007 it eliminated  piggyback  loans).CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tures.  To  anticipate  my  conclusion,  the  rational-choice  theories  ex-
plain  some  of the  observed  practices  in  the  subprime  market,  but
there  is much  that they cannot explain.  This explanatory gap  will be
filled in  Part IV by a behavioral-economics  theory.
A.  Deferred  Costs
1.  Affordability
Perhaps  the  most  common  justification  for  deferred-cost  con-
tracts  is  affordability.  If a borrower cannot afford to  make  a substan-
tial down payment, then she will take  a mortgage with a high LTV.  If
a borrower  currently cannot afford  to  make high monthly payments,
then  she  will  take  a  mortgage  with  low initial  monthly  payments. 125
Deferred-cost  contracts  create  short-term  affordability.  Indeed,  by
most accounts,  deferred-cost  contracts were designed  to secure  short-
term affordability.  But short-term affordability  is not a rational-choice
explanation.  If affordability  is  to  offer a  rational-choice  explanation
for cost deferral, it must be long-term affordability that is considered:
the borrower  must be  able  to service  the  loan both  now  and in  the
future.  While  deferred-cost  contracts  clearly  enhance  short-term  af-
fordability,  it is  by  no  means  clear  that  they  enhance  long-term  af-
fordability.  Paying less  now means  paying more  later.  Smaller  down
payments  (higher  LTVs)  and  lower  initial  payments  imply  higher
monthly  payments  in the  future.  Affordability  in  the  long term  can
rationally explain deferred-cost  contracts only if the borrower's availa-
125  See GAO  AMP  REPORT,  supra note  43, at Abstract  ("Federally  and state-regulated
banks and independent mortgage lenders and brokers market AMPs  [mostly I/O  and pay-
ment-option  loans],  which  have  been  used  for  years  as  a financial  management  tool  by
wealthy and financially sophisticated  borrowers.  In recent years,  however, AMPs  have been
marketed  as an  'affordability'  product  to allow  borrowers  to purchase  homes  they other-
wise  might not be able  to afford  with a conventional  fixed-rate  mortgage.");  Mayer  et al.,
supra note  33, at 7  ("[S]ubprime borrowers  may have  turned to  these products  in  an at-
tempt to  obtain  more affordable  monthly  payments.").  Affordability  concerns  were espe-
cially acute in  areas where  rapidly rising home prices forced borrowers to take larger loans,
which,  if they  were  traditional  FRMs,  implied larger  down  payments  and higher  monthly
payments.  See CREDIT  SUISSE  REPORT,  supra note  29,  at  29  ("We  have  long  been  of the
opinion  that  the  current  housing  downturn  is  as  much  a  function  of deteriorating  af-
fordability  as  an  issue  of  over  supply  from  fleeing  investors  and  aggressive
homebuilders  .... In  order to  mitigate  the  record price increases  seen throughout the
majority of the country in  the first  half of this decade,  home buyers  became  increasingly
dependant on exotic mortgage  products intended  to reduce  down payments and monthly
payments.");  FRATANTONI  ET  AL., supra note 37, at 23  ("lOs in particular allowed borrowers
to afford  homes in a booming market.");  Szu-Yin  Kathy Hung  & Charles Tu, An Examina-
tion of Housing  Price  Appreciation in California  and the Impact of  Alternative Mortgage  Instruments,
17  J.  HOUSING  REs.  33  (2008)  (finding  that in  California  increased  use  of ARMs  led  to
greater  housing  affordability  and  high  housing-price  appreciation  during  the  housing
boom  in  the  first half of this  decade).
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ble income  is expected to increase as fast as  (or faster than)  the esca-
lating mortgage  payments. 126
In  this spirit, the FRB  advises  borrowers  that "[d] espite  the risks
of these  loans, an  1-0  mortgage  payment  or  a payment-option  ARM
might be right for you if...  you have  modest current income but are
reasonably certain  that your income  will go up  in the future  (for ex-
ample,  if you're finishing your degree  or training program)  ....
But how  many borrowers  fit this  description?  Notice  that the  FRB is
not  talking  about  standard,  gradual  pay  raises.  Those  would  not
match  the  substantial  increase  in the  monthly mortgage  payment at
the end of the introductory period that many subprime and Alt-A con-
tracts  stipulate.  The  FRB  is  referring  to  students  and  trainees.  In-
deed,  2-28  hybrids,  and  even  I/O  and  option  mortgages,  may  be
beneficial  for a  second-year  law student who  anticipates  a  sharp  in-
crease  in  income  after  graduation.  These  students and  trainees  are
good  candidates  for  escalating  payment  contracts,  yet  there  are  too
few  of  them  to  explain  a  significant  fraction  of the  approximately
126  The failure to adopt this long-term affordability  perspective  has been the subject of
criticism.  In  particular,  lenders  have  been  criticized  for  qualifying  borrowers  who  can
make the low short-term  payments but not the high long-term payments.  See Hearing,  supra
note  1, at 11  ("Some  subprime  lenders  ...  established borrowers'  qualification  for mort-
gages  on the  basis  of initially low  teaser  rates.").  The  FRB  addresses this  concern  in  its
recently  adopted  TILA amendments.  See Truth  in  Lending,  73  Fed.  Reg.  44,522,  44,539
(July 30,  2008)  (to be  codified  at  12  C.F.R.  pt.  226)  ("TILA  Section  129(h),  15  U.S.C.
1639(h),  and  Regulation  Z  §  226.34 (a) (4)  prohibit a  pattern  or  practice  of extending
credit subject to §  226.32  (HOEPA loans) based on consumers'  collateral without regard  to
their repayment  ability.  The regulation creates a presumption of a violation  where a credi-
tor has a  pattern or practice  of failing  to  verify and document repayment  ability.").  The
effect of these regulations,  had they come sooner, could have been substantial.  In  a pres-
entation to  investors,  Countrywide  Financial  acknowledged  that it would  have refused  89
percent  of its  2006  borrowers  and  83 percent  of its  2005  borrowers,  representing  $138
billion in mortgage loans, had it followed  the long-term affordability standards adopted  in
the  FRB's  regulations.  See  Binyamin  Appelbaum  &  Ellen  Nakashima,  Banking Regulator
Played Advocate over Enforcer: Agency  Let Lenders Grow out of Control, Then Fail,  WASH.  POST,
Nov.  23,  2008,  at Al.
Some  have  blamed  the government for  the  lowering of underwriting  standards.  See
Liebowitz,  supra  note  26 (manuscript at 3-8)  (arguing that policymakers, eager to expand
home  ownership,  especially  in  lower-income  and  minority  segments,  facilitated-even
mandated,  through threats of Community Reinvestment  Act challenges-lower underwrit-
ing standards).
127  See BD.  OF  GOVERNORS  OF THE  FED.  RESERVE  SYS.  ET AL.,  INTEREST-ONLY  MORTGAGE
PAYMENTS  AND  PAYMENT-OPTION  ARMs-ARE  THEY  FOR You?  7  (2006),  available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/mortgage-interestonly/mortgage-in  terestonly.pdf  [herein-
after FRB,  INTEPREST  ONLY];  see also FTC Comment,  supra note  66, at 8  (noting  the advan-
tage  of  alternative  mortgage  products  for  "upwardly  mobile"  borrowers).  Empirical
evidence  confirms  that younger  households  with  a college  education,  and thus  better fu-
ture-income prospects, were more  likely to opt for innovative mortgage  products with  low
initial interest rates.  See Mark S.  Doms &John Krainer, Innovations in Mortgage Markets and
Increased Spending on Housing 35  tbl.2, 39 tbl.6  (Fed. Reserve  Bank of San  Francisco, Work-
ing Paper No.  2007-05,  2007),  available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/
papers/2007/wp7-05bk.pdf.CORNELL  LAW REVIEW
three  million hybrid  loans  originated  per  year  at  the  height  of the
subprime  market.
128
While  borrowers  with  rising  incomes  are  the  natural  candidates
for  escalating-payments  contracts,  borrowers  with  variable  incomes
may also find some  of these contractual  designs beneficial.  The  FRB
advises that a borrower with volatile income, who  can  afford  to make
only  small monthly  payments  in  low-income  periods,  may  rationally
prefer a loan  contract that requires  lower  monthly payments. 29  But
the  typical loan does not offer the low-payment option for more than
two years.  Accordingly, the income  of the  target borrower should be
volatile only temporarily and then stabilize.  Moreover, a rational bor-
rower  with  volatile  income  should  have  no  problem  making  fixed-
magnitude  mortgage  payments.  All  she  needs  to  do  is  save  some of
her  earnings  from  the  high-income  periods.  As  with  rising-income
borrowers,  the number of variable-income  borrowers who  would ben-
efit  from  deferred-cost  loans  seems  small  relative  to  the  number  of
loans with  these  design features.
The  (long-term) affordability  explanation  covers a small fraction
of deferred-cost  originations.  This  assessment  is  consistent  with  the
evidence  of especially  high  foreclosure  rates  on  homes  financed  by
deferred-cost loans.130  If deferred-cost loans were designed to address
short-term  liquidity problems,  then defaults  and  foreclosures  should
be rare.  But perhaps there  is another, more plausible version  of the
affordability  explanation.  Thus  far,  long-term  affordability  was  as-
sumed to imply an ability to make  the high future  payments-that  is,
from  rising income.  A less  literal  interpretation  of affordability  may
include  an  expectation  to  avoid,  rather than  make,  the  high future
128  The  three  million  estimate  is  based  on  the  2,780,000  first-lien  subprime  loans
originated  in 2006,  see supra Part I.B,  multiplied by the 75  percent of hybrid  ARMs among
subprime  loans.  See supra Part II.A.2.
129  See FRB,  INTEREST  ONLY,  supra note  127  (advising  borrowers  that I/O loans  and
option ARMs  may be suitable for them if they "have irregular income  (such as commissions
or seasonal earnings)  and want the flexibility of making 1-0  or option-ARM  minimum pay-
ments during low-income periods and larger payments during higher-income periods");  see
also FTC Comment, supra note  66, at 8 (noting the advantage  of alternative  mortgage prod-
ucts for borrowers  with  variable  income).
130  See  Paulson,  supra note  2.  In  October  2007,  Treasury  Secretary  Hank  Paulson
observed,
mortgage defaults and  foreclosures are rising.  While  the  delinquency  rate
today is near the 2001 rate, there are over seven times more subprime mort-
gages today than  there were  in 2001.  At the end of the  second quarter of
this year,  more  than 900,000  subprime  loans were  at least  30  days  delin-
quent.  Foreclosures are also up significantly-increasing  about 50 percent
from 2000  to  2006.  Foreclosures  on subprime  loans are up  over 200 per-
cent in  that same  period.  Current trends suggest there  will be just over  I
million  foreclosure  starts  this year-of which 620,000  are  subprime.
Id. Recall  that for most of the 620,000 subprime foreclosures that Secretary  Paulson antici-
pates,  the underlying  loan contract  was  a deferred-cost  contract.  See infra Part V.C.
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payments,  specifically by refinancing  the  loan before  the low-rate  in-
troductory  period ends.1
3
1
A borrower  could expect  to  obtain  a  new mortgage  with  lower
monthly payments if (1)  the borrower's credit score improves  (by reg-
ularly  making the  low  payments  during  the  introductory  period),
3 2
(2)  the market interest rate falls, or  (3)  house prices increase  (imply-
ing  a  lower  LTV for the  new  mortgage).  The  question  then  is  how
many  borrowers  rationally  expected  that  such  positive  realizations
would  enable  them  to  refinance  their  deferred-cost  mortgage  and
avoid  the high long-term  costs.  From an  ex post perspective,  it is  clear
that  the  subprime  crisis  and  the  ensuing  tightening of credit elimi-
nated the  refinancing option for many borrowers.
13 3  The FRB infers
that even from an ex ante perspective, which  is the relevant perspective
for judging the  affordability  explanation,  many borrowers  could not
have  rationally expected  to face  attractive refinancing  options:
[E]vidence from recent events is consistent with a conclusion  that a
widespread  practice  of making  subprime  loans  with  built-in  pay-
ment shock after  a relatively short period  on the basis of assuming
consumers  will  accumulate  sufficient  equity  and  improve  their
credit scores  enough to refinance before the shock sets in can cause
consumers  more  injury than benefit. 134
131  See Truth  in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg.  1672,  1687  (proposed Jan. 9, 2008)  (to be codi-
fied  at  12  C.F.R.  pt.  226)  ("Consumers  may also  benefit  from  loans with  payments  that
could increase after an initial period of reduced payments  if they have a realistic chance of
refinancing, before  the payment burden increases substantially,  into  lower-rate  loans  that
were  more  affordable  on a  longer-term  basis.  This  benefit  is,  however,  quite  uncertain,
and  it  is  accompanied  by  substantial  risk  ....  );  FTC  Comment,  supra note  66,  at  8
("[Blorrowers  who  are  confident  they will  sell  or refinance  their homes  for an equal  or
increased  value before the introductory period of the loan expires may benefit from alter-
native  loan  options.").
132  See Mayer et al.,  supra note 33, at  11  ("Industry participants claim  that teaser mort-
gages were  never  designed as long-term  mortgage products.  Instead,  they argue  that the
two- or  three-year  teaser period  was  designed for  consumers with  tarnished  credit  to im-
prove  their credit  scores  by making  regular payments  . . ").
133  Prepayment to  avoid high post-reset rates was  common  before the subprime crisis
hit and the credit crunch set in.  See Pennington-Cross & Ho, supra note 68, at 10  (finding,
based on LP data, that hybrid  mortgages tend to prepay quickly around the first mortgage
reset date);  Shane M.  Sherlund,  The Past,  Present,  and Future of Subprime Mortgages  10  (Bd.  of
Governors  of the  Fed.  Reserve  Sys.,  Fin.  &  Econ.  Discussion  Series  Paper  No.  2008-63,
2008)  (finding that "prepayments jump during reset  periods").
134  Truth  in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. at 1688.  The  possibility of refinancing and prepay-
ment  provides  another  explanation  for  deferred-cost  contracts.  Assuming  that low-risk
borrowers  will  be the first to get attractive  refinance  offers and prepay, the lender expects
her  pool  of borrowers  to  become  more  and  more risky  over  time.  The  increasing  risk
justifies increasing interest rates.  See Mayer et al., supra note  103, at 12.  Similar reasoning
explains  the  prevalence  of prepayment  penalties:  Assume  that  ex  ante all  borrowers  are
identical,  and  at some  point each  borrower  experiences  a credit  shock that  places  the
borrower  in either  the  low-risk  group  or the  high-risk  group.  Borrowers  can  pay  for the
prepayment option  ex ante, through higher initial rates, before  learning which  risk group
they will belong to.  Or the high-risk borrowers can  pay for the prepayment option that theCORNELL LAW REVIEW
The  possibility  of refinancing  and  prepayment,  together  with  short-
term affordability concerns, can also explain the prevalence of prepay-
ment  penalties-a  specific  deferred-price  dimension.  The  prepay-
ment  option  benefits  borrowers.  And  borrowers  must pay  for  this
benefit.  One  way  to  pay  for  the  prepayment  option  is  through  a
higher  (initial)  interest  rate.135  Short-term  affordability  concerns
render this ex ante payment unattractive.  The alternative  is to pay for
the prepayment option  ex post with  a prepayment penalty.  Put differ-
ently,  the  prepayment  penalty, which  can  be  viewed  as  the  exercise
price of the prepayment option, reduces the value  of the option to the
borrower  but also  reduces  the cost  that  this  option  imposes  on  the
lender.  This  explains  the  lower  interest rates  on  loans with  prepay-
ment penalties. 136  While  this explanation  for  the  prevalence  of pre-
payment  penalties  is  persuasive,  it  is  likely  incomplete.  This
explanation implies that prepayment penalties replace higher interest
rates.  There  is evidence,  however,  that the amounts paid in  penalties
ex post exceed  the  foregone  interest payments  that were  not paid  ex
ante.  137
2.  Speculation
An alternative  rational-choice  explanation  portrays  the deferred-
cost mortgage  as an investment vehicle designed  to facilitate  specula-
tion on real estate  prices. 13 8  This explanation  applies to  the substan-
tial portion-10  percent  in  the subprime  market  and  25  percent  in
the  Alt-A  market-of  loans  that  were  originated  on  investment
properties.' 3 9  It  may  also  apply  to  loans  originated  on  owner-occu-
pied properties.  The  speculator  purchases  a  house with  a deferred-
cost  mortgage  and begins  making  the initial,  low monthly payments.
If  real  estate  prices  go  up,  the  speculator  will  sell  the  house  and
low-risk borrowers exercise through higher long-term  rates.  A third alternative would  have
the low-risk  borrowers who  exercise the prepayment option pay for it through prepayment
penalties.  This  third option  provides valuable  insurance  against  a bad realization  of the
credit shock.  See id. at  12-13.
135  Arguably this is the situation  in the prime market, where prepayment penalties are
less common.
136  See supra Part  lI.A.3.
137  See LaCour-Little  & Holmes,  supra note  101,  at 662  (comparing 2-28  ARMs  with
lower  initial  rates  and  prepayment penalties  to  2-28  ARMs  with  higher initial  rates  and
without prepayment penalties, and finding that the total interest-rate savings is significantly
less than the amount of the expected  prepayment penalty).  Other studies find that adding
a prepayment penalty leads to no  reduction  in  ex ante interest rates  and is, in  fact, associ-
ated  with higher  ex ante interest rates.  See Engel  and McCoy,  supra note  47, at 2060.
138  I  focus  on  the  effects  of  home-price  trends  and  expectations  about  home-price
trends.  A  similar  argument  can be  made  about market  interest  rates  and  expectations
about market  interest rates.
139  Mayer et al., supra note 33,  at 19  (reporting the shares of loans originated on invest-
ment properties in  the subprime  and Alt-A  markets).
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pocket the difference  between the lower buy price and the higher sell
price,  or  the  speculator  will  refinance  the  loan  using  the  increased
equity  to  obtain lower  long-term  rates.  And  if real  estate  prices  go
down,  the speculator will simply default on the mortgage.  The specu-
lator  enjoys  the  upside benefit, while  the  lender  bears the  downside
cost.  This attractive  prospect is purchased  at the bargain price  of the
low, initial payments on a deferred-cost mortgage;  the high, long-term
costs  are avoided.
140
Speculation,  with  the help  of deferred-cost  loans,  is  not  really a
risk-free prospect.  The speculator does not simply default on the mort-
gage.  Default is  costly.  First, in jurisdictions where the lender has re-
course  to the borrower's assets, default places these assets at risk.  It is
important  to  note, however,  that a large number of states,  including
subprime  hot spots  like  California,  Colorado,  Nevada,  and Arizona,
have  no-recourse  laws. 4 1  Even in states without no-recourse  laws, fil-
ing an action  for deficiency  is often not cost effective for the lender,
and thus  the loan becomes a  de facto  no-recourse  loan. 142  A second
cost of default is foregone  equity, although  this cost too  is often small
due to high initial LTVs and even higher LTVs at the time of default
(recall  that default  is triggered  by falling  house  prices).  A third cost
of default  is  the  damage  to  the borrower's  credit  rating and  the  in-
creased  future cost of credit that a damaged credit rating implies.  Fi-
nally,  default  implies  foreclosure  and  relocation-both  costly
prospects.  While there is no consensus estimate for the cost of default
140  Professor  Todd Sinai  articulated  this strategy nicely:
There's  a whole lot of people who would've  been stuck as renters without
these exotic loan  products.  Now it's like they can do their renting from the
bank,  and if house  values go up, they become the owner.  If they go down,
you  have  the choice  to  give  the  house  back  to  the  bank.  You aren't  any
worse off than renting, and  you got a chance  to do  extremely  well.  If it's
heads  I  win, tails  the bank loses, it's worth  the gamble.
John  Leland, Facing  Default, Some Abandon Homes to Banks, N.Y.  TIMES,  Feb.  29,  2008, at Al
(reporting  the statement by  Professor  Sinai).  Professor  Sinai focuses  on  purchase  loans.
See  id. Nevertheless,  it should  be  noted that  the speculation  explanation  applies to  refi-
nance  loans as well.  Adopting the "heads-borrower  wins,  tails-lender loses" strategy  is
rational  for borrowers but not for lenders.  The speculation explanation  is  incomplete ab-
sent an account of lenders'  incentives.  Why did lenders  play along?  Agency problems-
within lending institutions and among the different parties  in the securitization  process-
provide  one set of answers.  See supra note  14 and accompanying  text.  Another  set of an-
swers recognizes that lenders enjoyed a substantial portion of the upside benefit.  In many
cases,  an  increase  in  housing  prices  led  to refinancing  by  the same  lender.  See Gorton,
supra note  14,  at 4-5.
141  See 2  MICHAEL T. MADISON, JEFFRY  R. DWYER,  &  STEVEN W. BENDER,  THE  LAW OF REAL
ESTATE  FINANCING  §  12:69  (rev. ed. 2008).  A full list of state  laws is available at http://www.
foreclosurelaw.org/.  For further discussion,  see  Zywicki  & Adamson,  supra note  11,  at 29
n. 134  ("It is difficult to estimate exactly how many states have antideficiency laws as foreclo-
sure rules  vary a great deal  from state to state, but an approximation  may be about fifteen
to  twenty states,  including many larger states.").
142  See Zywicki  & Adamson,  supra note  11,  at 30.
2009] 1113CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1073
and foreclosure,  for many borrowers  this cost will  amount  to tens  of
thousands  of  dollars.14 3  Despite  the  cost  of default,  however,  the
downside  risk  is  still dominated  by the  upside  benefit as  long as  the
probability of a positive realization is sufficiently high.  In other words,
if house  prices  are  expected  to  rise  high  enough  and  fast  enough,
then speculation  is rational  even  if the  costs incurred in the unlikely
event of default are substantial. 1 44
The question, therefore,  is whether such expectations  of continu-
ing,  rapid  increase  in  house  prices  were  rational  for  borrowers  to
hold.  An  initial  observation  is  that during  the subprime  expansion,
home  prices  were  high  relative  to  underlying  fundamentals.1 45  As
noted by Peter Orszag, the CBO director, "for a time, the expectation
of higher prices became a self-fulfilling  prophecy that bore little  rela-
tion to the underlying determinants of demand, such as demographic
forces,  construction  costs,  and  the  growth  of household  income.'
1 46
But  expectations  that  deviate  from  long-term  fundamentals  are  not
necessarily  irrational.  A rational borrower  may recognize  that home
prices  must fall eventually  but expect that the correction  will not oc-
cur before he exits the market.  This expectation, while it proved to be
erroneous  for many  subprime  and Alt-A  borrowers  ex post,  may well
have been  rational  ex ante.
143  See  ELLEN  SCHLOEMER  ET AL.,  CTR.  FOR  RESPONSIBLE  LENDING,  LOSING  GROUND:
FORECLOSURES  IN  THE SUBPRIME  MARKET AND THEIR  COST TO HOMEOWNERS  16 (2006),  avail-
able  at  http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf  (esti-
mating,  based on  a dataset including  loans originated  between  1998  and 2006  on owner-
occupied homes, that 2.2 million will  lose their homes  to foreclosure,  and they will  lose a
total of $164  billion, which  translates into approximately  $75,000  per  borrower; this  esti-
mate  assumes that borrowers  hold relatively high  equity levels,  and is  therefore  probably
excessive);  Bernanke  March  2008  Speech,  supra note  77  ("A  recent estimate  [of foreclo-
sure-related  costs]  based on  subprime mortgages foreclosed  in the fourth  quarter of 2007
indicated that total  losses exceeded 50  percent of the principal balance,  with  legal,  sales,
and maintenance  expenses  alone  amounting  to more  than  10 percent of principal.").
144  The upside benefit is  also  not as straightforward  as implied  in the initial  descrip-
tion.  Sale and  refinancing  involve transaction  costs  and,  in many  cases, also  prepayment
penalties.  Moreover, even  with increasing house prices, a borrower may be left with low or
negative equity, the result of high initial LTVs and slow-zero or even negative-amortiza-
tion,  severely  reducing  sale and  refinancing  options.  But, again,  this only  means  that  a
rational speculator must have expected  a substantial increase in house prices-an  increase
sufficient to outweigh  the costs and  difficulties of sale  and refinancing.
145  RobertJ. Shiller,  Understanding  Recent Trends in House Prices and Home Ownership 4-5
(Yale Univ. Econ. Dep't, Working  Paper No.  28,  2007),  available at http://www.econ.yale.
edu/ddp/ddp25/ddpOO28.pdf.
146  Hearing,  supra  note  1, at 10.  One indicator, cited by both the CBO and Shiller, that
housing  prices were  high relative  to underlying  fundamentals,  particularly in  2005-2006,
was the ratio of housing prices  to rents.  See CBO OUTLOOK,  supra note 2, at 8; Shiller, supra
note  145,  at 4-5.  On  the  limits  of this indicator,  see Jonathan  McCarthy & Richard  W.
Peach, Are Home Prices the Next 'Bubble',  FED. RES.  BANK N.Y. ECON.  POL'Y REv.,  Dec. 2004, at
1, 7-8;  Housing Price-Rental  Ratios,  http://cboblog.cbo.gov/?p=52  (Dec. 21,  2007,  05:38
EST).
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There were surely some rational speculators in the subprime and
Alt-A markets who rode the real estate bubble armed with accurate  ex
ante estimates  (that turned  out to be false ex post) about the timing of
the bubble's inevitable end. 147  There were also other borrowers-spec-
ulators  with  optimistic  expectations  about  future  house  prices  that
were  not  rationally formed.  Specifically,  the irrational  borrowers  ex-
trapolate from  past price  trends:  if home prices  increased  by  10  per-
cent over the past year, these traders expect that home prices will also
increase  by  10  percent over the  next year.  Indeed,  in  an influential
study, Karl  Case  and  Robert  Shiller  found  that  many  home  buyers
overestimate  the  correlation  between  past  trends  and  future  price
movements; put differently, backward-looking tendencies  drive expec-
tations of future  price growth  (beyond what could  plausibly be justi-
fied  in  a  rational-expectations  model). 148  The  subprime  and  Alt-A
markets experienced both rational and irrational  speculation. 149  The
147  Rational  speculation  is  more  plausibly  attributed  to  the Wall  Street  banks  that
securitized  and  sold  the  MBSs.  Additionally,  the banks'  sophisticated  clients  who  pur-
chased these MBSs may have  also been rational speculators.  And there is reason  to believe
that even  these sophisticated parties were making irrational assessments.  See Hearing,  supra
note 1, at 11  ("[T]he rating agencies appear to have miscalculated  the  risks of some securi-
ties backed by subprime loans, and they may have  unduly emphasized  the unusual period
of appreciating  prices.").
148  See Karl  E.  Case  & Robert J. Shiller,  The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom and Post-
Boom Markets, NEW.  ENG.  ECON.  REv.,  Nov.-Dec.  1988, at 29;  see also  Karl E. Case & RobertJ.
Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing  Market?, 2003 BROOKINGS  PAPERS  ON  ECON.  Ac-riviTy,
No.  2,  at 299; RobertJ.  Shiller, Speculative Prices and Popular  Models,  J. ECON.  PERSP.,  Spring
1990, at 55, 58-61.  Moreover,  Case and Shiller found  that many home buyers  believe that
home prices  cannot decline.  Id. at 59.  Case and Shiller repeated their study for the recent
housing bubble, obtaining  similar results.  See Karl E.  Case  & RobertJ.  Shiller, Home Buyer
Survey Results 1988-2006 (unpublished  paper, Yale  University,  2006); see  also Shiller, supra
note 145,  at 11.  These survey results are also supported by evidence of borrower behavior,
In  particular,  home  buyers  extend  themselves  more-via higher  LTVs  and  higher pay-
ment-to-income ratios-when  buying a home in markets with high historical appreciation
rates.  See Christopher  Mayer  & Todd  Sinai,  Housing  and  Behavioral  Finance  (Sept.  25,
2007)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://real.wharton.upenn.edu/-sinai/pa-
pers/Housing-Behavioral-Boston-Fed-v9.pdf.  In addition, Christopher Mayer  and Todd  Si-
nai found  that "the  lagged five-year  average  of house price  growth  is  positively  associated
with  increases in  the price-rent  ratio."  See id. at 22.  On  the other hand,  contrary  to  the
Case-Shiller survey  results, Mayer  and Sinai  find that the prior year's  house-price  growth
does not affect the  price-rent ratio.  Id. at 23.  Mayer  and Karen Pence found that "[a]  one
standard deviation  increase in  house price  appreciation  in  [2004]  is  associated with  a 39
percent increase in subprime  loans  [in 2005]."  ChristopherJ.  Mayer  & Karen Pence, Sub-
prime Mortgages: What,  Where, and to Whom?  13  (Nat'l Bureau  of Econ.  Research,  Working
Paper No.  14083, 2008),  available  at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1149330.  Since it is a lagged
appreciation  variable  that  is  correlated  with  the increase  in  subprime  originations,  this
finding is consistent with a behavioral story that demand for subprime loans was driven  by
expectations of future house-price  appreciation  based on  extrapolation  from past  trends.
149  This is consistent with a leading economic theory of bubbles, which  posits the exis-
tence of both  rational and  irrational  traders.  SeeJ. Bradford  De  Long et al.,  Noise Trader
Risk in Financial  Markets, 98 J.  POL.  ECON.  703,  705  (1990); J.  Bradford  De  Long et  al.,
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing  Rational Speculation, 45 J.  FIN.  379,  380
(1990);  Andrei Shleifer  & Lawrence  H.  Summers,  The Noise Trader Approach to Finance,  J.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
relative  proportion  of  these  two  species  of speculators  remains  an
open question.
B.  Complexity
1.  Interest Rates
Mortgage  loans, like any other long-term credit product, are sub-
ject to interest-rate risk-the risk that market interest rates will change
over the life of the loan, departing, often substantially, from the inter-
est rates that prevailed at the time of origination.  In a rational-choice
framework,  ARMs,  with  their  complex  formulas  for  setting  interest
rates, are designed to  optimally allocate interest-rate  risk between  the
lender and the borrower.  An FRM allocates all interest-rate risk to the
lender.  A pure ARM, with  an interest rate that closely tracks a market
index, provides  the polar opposite  allocation,  imposing  all  the inter-
est-rate  risk  on the  borrower.  The  more complex-and  more  com-
mon-ARMs, with  caps  that limit interest rate  adjustments,  enable  a
range  of risk  allocations between  these  two  extremes.
ARMs were  initially developed  in the  early 1980s to protect lend-
ers  from  the  interest-rate  risk  that  they  bore  under  the  traditional
FRM. 15 0  In a time when loan originators held mortgages on their own
balance  sheets  shifting  the  risk  to  the  borrower  was  an  important
means of shedding the  risk.  This explanation  for ARMs  is,  however,
less powerful in  the era of securitization.  Originators  no longer bear
interest-rate risk, or they at least bear much less of it.  The securitizers
then spread this risk  among multiple investors, who  are,  as a general
matter, better situated  to bear this risk than the typical  borrower.
2.  Fees
As  explained in Part II, many different services and many differ-
ent  costs  are  associated  with  the  mortgage  transaction.  In  the  past,
most  of these  costs  were  folded  into  the  loan's  interest  rate.  Now
lenders  (and their affiliates:  mortgage  settlement/closing companies
and servicers)  charge  separate  fees for each  service  rendered  or cost
incurred.  There  are  two  rational-choice,  efficiency-based  explana-
tions for  the proliferation  of fees.
First,  to the  extent that some  services are  optional, setting sepa-
rate prices for these services  allows for more efficient  tailoring of the
product  to the  needs  and preferences  of different  borrowers.  This
explanation  is  plausible for some services and fees but not for others.
Specifically,  it is not plausible for the many non-optional services that
ECON.  PERSP.,  Spring 1990, at 19, 28-29; see also ROBERTJ.  SHILLER,  IRRATIONAL  EXUBERANCE
60-64  (2000)  (developing  a market-psychological  theory of bubbles).
150  See Peek,  supra note  80, at 48.
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all borrowers  purchase, such as credit checks, document preparation,
and  appraisals.  Moreover,  evidence  of  "[w]ild  variation"  in  fees
charged  for largely standardized  services  is inconsistent  with  a  claim
that borrowers pay  the cost of optional services  that they request.' 51
The  second  rational-choice  explanation  describes  the  prolifera-
tion  of fees  in subprime mortgage  contracts  as reflecting  a desirable
shift  to risk-based  pricing.  For example,  if the  costs  of delinquency
and  foreclosure  proceedings  are folded  into  the  interest  rate,  then
nondefaulting  borrowers  will  pay for  the  delinquency  and  foreclo-
sures of defaulting borrowers.  Separate late fees and foreclosure  fees
eliminate  this cross-subsidization.  Again,  this explanation  is plausible
for certain fees,  but not for others.
3.  Prepayment and Default
The  (implied) default option  is  an  inevitable  component of any
loan product.  I thus focus on the prepayment option that, while ubiq-
uitous in mortgage  contracts in the United  States, is virtually nonexis-
tent  in most other  countries.' 52  The  prepayment  option  serves  two
main goals:  First, by allowing borrowers who improve their credit rat-
ings to  refinance  into lower-rate loans, the prepayment  option  allows
individuals  to  consider home ownership  earlier.  Second,  the prepay-
ment  option protects  borrowers  from  the  risk of paying  a mortgage
interest rate  that is substantially above the current market rate.  These
benefits, however, should be weighed against the difficulty of valuing a
mortgage  with a prepayment  option.
4.  A  Complex Array of Complex Products
The decision problem faced by a potential borrower is made diffi-
cult by the  complexity of the  typical subprime or Alt-A mortgage  and
even  more  difficult by the  need to  choose among  multiple  complex
mortgage products.  The standard efficiency explanation for the large
variety of products available  in many markets is consumer heterogene-
ity.  In the  mortgage  market, different borrowers  have  different pref-
erences and face different constraints.  A mortgage design that is ideal
for one borrower could be  terrible for another borrower.  With more
products to  choose from, each borrower,  in theory, is  able to  choose
the mortgage  that is best for her.  This explanation,  however, assumes
151  See Mark  D.  Shroder,  The  Value  of the Sunshine Cure: The Efficacy  of the Real Estate
Settlement Procedures  Act Disclosure  Strategy, 9 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEV.  & REs.,  No.  1, at 73, 84
(2007)  (noting, for example,  that the  cost of obtaining  a  credit report,  "a  standard  na-
tional,  largely automated,  service"  is  typically about $50,  yet credit report  fees range from
$25  to $100).
152  Richard  K. Green & Susan M.  Wachter,  The American Mortgage in Historical  and Inter-
national Context, J. ECON.  PERsP.,  Fall  2005, at 93,  101.
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that informed choice  is possible,  despite the high level  of complexity
of the choice  problem.15
1
C.  Summary
Efficiency-based  rational-choice  theories  can  explain  many,
though not all, of the contractual design features observed in the sub-
prime and Alt-A markets.  Moreover, even for the design features  that
can  be  explained  within  a  rational-choice  framework,  the  rational-
choice  theories have  only limited reach.  The rational-choice  theories
explain  the  demand structure  of rational borrowers  and the contrac-
tual-design  response  to  this demand.  As  shown below,  however,  not
all  borrowers,  and  especially  not all  subprime  and  Alt-A  borrowers,
were  financially  sophisticated,  rational  borrowers. 154  The  rational-
choice  theories  leave  an explanatory  gap.  I now turn  to  the  task  of
filling this gap.155
IV
A BEHAWoRAL-ECONOMIcs  THEORY
The subprime  mortgage  contract is a product of the interaction
between  the  forces of supply and demand  in the subprime mortgage
market.  When lenders respond  to  a demand for financing  that is in-
fluenced by borrower psychology, the resulting loan contract will fea-
ture deferred costs and a high  level  of complexity. 156
153  A more sophisticated  rational-choice  explanation  recognizes  that complexity-of a
single product and of the array of offered products-increases  the cost of shopping.  When
shopping costs  more, the rational borrower will shop less.  Since shopping creates  a posi-
tive externality,  there  is  a risk  that the  market will  produce  an inefficiently high  level  of
complexity.
154  See infra Part IV.C.
155  In theory, the demand generated by rational borrowers, even  if they are a minority,
could determine the contractual  design of all mortgage contracts, including  those offered
to imperfectly rational borrowers.  Cf Alan Schwartz  & Louis  L. Wilde,  Intervening in Mar-
kets on the Basis of Imperfect Information:  A  Legal and Economic Analysis, 127  U.  PA.  L. REv.  630,
633-34 (1979)  (noting that courts and legislatures often determine  and enforce purchase
terms based on  their conception  of rational  consumer preferences).  This theory assumes
that lenders cannot, or cannot efficiently, discriminate  between  the two groups  of borrow-
ers and offer different contracts  to  the different groups.  This assumption  is unrealistic  in
the  subprime  and Alt-A  mortgage  markets.  Note  that,  to  exercise  such  discrimination,
lenders need  not identify in  advance  the  rational  borrowers  and the imperfectly rational
borrowers.  Instead,  lenders  only need  to offer  two sets  of contracts-one  attractive  to ra-
tional  borrowers  and  the other  attractive  to  imperfectly rational  borrowers-and let  the
borrowers  self-select.  See Bar-Gill  & Warren,  supra note  18, at 35-36  (describing a market
experiment  in which  a  bank "offered consumers  a  choice  between  two  credit card con-
tracts: one with  an annual fee and a lower interest rate, and one with  no annual  fee and a
higher interest rate").
156  For  a  good,  early  behavioral  analysis  of mortgage-market  imperfections,  see  Es-
kridge, supra  note 24, at 1112-18  (arguing that the high stress involved  in the home-buying
and mortgage-borrowing  process leads many buyers-borrowers to acquire insufficient infor-
mation and to make suboptimal choices).  Eskridge also discusses  the influence of agents-
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A.  Deferred  Costs
The  behavioral-economics  explanation  for  deferred-cost  con-
tracts is based on evidence that future costs are often underestimated.
When  future  costs  are  underestimated,  contracts  with  deferred-cost
features  become  more attractive  to borrowers and  thus to lenders.' 57
Consider  a  simplified  loan  contract  with  two  price  dimensions:  a
short-term price,  PsT, and a long-term price, PLT.  Assume that the opti-
mal mortgage  contract sets  PST =  5 and PLT = 5,  as these prices provide
optimal incentives and minimize  total costs.  If borrowers are rational,
lenders  will  offer  this optimal  contract.  Now assume  that borrowers
underestimate  future  costs.  For concreteness,  assume that borrowers
perceive  the  long-term  payments  to  be  one-half of the  actual  long-
term payments:  PLT = 1/2  " PLT.  As a result of such misperception, lend-
ers will no longer offer the optimal contract.  To see this, compare the
optimal contract, the  (5,5)  contract, with an  inefficient, deferred-cost
contract setting  PST  =  3 and  PLT =  8,  the  (3,8)  contract.  Assume  that
under both  contracts,  the lender just covers  the  total cost of making
the loan.  (The total cost is higher under the inefficient, deferred-cost
contract: 8 + 3 > 5 + 5.)  Total payments under the optimal contract, as
perceived by the imperfectly rational borrowers, would be P(5,5)  =  5 +
1/2  • 5  =  7.5. 158  Perceived  total  payments  under  the  inefficient,  de-
ferred-cost contract would be P(3,8)  = 3 + 1/2  • 8 =  7.  Borrowers would
prefer,  and  thus  lenders  will  offer,  the  inefficient,  deferred-cost
contract.1
59
brokers whose interests are not aligned with those of the buyers, arguing that these agents-
brokers  take advantage of buyers'  imperfect  information  and imperfect rationality.  See id.
at  1118-23.
157  The CBO has recently suggested that "[t]he  rise in defaults  ofsubprime mortgages
may also reflect the fact that some borrowers lacked a complete understanding of the com-
plex terms of their mortgages and assumed  mortgages that they would have  trouble repay-
ing."  Hearing,  supra note  1,  at  13.  Further,  "[c]ertain  ARMs  may have  been among  the
more difficult mortgages for first-time borrowers to understand.  Many of those mortgages
made  in  recent years  included  teaser  rates,  which  may  have  confused  some  borrowers
about the eventual  size of their mortgage payments when their mortgage  rates were reset."
Id. at 21  n.3.
158  Time  discounting is  ignored for simplicity.
159  Cf DAVID  MILES,  THE  U.K.  MORTGAGE  MARKET:  TAKING  A  LONGER-TERM  VIEW,  IN-
TERIM  REPORT:  INFORMATION,  INCENTIVES  AND  PRICING 3  (2003),  available  at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/consultmiles  index.htm  (noting that borrowers  tend  to focus dispropor-
tionately on the initial, rather than the long-term,  cost of a loan); Monica  Paiella & Alberto
Franco Pozzolo, Choosing Between Fixed and Adjustable Rate  Mortgages  I  (Mar. 26,  2007)
(unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=976346  (finding,  based
the  Bank of Italy's  Survey of Household  Income and  Wealth,  that "ARM  holders  do not
fully take into account the risk of a rise of the reference interest rates.  On the other hand,
lenders price quite expensively  this risk and borrowers end up paying a high  price for the
benefit of low initial  pay'ments.").
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There are several reasons to expect systematic underestimation  of
future  costs.  Myopia  is one  such  reason. 160  High  LTV contracts  are
attractive  to  myopic  borrowers,  who  place  excessive  weight  on  the
short-term  benefits  of a low  down  payment  (or a  large  cash-out  in  a
refinance  loan)  and  insufficient  weight  on  the  long-term  conse-
quences  of a high LTV, such  as  higher interest payments and greater
difficulty  to refinance.  Escalating-payments  contracts are  similarly at-
tractive  to myopic borrowers, who place excessive  weight on the initial
low payments and insufficient weight on the future high payments.161
Myopia will also lead borrowers  to discount the costs associated with a
prepayment  penalty-the  penalty  itself  or  the  cost  of  delayed
prepayment.
Another bias that is responsible for the underestimation  of future
costs  is  optimism.  Borrowers might  be  optimistic  about their future
income.  They might also  optimistically underestimate  the probability
that an adverse contingency,  such as job loss, accident, or illness, will
bring about financial hardship. 62  As  a result, borrowers  might over-
estimate  their  ability  to  service  a loan with  high,  deferred  costs.  In
addition,  borrowers  might overestimate  their ability  to  refinance  the
160  An especially  troubling manifestation of myopia is the  problem of insufficient sav-
ing for retirement.  See Brigitte  C. Madrian  & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia
in  401(k) Participation and Savings  Behavior, 116  Q.J.  ECON.  1149,  1150  (2001)  (docu-
menting the problem of insufficient  saving for retirement);  Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic
Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic  Theory,  58  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  1275,  1275
(1991)  ("Left to their  own devices, many people will  not save enough  for their old age.").
161  See  Rick  Brooks  & Ruth  Simon,  Subprime Debacle Traps Even  Very  Credit-Worthy: As
Housing Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader  Market, WALL  ST. J., Dec.  3,  2007, at Al
("During  the  housing  boom,  the  lower  introductory  rate  on  adjustable-rate  mortgages
made them feel closer in cost to regular loans to many subprime  borrowers, but those rates
can jump after two  or three years.  Brokers had  extra incentives  to sell those  loans, which
have  terms  that often  are confusing to borrowers.").  The  term "payment shock,"  used  to
describe the  experience of a borrower who has seen his  interest rate reset and his monthly
payment increase,  implies a less than perfect understanding of this contractual design  fea-
ture.  The term  "payment shock" is used, for example,  by  the  FRB and the  FTC.  See FED.
RESERVE  BD.,  CONSUMER  HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE  RATE  MORTGAGES  20 (2006),  available  at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/armsenglish.htm;  FRB,  INTEREST  ONLY,  supra
note  127;  FTC Comment, supra note  66,  at 9.
162  See Ola  Svenson,  Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47
ACTA  PSYCHOLOGICA  143,  143  (1981)  (describing a study revealing that the majority of peo-
ple "regard themselves  as  more  skillful  and  less  risky than  the  average  driver");  Neil D.
Weinstein,  Unrealistic  Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY  &  SOC.  PSYCHOL.
806,  806  (1980)  (describing  two  studies revealing  that people  tend to  be  unrealistically
optimistic about future life events); see also In  re Eashai,  87 F.3d  1082, 1090  (9th Cir. 1996)
("[W]e recognize the fragility of human nature.  '[H]uman  experience  tells us debtors can
be unreasonably optimistic despite their financial circumstances."'  (quoting In re Cox,  182
B.R.  626,  635  (Bankr.  D.  Mass.  1995)));  TERESA  A.  SULLIVAN,  ELIZABETH  WARREN  & JAY
LAWRENCE  WESTBROOK,  THE  FRAGILE  MIDDLE  CLASS: AMERICANS  IN  DEBT  114  (2000)  ("The
recently unemployed,  hopeful that they will be back at work  in a matter of days or weeks,
may not be prepared  to  tell the children  there  will be no new soccer shoes  this season or
no back-to-school  clothes.").
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loan at an attractive rate and to avoid the high, long-term  costs associ-
ated with a deferred-cost  loan  by doing so.  Such overestimation  may
result from optimism about future home prices, about future interest
rates, and about the borrower's  future credit score.
Some  borrowers  were  myopic  and  optimistic.  Moreover,  some
lenders  and  brokers  reinforced  borrowers'  myopia and  optimism.' 63
These  biases  provide  an  alternative,  behavioral  explanation  for  the
prevalence of cost deferral.  Myopia  and optimism  explain why short-
term  affordability, rather  than  rational,  long-term  affordability,  took
center stage in  the subprime and Alt-A markets. 164  These biases, and
especially optimism about future  house prices,  also add an important
dose of reality  to the speculation  explanation. 165
B.  Complexity
The  typical subprime and Alt-A mortgage contract is  complex.  It
specifies  numerous  interest rates, fees,  and  penalties,  the magnitude
and  applicability  of which  may  be  contingent  on  unknown  future
events.  A  rational  borrower  will  navigate  this  complexity  with  ease.
She will  accurately  assess  the  probability of triggering  each  rate,  fee,
and penalty, and she will accurately calculate  the expected magnitude
of each rate, fee, and penalty.  Accordingly,  each price dimension  will
be  afforded  the  appropriate  weight  in  the  overall  evaluation  of the
mortgage  product.
The  imperfectly rational borrower, however,  is incapable of such
an accurate  assessment.  He is  unable  to calculate  prices  that are not
directly specified.  Even if he could perform  this calculation, he would
163  See Truth in Lending, 73  Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,542 (July 30, 2008)  (to be codified at
12  C.F.R.  pt, 226)  ("In  addition,  originators may  sometimes  encourage  borrowers  to be
excessively optimistic about  their ability  to  refinance should  they be unable  to sustain  re-
payment.  For example,  they  sometimes offer  reassurances  that interest rates  will remain
low and house prices will  increase; borrowers may be swayed by such reassurances  because
they believe the sources are experts.");  see also Complaint, People v. Countrywide  Fin. Corp.
(Cal. Super. Ct. June  24, 2008)  (claiming that Countrywide  encouraged  borrowers to take
complex  hybrid  and option  ARMs  by  emphasizing  low teaser  rates and  misrepresenting
long-term costs)  (the complaint,  the California settlement, signed  by  the California Attor-
ney General on  October 6, 2008, and the Multistate Settlement Term Sheet, signed by the
Attorneys  General  of  Arizona,  Connecticut,  Florida,  Illinois,  Iowa,  Michigan,  Nevada,
North  Carolina,  Ohio,  and  Texas,  can  be found  at  http://www.consumerlaw.org/unre-
ported); Gretchen  Morgenson,  Countrywide Subpoenaed by Illinois,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Dec.  13,  2007,
at CI  (stating that the  Illinois Attorney  General  sued a  Chicago  mortgage broker  and  is
investigating Countrywide Financial,  the broker's primary lender, for abusive lending prac-
tices,  specifically  pushing  borrowers  into payment-option  ARMs  by  emphasizing the  low
short-term  payments  and  deemphasizing  the high  long-term  costs).
164  See supra Part  III.A. 1.
165  See supra Part III.A.2.  Cf  Robin  Greenwood  & Stefan  Nagel,  Inexperienced Investors
and Bubbles (Nat'l Bureau  of Econ.  Research, Working Paper No. 14111,  2008),  available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl4111  (arguing that less experienced  investment managers
were  more likely  to exhibit irrational  trend-chasing  behavior).
2009] 1121CORNELL LAW REVIEW
be  unable  to  simultaneously  consider  ten  or fifteen  (or  even  more)
price  dimensions.  And  even  if he  could  recall  all  the  price  dimen-
sions, he would be unable  to calculate  the impact of these  prices  on
the total  cost of the  loan.  While  the rational  borrower is unfazed by
complexity,  the  imperfectly  rational  borrower  might  be  misled  by
complexity.
The imperfectly rational borrower deals with complexity by ignor-
ing  it.  He  simplifies  his  decision  problem  by  ignoring  nonsalient
price dimensions. 166  And he approximates, rather than calculates,  the
impact of the salient dimensions  that cannot be ignored.  In particu-
lar, limited  attention and  limited memory  might result in  the  exclu-
sion  of  certain  price  dimensions  from  consideration.' 67   Limited
processing  ability might prevent  borrowers from  accurately aggregat-
ing the different price  components  into a single,  total expected price
that would serve  as the basis for choosing the  optimal loan.168
Increased  complexity  may  be  attractive  to  lenders,  as  it  allows
them  to hide the true cost of the loan in  a multidimensional  pricing
maze.  A lender who understands the imperfectly rational response to
complexity can use complexity to her advantage-to create an appear-
ance  of a  lower  total  price  without  actually  lowering  the  price.  For
example,  if the tax  certification fee  and the late payment  fee are not
salient to  borrowers,  lenders  will  raise  the  magnitude  of these  price
dimensions.  Increasing  these  prices  will  not hurt demand.  On  the
contrary,  it will  enable  the  lender  to  attract  borrowers  by  reducing
more salient price  dimensions.169  This strategy depends  on the exis-
tence  of nonsalient  price  dimensions.  When  the  number  of  price
dimensions goes  up, the number of nonsalient price dimensions  can
also  be  expected  to go up.  Lenders  thus  have  a  strong incentive  to
increase  complexity and multidimensionality.
166  SeeRichard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12J. BEI-Hv.  DECISION  MAKING  183,
194  (1999)  (finding that small disaggregated  fees are  ignored).
167  Cf Truth in  Lending,  73  Fed.  Reg. at 44,525-26.
168  See GAO  AMP  REPORT,  supra  note  43, at Abstract  ("Regulators  and others are con-
cerned  that  borrowers  may  not be well-informed  about  the  risks  of AMPs,  due to  their
complexity and  because  promotional  materials by  some lenders  and brokers  do not pro-
vide balanced  information on AMPs benefits and risks."); FTC Comment, supra note 66, at
14  ("[F]or  loans  with  more  complexity-such  as  nontraditional  mortgages-consumers
face  further challenges  in understanding  all significant  terms  and  costs.").  For over  five
years, HUD has been working on reforming the home buying process, specifically through
increased  transparency regarding  closing costs.  See Mary  McGarity,  Closing Nirvana, MORT-
GAGE  BANKING, Aug. 2005, at 32  (quoting HUD Secretary AlphonsoJackson  as saying, "Buy-
ing a home today is too complicated,  confusing and costly....  Each year Americans spend
approximately  $55  billion on  closing costs  they don't fully  understand.").
169  See Bar-Gill,  Consumer Contracts, supra note 18, at 771-78; see also  Willis,  supra note 4,
at  725-26  (describing  how  "a  lender  can  creatively  manipulate  each  component  of the
price of a loan  to effect  a desired  predicted  return").
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Lenders also have a strong incentive  to increase  the complexity of
salient price  dimensions, like  the options  in an  option ARM and  the
adjusting interest rate in a 2-28 hybrid with adjustment caps.  The bor-
rower who  is unable  to  calculate  these  prices will  try to  approximate
them.  Complexity  is attractive  to  lenders  as  long  as  the  borrower's
approximation  is  an underestimation.
170
Finally,  complexity  can  be  expected  to  increase  as  borrowers
learn to effectively incorporate  more price dimensions into their deci-
sion.  If lenders significantly  increase  the  magnitude  of a  nonsalient
price dimension, borrowers will eventually learn  to focus on this price
dimension  and  it will  become  salient.  Lenders  will  have  to find  an-
other  nonsalient price dimension.  When they run  out of nonsalient
prices in  the existing contractual  design, they can create  new ones by
adding more interest rates, fees, or penalties.  Similarly, borrowers will
eventually learn  to accurately  estimate even  prices  that, while salient,
are indirectly defined using complex formulae  and whose impact de-
pends  on a host of unknown future  realizations.  When this happens,
lenders will have  an incentive  to increase even further the complexity
of these  or other prices. 171
C.  Heterogeneity  in Cognitive  Ability
The  limits  of the  rational-choice  theories,  explored  in  Part  III,
opened  the  door  to  the  consideration  of an alternative,  behavioral-
economics  theory.  I  have  argued  that such  a  theory,  by integrating
psychology  and  economics,  can  explain  the  contractual  design  fea-
tures observed in the subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets.  But the
two  theoretical  approaches-the  neoclassical,  rational-choice  ap-
proach  and  the  behavioral  approach-are  not  mutually  exclusive.
The rational-choice  theories explain  the behavior of the more sophis-
ticated borrowers and the market's response-specifically the contrac-
tual design response-to  the  demand generated  by these  borrowers.
Meanwhile,  the  behavioral-economics  theory  explains  the  demand
170  See Brian  Bucks &  Karen  Pence,  Do Homeowners Know  Their House Values and Mort-
gage Terms? 1  (Bd.  of Governors  of the  Fed.  Reserve  Sys.,  Fin.  &  Econ.  Discussion  Series
Paper  No.  2006-3,  2006),  available at  http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/
200603/200603pap.pdf  (noting  that  ARM  borrowers  "appear  to  underestimate  or  not
know how much  their interest rates could change").
171  A  series  of  recent  papers  in  industrial  organization  argue  that  firms  introduce
spurious  complexity into tariff structures and by doing so inhibit competition  and reduce
welfare.  See, e.g.,  Glenn  Ellison, A  Model of Add-On Pricing,  120 QJ. ECON.  585  (2005); Xav-
ier Gabaix  & David  Laibson,  Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppres-
sion in Competitive Markets, 121  Q.J. EcoN. 505  (2006);  Ran Spiegler,  Competition over Agents
with Boundedly Rational  Expectations, 1 THEORETICAL  ECON.  207 (2006); Glenn Ellison & Sara
Fisher Ellison,  Search, Obfuscation, and Price  Elasticities  on the Internet (Nat'l Bureau  of Econ.
Research,  Working  Paper  No.  10570,  2004),  available at http://wwiv.nber.org/papers/
w10570.pdf.
2009] 1123CORNELL LAW REVIEW
generated  by less  sophisticated  borrowers and  how lenders designed
their contracts  in response  to this demand.
In  a  companion  piece,  co-authored  with  Sumit  Agarwal,  Gene
Amromin,  Zahi Ben-David,  and  Sewin  Chen, I  investigate  empirically
the relative  importance  of the rational-choice  theory and  the  behav-
ioral-economics  theory in  explaining  the  contractual  design  of sub-
prime  and  Alt-A  mortgage  contracts.  Pending  the  results  of  this
ongoing study,  the relative  domain of the  two competing  theoretical
approaches can be indirectly assessed  using evidence on the cognitive
abilities of borrowers.  Available  evidence  suggests  that imperfect ra-
tionality is pervasive in the residential mortgage market and especially
in the  subprime  market. 172  A  recent  study,  by Sumit Agarwal,  Gene
Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David,  Souphala Chomsisengphet, and Douglas
D.  Evanoff, found  that  mandated  financial  counseling  is  correlated
with  less  risky  ARM  contracts,  specifically  with  higher  short-term
teaser rates  and  lower  long-term  rates. 173  These  counseling  sessions
likely respond  not  only  to an information  deficit  among borrowers,
but also  to a  cognitive deficit.
Survey  studies and  consumer testing conducted  by  the FRB and
the FTC found that borrowers do not understand mortgage  terms. 174
Also,  the FTC,  in testing  the efficacy  of proposed  disclosures,  identi-
fied substantial  framing  effects: different  disclosure forms  containing
the same information led to different choices-a result that would not
be expected  if borrowers were  perfectly rational. 175
Other studies have documented  specific mistakes  that borrowers
consistently  make.  A  recent  study  by  Sumit Agarwal,  John  Driscoll,
Xavier  Gabaix  and  David  Laibson  identified  persistent  mistakes  in
172  See Howard  Lax  et al.,  Subprime Lending: An  Investigation of Economic Efficiency,  15
HOUSING  POL'Y DEBATE  533, 544-46  (2004)  (noting that subprime  borrowers  tend  to  be
less educated and less sophisticated  about the mortgage  market).
173  Sumit Agarwal  et al.,  Can Mandated Financial Counseling Improve Mortgage Decision-
Making? Evidence from a Natural Experiment 27  (Fisher  Coll. of Bus.,  Working  Paper  No.
2008-03-019,  2009),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1285603.  This study  also found
that the mandated  financial  counseling led to a decline in  the demand  for credit.  Id. at 3;
see also ROBERTJ.  SHILLER,  THE  SUBPRIME SOLUTION: How  TODAY'S GLOBAL  FINANCIAL  CRISIS
HAPPENED,  AND  WHAT  TO Do  ABOUT  IT  124  (2008)  (noting that most people  need  to be
financially  educated);  Annamaria  Lusardi,  Household Saving Behavior: The Role  of Financial
Literacy, Information, and Financial  Education Programs 2  (Nat'l  Bureau  of Econ.  Research,
Working Paper  No. 13824,  2008),  available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13824  (argu-
ing that households enter into risky financial contracts due to lack of financial education).
174  See LACKO  & PAPPALARDO,  supra  note  104, at ES-6 (demonstrating the limits of mort-
gage disclosures and noting that many borrowers "did not understand important costs and
terms of their own  recently  obtained  mortgages.  Many  had loans  that were  significantly
more costly  than they believed, or contained  significant  restrictions, such  as prepayment
penalties, of which  they  were  unaware.");  Bucks  & Pence,  supra note  170.
175  SeeJAMES  M.  LACKO  & JANIS K.  PAPPALARDO,  FED.  TRADE  COMM'N,  THE  EFFECT  OF
MORTGAGE  BROKER  COMPENSATION  DISCLOSURES  ON  CONSUMERS  AND  COMPETITION: A  CON-
TROLLED  EXPERIMErr,  at ES-7  (2004).
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loan applications that increased borrowers'  APRs by an average  of 125
basis  points.1 76  Another  study,  by  Susan  Woodward,  identified  sys-
temic  mistakes  leading  to  excessive  broker  fees  of up  to  $1,500.177
And numerous  studies  have  documented  borrowers'  failure  to  make
optimal  refinancing  decisions:  Many  consumers  fail  to  exercise  op-
tions to  refinance  their mortgages and thereby end up with  rates that
are substantially higher than  the  market rate.  Other consumers refi-
nance too early, failing to account for the possibility that interest rates
will continue to decline.1 78  According to one estimate,  these refinanc-
ing mistakes can  cost borrowers  tens of thousands  of dollars or up to
25 percent of the loan's value.
1 79
Evidence of rapid defaults, within six to twelve months of origina-
tion, 180  provides further  support to  the behavioral-economics  theory.
One  explanation  for borrowers'  inability "to  afford  the monthly  pay-
176  See Sumit Agarwal  et al.,  The Age of Reason:  Financial  Decisions over the  Lifecycle
9-11  (Oct.  21,  2008)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at  http://ssrn.com/
abstract=973790.
177  See Susan  E. Woodward,  Consumer  Confusion  in  the  Mortgage  Market  (July  14,
2003)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at www.sandhillecon.com/pdf/consumercon-
fusion.pdf;  see aLsoJohn  Y. Campbell,  Household Finance,  61 J. FIN.  1553,  1589  (2006)  (citing
Woodward,  supra).
178  See Campbell,  supra note  177,  at  1579,  1581,  1590; LaCour-Little  & Holmes,  supra
note 101,  at 644  (describing the "apparent irrationality on the part of mortgage borrowers,
who fail  to default to the extent predicted when  house prices fall and fail  to prepay to the
extent predicted  when interest rates fall");  Agarwal  et al.,  supra note  120, at 3  (surveying
evidence  that borrowers  fail  to  make optimal  refinancing  decisions);  see also Robert Van
Order, Simon  Firestone & Peter Zorn,  The Performance of Low Income and Minority Mortgages
(Ross  Sch.  of  Bus.,  Working  Paper  No.  1083,  2007),  available at http://ssn.com/ab-
stract=1003444.  Similar  mistakes  have  been  identified  in  the  U.K.  See MILES,  supra note
159,  at  33;  Campbell,  supra note  177,  at  1588.  Others  have argued  that apparently  irra-
tional refinancing patterns can be explained within a rational-choice framework that allows
for heterogeneous  transaction  costs and accounts for relocation and liquidity motives.  See
Michael LaCour-Little, Another Look at the Role of Borrower Characteristics  in Predicting  Mortgage
Prepayments, 10J.  HOUSING  RES.  45,  47  (1999)  (emphasizing  the  role of transaction  costs
and  relocation and liquidity  motives);  Richard Stanton, Rational Prepayment and the Valua-
tion of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 8 REv. FIN.  STUD.  677, 681,  706  (1995)  (arguing that heter-
ogeneous  transaction  costs  and  exogenous  factors  such  as  divorce  and  sudden
unemployment  can explain  seemingly irrational  refinancing  behavior).  The  problem  of
deriving  the  optimal  time  for  prepayment  is  a  complex  one,  and  it  can  only  be solved
numerically  with  the  help  of  high-powered  computers.  Recently,  Agarwal  and  his  col-
leagues  have shown  that the optimal prepayment decision  can  be approximated  using  an
implementable  formula.  See Agarwal  et al.,  supra note  120,  at 5-6.
179  SeeAgarwal  et al.,  supra note  120, at 25  ("[M]arket data ...  shows  that many house-
holds did  refinance  too close  to the NPV break-even  rule  during  the last  15 years  .... ").
Following  the  NPV rule,  instead  of the optimal-refinancing  rule,  leads  to  substantial ex-
pected losses:  $26,479  on a $100,000  mortgage, $49,066  on a $250,000  mortgage, $86,955
on a $500,000  mortgage, $163,235  on a $1,000,000  mortgage.  Id. at 28  tbl.5.
180  See Mayer et al., supra note 33, at 16  (noting that "2 percent of outstanding loans in
the  2007 vintage  were in  default within six months of origination,  and 8  percent were  in
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ments almost from the moment of origination" 1 81  is that they did not
fully understand  the extent of the obligations that they were undertak-
ing. Evidence  that loan prices are affected  by factors unrelated  to the
risk of nonpayment provides  indirect evidence  of borrower mistakes:
both data and testimony by loan  officers suggest that many borrowers
who would  qualify for prime loans ended up with  higher-priced  sub-
prime mortgages-an  indication  of systematic  mistakes.18 2  Evidence
that  borrowers  who  consider  two  or  more  price  dimensions  when
shopping for a loan end up paying more for the loan than borrowers
who  consider  only a  single  price dimension 1 8 3 provides  further  sup-
port for  the behavioral  explanation.
It seems  that few  people dispute  the fact that at least some bor-
rowers  did not enter  into their subprime  mortgage  contracts  with  a
full understanding  of the costs and benefits associated with these con-
tracts.  The FRB, in justifying its new mortgage regulations, referred to
borrowers who "unwittingly accept[ed]  loans" with terms that they did
not fully understand. 184  Likewise,  the CBO concluded that "[t] he rise
in defaults  of subprime mortgages  may also reflect the fact that some
borrowers lacked a  complete understanding of the complex  terms of
their mortgages and assumed mortgages that they would have  trouble
repaying."
18 5
A clarification  is in order.  In theory, an incomplete  understand-
ing  of  complex  contracts  is  consistent  with  rational-choice  theory.
Facing a complex  mortgage  contract, a rational borrower would have
to spend time  reading  the  contract and  deciphering its meaning.  If
181  See id. Other  early defaulters  were rational  speculators, who  stopped paying when
house prices  stopped rising.  Id.
182  SeeJames  H. Carr & Lopa Kolluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview, in FINANCIAL  SER-
VICES  IN  DISTRESSED  COMMUNITIES:  ISSUES  AND  ANSWERS  31,  37  (2001)  (recording estimates
by Freddie  Mac and Fannie  Mae  that between  35 percent and 50 percent  of borrowers  in
the  subprime  market could  qualify for  prime market  loans);  Lew Sichelman,  Community
Group Claims CitiFinancial  Still Predatory, ORIGINATION  NEWS,  Jan.  2002,  at  25  (reporting
that, in  2002, researchers at Citibank concluded that at least 40 percent of those who were
sold high interest rate, subprime  mortgages would have  qualified for prime-rate loans);  see
also Willis, supra  note  4, at 730; Morgenson, supra note 99, at 9 (recounting that in Decem-
ber 2006, in an agreement with the New York State Attorney General,  Countrywide agreed
"to compensate  black and  Latino  borrowers  to whom  it  had  improperly  given  high-cost
loans  in  2004").
183  Woodward, supra note  177,  at 2.
184  Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,525-26  (July 30,  2008)  (to be codified at
12  C.F.R.  pt. 226)  ("Consumers  who  do  not fully  understand  such  terms and  features,
however, are less able to appreciate  their risks, which  can be significant.  For example,  the
payment  may  increase sharply and a prepayment  penalty may hinder the consumer  from
refinancing  to avoid the payment increase.  Thus, consumers may unwittingly accept loans
that they  will have  difficulty  repaying.").
185  See Hearing,  supra note  1,  at 13;  see also GAO  CONSUMER  PROTECrION REPORT,  supra
note  17, at 14  (describing borrowers "who  lack sophistication about  financial  matters, are
not highly educated,  or suffer  physical  or mental  infirmities").
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the cost of attaining perfect information and perfect understanding of
the  contract  is high,  the  rational  borrower  would  stop  short  of this
theoretical  ideal.  In  fact,  imperfect  rationality  can  be  viewed  as  yet
another cost of attaining more information and better understanding.
When  this  cost  component  is  added,  the  total  cost  of becoming  in-
formed goes up, and thus the borrower will end up with less informa-
tion and a less complete understanding of the contract.  The observed
levels  of misunderstanding  suggest that  many borrowers  were  incur-
ring  this added cost of imperfect rationality.1
8 6
Imperfect rationality, however, is not simply another cost compo-
nent.  A  rational borrower who  decides  not to  invest  in reading and
deciphering  certain  contractual  provisions  in  the  mortgage  contract
will not assume that these provisions are favorable  to her.  In fact, she
will recognize  that unread provisions  will generally  be pro-lender.  In
contrast,  an imperfectly rational borrower  will  completely ignore  the
unread or forgotten terms or naively assume that they are favorable  to
him.  Accordingly,  a  complex,  unread  term  or  a  hidden  fee  would
lead an imperfectly rational borrower-but  not a rational borrower-
to underestimate  the total cost of the loan.  As  a result, the incentive
to increase complexity and hide fees will be stronger in a market with
imperfectly rational borrowers.  The behavioral theory of contract de-
sign  is  an  imperfect-rationality  theory, not an imperfect-information
theory. 1
8 7
D.  Market  Correction
Individuals  are  imperfectly  informed  and  imperfectly  rational.
Yet  most  markets  work  reasonably  well  despite  these  imperfections.
Several  market-correction  mechanisms  operate  to  minimize  the  ef-
fects of imperfect  information  and imperfect  rationality.  These cor-
rection  forces  are  present  also  in  the  subprime  and  Alt-A  mortgage
markets.  As  I  discuss  below, however,  they are weaker in  these  mar-
kets.  For  this  reason,  borrower  mistakes  persisted  in  the  subprime
and Alt-A markets  for a prolonged  period of time, and  the desirable
changes  that we  are now seeing in lending practices began only after
the subprime market collapsed.
186  See, e.g.,  Bucks & Pence,  supra note  170, at  19-20  (finding that many borrowers  do
not even  know that they have  an ARM  rather  than  a  FRM).
187  Cf Philip  Bond, David  K. Musto  & Bilge Yilmaz,  Predatory  Mortgage Lending 3  (Fed.
Reserve  Bank of Phila., Working  Paper No. 08-24,  2008),  available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1288094  (demonstrating that "a realistic information  asymmetry between borrowers
and lenders is enough to generate [predatory  mortgage lending] and can explain  (at least
qualitatively)  when and where  it occurs").
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1.  On the Demand Side: Learning  by  Borrowers
Individuals  make  mistakes.1 8 8  But  individuals  also  learn  from
their mistakes and learn not to repeat these  mistakes.  While learning
is  not absent from  the  mortgage  market, it  is  slower.  The  reason  is
that  the  mortgage  contracts  that individuals  sign  over  a  lifetime  are
few  and  far between. 189  Interpersonal  learning  can  compensate  for
limited  intrapersonal  learning,  as  borrowers  share  mortgage-related
experiences.  Interpersonal  learning,  however,  is not always  common
enough and  detailed enough  to  eliminate  mistakes.  More  generally,
the  evidence  shows  that  learning  about  financial  decisions  is
incomplete.' 90
In  many  markets,  effective  learning  occurs  when  individuals,
aware  of their  limitations, seek  expert  advice.  This  mechanism  also
works imperfectly in the mortgage market.  Borrowers commonly seek
the  advice  of mortgage  brokers  who  face  an  incentive  structure  that
prevents them from being loyal agents of the borrower.191  Moreover,
188  Not all individuals make mistakes.  In theory, even a minority of informed, sophisti-
cated borrowers  will induce  sellers to offer welfare-maximizing  products and contracts.  See
Alan  Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde,  Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Exam-
pies of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA.  L. REv.  1387  (1983);  Schwartz  & Wilde,  supra
note  155; Alan Schwartz  & Louis L. Wilde, Product Quality and Imperfect Information, 52 Rv.
ECON.  STUD.  251,  251-52  (1985).  The informed-minority  argument has  only limited  rele-
vance  in the subprime mortgage market, where  lenders can  segment the market, offering
different contracts  to sophisticated  and  less-sophisticated  borrowers.  See Bar-Gill  & War-
ren, supra note  18, at 22-23;  Eskridge, supra note  24,  at  1141-43.
189  SeeTruth in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg.  1672,  1676 (proposedJan. 9, 2008)  (to be codi-
fied  at  12  C.F.R. pt.  226)  ("Disclosures  themselves,  likely cannot provide  this  minimum
understanding  for  transactions  that  are  complex  and  that consumers  engage  in  infre-
quently.");  Shlomo Benartzi  & Richard H. Thaler,  Heuristics  and Biases in Retirement Savings
Behavior,  J.  Econ. Persp.,  Summer 2007, at 81.
190  Experimental evidence  suggests that while learning is  generally  effective  in  mini-
mizing mistakes, biases in relatively abstract domains like math and finance  are more resili-
ent.  See HEURISTICS  AND  BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY  OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT  (Thomas Gilovich
et al. eds., 2002); Keith  E. Stanovich,  The Fundamental  Computational Biases of Human Cogni-
tion: Heuristics that (Sometimes) Impair Decision Making and Problem Solving, in THE  PSYCHOL-
OGY OF  PROBLEM  SOLVING  291  (Janet E. Davidson & RobertJ.  Steinberg eds., 2003);  see also
Victor  Stango  & Jonathan  Zinman,  Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance,  J.  FIN.
(forthcoming)  (manuscript at 1-2),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1081633  (docu-
menting  the "exponential  growth  biases"  that lead borrowers  to underestimate  both bor-
rowing costs  and  returns  to savings);  Sumit Agarwal  et  al.,  Do Consumers Choose the Right
Credit Contracts? (Fed. Reserve  Bank of Chi., Working Paper No. 2006-11,  2006)  (discussing
how systematic and  costly consumers'  mistakes are  in practice);  Agarwal  et al.,  supra note
176  (discussing  the diminished returns from  learning about finances).
191  In  the  real  estate  brokerage  market,  there has  been a  recent shift,  aided by  legal
changes,  from  seller  agency  to  buyer  agency.  See  Ronald  Benton  Brown,  Joseph  M.
Grohman & Manuel  L. Valcarcel,  Real Estate Brokerage: Recent Changes in Relationships and a
Proposed Cure, 29  CREIGHTON  L.  REV.  25  (1995)  (describing  this shift); Christopher Curran
& Joel Schrag,  Does It Matter Whom  an  Agent Serues? Evidenceftom Recent Changes in Real Estate
Agency Law, 43J.L. & ECON.  265, 265-71  (2000)  (describing the evolution and effects of a
market for buyers' agents  in Atlanta, following a  1994 change  in Georgia's real estate  law).
This shift could have  a  positive effect on  the mortgage  market as well.
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the  complexity  of the subprime  mortgage  contract  is  such  that even
so-called  experts  often  get it wrong.  For example,  a  recent  study by
Sumit Agarwal, John  C.  Driscoll,  and  David Laibson  has  shown  that
available  expert  advice  on  refinancing  ignores  the  option  value  of
postponing the prepayment  decision-an  omission that can cost bor-
rowers up  to  25 percent of the  loan value. 192
2.  On the Supply Side: Mistake Correction by Sellers and Reputation
Effects
Competing  sellers  will  often  have  an  incentive  to  correct  con-
sumer mistakes  through, for example, advertising.' 93  While  these in-
centives are not always sufficient in competitive markets, they are even
weaker  in imperfectly competitive markets.' 94  As explained above, in-
effective shopping by borrowers inhibits competition in the subprime
mortgage  market.195  In  many  markets,  seller reputation  provides  a
powerful defense against the abuse of consumers.  But, again,  reputa-
tional  forces  are  weaker  in  the  subprime  mortgage  market.  First,
there  is little repeat business, as a single borrower  takes few mortgage
loans, and  a relatively long time passes between  loans.  Second, lend-
ers are relatively short-lived. 196  A downside  of the securitization  inno-
vation was  the  opening of the  market  to  fly-by-night originators  that
had  little  reputation  to  lose  and  insufficient  incentives  to  build  a
reputation. 197
192  See Agarwal et al.,  supra note  120,  at 24-25 ("Most  of the  advice boils down  to the
following necessary  condition  for refinancing-only refinance  if you  can recoup the  clos-
ing costs  of refinancing  in reduced  interest payments....  None  of the  15 books and  10
web sites  in our sample  discuss  (or quantitatively  analyze)  the value  of waiting due  to the
possibility  that interest rates might continue  to decline.");  cf  Michael  S.  Haigh  &John A.
List, Do Professional Traders Exhibit Myopic Loss Aversion? An Experimental Analysis, 60 J.  FIN.
523  (2005)  (documenting biased decisions by financial professionals  despite ample oppor-
tunities for learning).
193  See Bar-Gill,  Consumer Contracts, supra note  18,  at 758-61.
194  Id. at 769-70.
195  See supra Part  1.
196  This phenomenon  is evidenced  by the number of loan originators  that have gone
out  of  business  during  the  recent  crisis.  See  Worth  Civils  &  Mark  Gongloff,  Subprime
Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, WALL ST. J.  ONLINE,
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-subprimeloans0706-sort.html
(last visited  Mar.  30,  2009)  (listing  eighty  loan originators  that closed or  filed  for  bank-
ruptcy between  November  2006  and September  2007).
197  See Engel  &  McCoy,  supra note  47,  at  2041  ("[S]ecuritization  funds  small,  thinly
capitalized lenders and brokers, thus enabling them to enter the subprime market.  These
originators are more prone to commit loan  abuses because they are less heavily regulated,
have  reduced  reputational  risk, and operate with  low capital,  helping  to make them judg-
ment-proof.").  So, while securitization  reduces entry barriers  and thus enhances  competi-
tion,  it is  not clear  that this  enhanced competition  is  welfare  enhancing.
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WELFARE  IMPLICATIONS
What are the costs of the identified contractual designs, especially
when  understood  as  a  response  to borrowers'  imperfect  rationality?
First, complex, multidimensional  contracts hinder competition in the
subprime mortgage  market.  Second, complex and deferred-cost  con-
tracts distort the  remaining, weakened forces of competition, leading
to excessively high prices on more salient price dimensions and exces-
sively  low prices  on  less  salient  price  dimensions.  Third,  these  con-
tractual  design  features  increase  the  likelihood  of  default  and
foreclosure,  with  all  the  ensuing costs-to  borrowers,  lenders,  com-
munities,  and the  economy at large.  Fourth,  the  identified  contrac-
tual  designs  raise  distributional  concerns,  as  they  impose
disproportionate  burdens  on weaker-often  minority-borrowers.  I
address  these welfare  costs in turn.
A.  Hindered  Competition
Perhaps the largest cost associated with  excessively complex con-
tracts  comes from  the  inhibited  competition  that  they  foster. 198  As
described  above,  complexity  prevents the  effective  comparison  shop-
ping  that is  necessary  for vigorous  competition.  The  market  power
gained by lenders  clearly helps lenders  at the  expense  of borrowers.
But the limited competition also imposes a welfare cost in the form of
allocation  inefficiency:  borrowers  are not matched with the most effi-
cient lender.
The  limits of competition  in the  subprime  mortgage  market are
reflected  in  evidence  of above-cost  pricing.  In  particular,  borrowers
are  paying origination fees  exceeding  the  actual costs  that these fees
198  See Paulson,  supra note 2  ("Homebuyers  today have  more choices than ever before
in finding a mortgage that best suits their circumstances.  Yet, comparing  the attractiveness
of one mortgage product to another can be difficult.");  see also Susan Block-Lieb  & Edward
J. Janger,  The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Re-
form" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 T~x. L. REv. 1481,  1530,  1539-40  (2006); Engel & McCoy, supra
note 47,  at 2080; Willis,  supra note 4, at 726  (describing the increased  complexity  of mort-
gage products, and arguing that borrowers  face  a "bewildering array" of home  loan prod-
ucts (citingJinkook Lee  & Jeanne M. Hogarth,  The Price  of Money:  Consumers' Understanding
of APRs and Contract  Interest Rates, 18J.  Pun. POL'Y & MARKETING  66, 67  (1999)));  Zywicki  &
Adamson,  supra note  11,  at  70-71  (noting  that, while standardization  and  transparency
provide  for easy  comparison  shopping  and foster  competition  in  the prime  market,  the
same  is  not true of the  subprime  market, where  lack  of standardization  and  complexity
impede comparison shopping and hinder competition).  Since borrowers cannot value the
different loan  options,  they are  susceptible  to skewed  advertising  that selectively empha-
sizes  certain  dimensions  of the  loan  contract.  See  FrC Comment,  supra note  66, at  3-4
(describing FTC  enforcement  actions,  taken when  lenders'  and  brokers'  advertisements
and oral  sales  pitches  were  inconsistent with  the  offered contracts).  The  success of such
advertising proves  the imperfect information,  imperfect rationality of borrowers, or both.
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allegedly cover by hundreds-or even thousands-of dollars.'9 9  Bor-
rowers  are  also  paying  interest  rates  that  are  higher  than  what  the
borrowers'  risk  profiles justify.2 00  The  most extreme  case  is  that  of
borrowers who would qualify for lower-cost conventional  loans but are
nonetheless  obtaining  high-cost  subprime  mortgages. 20  It  is  the
199  See SUSAN  E.  WOODWARD,  U.S. DEP'T  OF Hous. &  URBAN  DEV.,  A STUDY  OF  CLOSING
COSTS  FOR  FHA  MORTGAGES  (2008).  The Woodward  study finds that complexity and  mul-
tidimensionality  of origination  fees  prevent  effective  shopping, hinder  competition,  and
lead  to inflated  prices;  it further analyzes  more  than  7,500 FHA-insured  thirty-year fixed-
rate home  purchase  loans with  a 7 percent  coupon  rate  closed in  May and June  of 2001.
These were  not the typical  subprime loans  but loans  than  often  target similarly  high-risk
borrowers.  According  to  HUD,  borrowers  are paying  excess  fees  averaging  around  $700
per mortgage,  and these  excess fees  can be eliminated  by improved disclosure that would
enhance competition.  See News Release,  U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., supra note 115.
200  See Engel & McCoy, supra note 47, at 2058;  Howard Lax et al.,  Subprime Lending: An
Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 15  HOUSING  POL'Y DEBATE  533  (2004)  (arguing that sub-
prime interest rates cannot  be justified by risk alone); see also STEIN,  supra note 99  (valuing
the  cost  to borrowers  of excess  interest at $2.9  billion).
201  See FREDDIE  MAc,  AUTOMATED  UNDERWRITING:  MAKING  MORTGAGE  LENDING  SIMPLER
AND  FAIRER  FOR AMERICA'S  FAMILIES  ch. 5 (1996),  available at http://www.freddiemac.com/
corporate/reports/moseley/chap5.htm  (reporting that 10 to 35  percent of subprime bor-
rowers  would  qualify for  lower  cost conventional  loans);  Freddie  Mac,  Half of Subprime
Loans Categorized as  'A'  Quality, INSIDE  B&C  LENDING,  June  10,  1996  (describing a  poll  of
fifty subprime  lenders who estimated  that half of subprime borrowers could have qualified
for prime loans); Fannie  Mae Has Played Critical  Role in Expansion of Minority Homeownership
Over Past Decade; Raines Pledges to Lead Market for African American Mortgage Lending, Bus.
WIRE,  Mar.  2,  2000,  LexisNexis Academic  (noting  that up to  half of subprime  borrowers
would qualify for  lower-cost conventional  loans);  see also Bar-Gill  & Warren, supra note  18,
at 38-40;  Engel and  McCoy, supra note 47, at 2058  n.92; Ass'n  of Cmty.  Orgs. for Reform
Now  (ACORN),  Many Borrowers in Subprime Loans Should Have Qualified  for a Lower  Cost
Loan,  ACORN.ORG,  http://www.acorn.org/index.php?id=114.  The  Wall  Street Journal
noted  the incentive  to steer borrowers  toward higher-cost loans:
The analysis also  raises pointed questions about the practices of major
mortgage  lenders.  Many borrowers  whose  credit scores  might have  quali-
fied them for more conventional  loans say they were pushed into risky sub-
prime  loans.  They say lenders or brokers aggressively  marketed  the loans,
offering easier and faster approvals-and  playing down or hiding the oner-
ous price  paid over the long haul  in higher interest rates  or stricter repay-
ment terms....
The subprime  sales  pitch sometimes  was fueled  with  faxes and emails
from  lenders  to  brokers touting easier  qualification  for borrowers  and at-
tractive payouts for mortgage  brokers who brought in business.  One of the
biggest weapons:  a compensation  structure  that rewarded brokers for per-
suading borrowers to  take a loan with an  interest rate higher  than the  bor-
rower  might have  qualified  for.
Brooks  &  Simon,  supra note  161.  Gretchen  Morgenson,  writing  for the  New  York  Times,
made  a similar observation:
On  its  way  to  becoming  the  nation's  largest  mortgage  lender,  the
Countrywide  Financial Corporation  encouraged  its sales  force to court cus-
tomers  over  the  telephone  with  a  seductive  pitch  that seldom  varied.  "I
want to be sure you are getting the best loan possible," the sales representa-
tives would  say.
But providing "the  best loan possible"  to customers wasn't  always  the
bank's  main goal,  say some  former employees....
Countrywide's entire operation,  from its computer system  to its incen-
tive  pay structure  and financing  arrangements,  is  intended  to wring  maxi-CORNELL LAW  REVIEW
higher profit margin in  the subprime  market that induced lenders  to
steer  borrowers  into subprime  loans. 2 02  This problem  was  explicitly
recognized  by the  FRB:  "[A]n  atmosphere  of relaxed  standards  may
increase  the  incidence  of abusive  lending practices  by attracting  less
scrupulous originators  into the market, while  at the same  time bring-
ing  more  vulnerable  borrowers  into  the  market.  These  abuses  can
lead  consumers  to  pay more  for  their  loans  than  their  risk  profiles
warrant."
203
B.  Distorted  Competition
Limited  competition  allows  lenders  to  set above-cost  prices  and
reap  supra-competitive  profits.  But even if borrowers engaged  in vig-
orous shopping, eliminating all supra-competitive  profits, there would
still be  a welfare  cost.  The reason  is that borrowers'  shopping, while
vigorous, would be misguided.  Consider again the stylized example of
a mortgage  contract with  a two-dimensional  price:  a short-term intro-
ductory rate,  PST,  and  a long-term  rate, PLT.
204  The  two  prices  affect
the  two  decisions  a borrower  must make:  whether  to  get out  of the
loan at the  end of the  introductory  period and whether  to take  the
loan  in the  first place.  An  optimal contract will set the  two prices  to
induce efficient  decisions.  If borrowers  are rational, competition  will
produce  the optimal contract.  Not so if borrowers are imperfectly  ra-
tional.  In particular, I have shown that if borrowers underestimate  the
costs associated with the long-term rate, PT,  competition  will focus on
the  short-term  rate,  PST, resulting  in  an  inefficient  contract  with  an
excessively  low  PST and  an  excessively high  PLT.
20 5
mum  profits  out  of the  mortgage  lending boom  no matter what  it costs
borrowers, according to interviews with former employees  and brokers who
worked in different units of the company and internal documents  they pro-
vided.  One  document, for  instance,  shows  that  until  last September  the
computer system in the company's subprime unit excluded  borrowers'  cash
reserves,  which had  the effect of steering them  away from  lower-cost loans
to  those  that were more expensive  to homeowners and  more profitable  to
Countrywide.
Morgenson,  supra note 99.
202  See  Morgenson,  supra note  99  (explaining  that internal  Countrywide  documents
and testimonies  of former  employees  reveal  larger profit  margins on  subprime  loans  as
compared  to  prime  loans  and  especially  large  margins on  loans  with  high prepayment
penalties and high go-to rates.  As a result, the commission structure rewarded brokers and
sales  representatives  who  sold  subprime  loans, including  to borrowers  who  qualified  for
Alt-A loans, loans with higher and longer prepayment  penalties, and loans with  higher go-
to rates).  Evidence  refutes the alternative hypothesis that the relative  increase in subprime
loans  reflects  an  increase  in  borrower  risk.  See  LaCour-Little,  supra note  31,  at 490-93
(showing  empirically,  through  assessment  of the  two  most common  risk indicators-the
FICO  score and  LTV-that borrower risk remained  relatively  stable).
203  Truth in  Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672,  1675 (proposedJan.  9, 2008)  (to be codified
at  12 C.F.R.  pt. 226).
204  See supra Part IV.A.
205  See supra Part  MA.
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There are two adverse welfare  implications.  First, the  excessively
high PLT will inefficiently lead some borrowers to exit at the end of the
introductory  period.  Second, and  more importantly, the  initial deci-
sion to take a loan will be  distorted.  While  the actual total payments,
PST + PLT, will go up to cover the increased cost generated  by the ineffi-
cient contractual  design,  the  total payments  as  perceived  by  the  bor-
rower  will  go  down. 206  The  result  is  excessive  borrowing  (and
excessive  home  purchases) .
20 7
This analysis applies to all the examples of cost deferral discussed
above:  small  down  payments,  high  LTVs,  escalating  payments,  and
prepayment  penalties. 2 0 8  The analysis  also  applies  to  the complexity
examples,  where  one  (or  more)  less  salient  or  indirectly  specified
price  dimensions  is  ignored  or underestimated.  (PLT corresponds  to
the less salient, underestimated  price dimension, and PsT corresponds
to the more salient price dimension.)  In all of these cases, imperfect
rationality results in  price distortions;  these  price distortions increase
total  costs  and  total  payments,  and skew  both  long-term  and  short-
term  decisions.  Most importantly, these  distortions,  while increasing
the actual cost, reduce the perceived cost of the loan and thus lead to
an  artificially  inflated demand for mortgage  financing.
C.  Delinquency and Foreclosure
There  is  evidence  that the  identified contractual  design  features
increase  delinquency  and  foreclosure  rates. 2 0 9  Deferred-cost  con-
tracts are associated with higher rates of delinquency and foreclosure.
Specifically,  increased  delinquency  and  foreclosure  rates  have  been
206  See supra Part IVA.
207  Excessive borrowing would result even  absent a contractual-design  response-that
is,  even under the optimal contract.  The contractual  design  response exacerbates  the wel-
fare  cost.
208  Focusing on prepayment penalties, several  studies found empirical evidence of one
of the  welfare costs  associated with distorted  competition.  See, e.g.,  Engel & McCoy, supra
note 47,  at 2060  (reviewing  studies  that found a positive  correlation  between  prepayment
penalties and  higher interest  rates);  LaCour-Little  & Holmes,  supra note  101,  at  660-61
(finding that, for the common  2-28 ARM,  the total interest rate savings  is significantly less
than  the amount of the expected  prepayment  penalty).
209  See generally EDWARD M.  GRAMLICH,  SUBPRIME  MORTGAGES:  AMERICA'S  LATEST BooM
AND  BUST  66-67  (2007)  (arguing, based  on  the  study  by Schloemer and  her colleagues,
supra note  143,  that mortgage contract  design  is linked  to borrower  distress).
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linked to high LTVs,21 0  escalating  payments, 21'  and prepayment pen-
alties.212  The  FRB,  in  advocating  its  new  mortgage  regulations,  ac-
210  See Gerardi  et al.,  supra note 29, at 4.  According  to Kristopher  Gerardi, Adam Sha-
piro, and Paul  Willen:
Subprime lenders created a group of borrowers that were much more  likely
to  default  for  at least  two  reasons.  First, while  they  did  not invent  zero-
equity borrowing,  they  did  allow  a  much  larger  fraction  of borrowers  to
start homeownership  with no cushion against negative  [House  Price Appre-
ciation].  Second,  subprime  lenders  allowed  borrowers  with  a  history  of
cash  flow problems and with monthly payments that exceeded fifty percent
of current  income  to  enter  homeownership.  Under  the  best  of circum-
stances, subprime borrowers are at least five  times as likely to become delin-
quent as prime  borrowers.
211  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert, supra note  I  (manuscript at 19 tbl.3)  (finding posi-
tive correlation  coefficients, though  with limited statistical significance, on ARM  (vs.  FRM)
and  Hybrid  (vs.  FRM)  loans  in  regressions  that  try  to  explain  default  and  foreclosure
rates).  All  types of mortgages-not  only the nonstandard ARMs-originated  in  2006 per-
formed badly in  terms  of delinquency  and foreclosure  rates.  ARMs,  however,  performed
worse  (and  many ARMs  are nonstandard).  Cf  id.  (manuscript  at  11  fig.4)  (showing  a
much  higher delinquency rate for hybrids  as compared  to  FRMs);  Bernanke  March  2008
Speech,  supra  note  77  ("The worst payment problems  have been among subprime adjusta-
ble-rate mortgages  .... ");  Bernanke January 2008 Speech,  supra note 9  ("Ample evidence
suggests  that responsible nonprime lending can  be beneficial and safe for the borrower as
well as profitable  for the lender.  For example,  even  as delinquencies  on subprime ARMs
have  soared, loss rates  on subprime  mortgages with  fixed interest rates,  though  somewhat
higher recently, remain in their historical range.").  Mayer, Pence, and Sherlund noted the
data  indicating far worse  performance  for ARMs:
[D]elinquincies  have been  particularly pronounced  for loans  that include
an  adjustable interest rate component-floating-rate  mortgages, short-term
hybrids,  and  long-term  hybrids.  For  example,  looking  at subprime  mort-
gages,  the serious delinquency rates for both adjustable-rate  and fixed-rate
loans were about 5.6  percent in mid-2005.  But by July 2008, serious delin-
quencies  on adjustable-rate  mortgages had risen to  over 29  percent, while
the similar  rate for  fixed-rate mortgages  rose to  9 percent.  Similarly,  seri-
ous delinquency rates for both the adjustable-rate and fixed-rate Alt-A mort-
gages  were  about  0.6  percent  in  mid-2005.  But  by  July  2008,  the
delinquency rate  on adjustable-rate  Alt-A mortgages had risen  past  13 per-
cent, while  the delinquency rate on fixed-rate  mortgages had  risen  over 5
percent.
Mayer et al.,  supra note  33, at 8.  The high  default rates of ARMs,  as compared  to FRMs,
may be due  to the comparatively  poor risk attributes-in terms of average  FICO score and
CLTV-of these loans.  Mayer,  Pence, and Sherlund  observed:
The exceptionally high default rates of subprime adjustable-rate  mortgages
may  be  due  in  part  to  the  relatively poor  risk  attributes  of these  loans.
Short-term  hybrids,  which  make  up  almost  all  subprime  adjustable-rate
mortgages,  had an average FICO credit score of only 612 and a mean com-
bined  loan-to-value  ratio  of  89  percent.  By contrast,  subprime  fixed-rate
mortgages  have higher  credit scores  (FICO  of 627)  and  lower  combined
loan-to-value  ratios  (80 percent).
Id.  In other words,  poor underwriting standards  are  to blame.  Contractual  design  facili-
tated lower underwriting standards, such as  the fact that ARMs  enabled lenders  to qualify
borrowers based  on the  low, initial  rate.
212  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert,  supra note  I  (manuscript at 19 tbl.3)  (finding  posi-
tive correlation  coefficients  on Prepayment  Penalty  in regressions  that  try  to  explain de-
fault and foreclosure  rates);  Roberto G.  Quercia, Michael  A. Stegman  & Walter  R. Davis,
The Impact of Predatory  Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Pen-
alties and Balloon Payments, 18 HOUSING  POL'Y  DEBATE  311,  337  (2007)  (finding,  based  on
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knowledged that "several riskier loan attributes," including "high loan-
to-value  ratio[s]"  and "payment shock  on adjustable-rate  mortgages,"
"increased  the  risk  of serious  delinquency  and  foreclosure  for  sub-
prime loans originated in 2005 through  early 2007."213  A study based
on  data  from  2004  through  2006  estimates  that about  12  percent  of
subprime loans will end up in foreclosure  as a result of large resets (in
escalating-payments  contracts),  coupled with  insufficient equity to en-
able sale or refinancing  (due to high LTVs). 214  The continuing  dete-
rioration  in  the  housing  and  credit  markets  since  December  2006
suggests  that the 12 percent figure  could well be an underestimate. 2 1 5
The welfare costs associated with foreclosure  are substantial.  The
FRB Chairman, Ben Bernanke, estimated that, on average,  total losses
from foreclosure  "exceeded 50 percent of the principal balance,  with
legal, sales, and maintenance expenses alone amounting to more than
10 percent  of principal. '21 6  An  industry study  that assumes  foreclo-
LP data, that "lengthy"-that is,  3 years  or more-prepayment penalties  increase foreclo-
sure risk by about 20 percent and that ARMs have a 50 percent higher foreclosure risk than
FRMs).  Others  argue that prepayment  penalties  affect default and foreclosure  only  indi-
rectly by enabling the lower initial interest rates  that qualify  riskier borrowers.  See Mayer et
al.,  supra note  33,  at  12-13.
213  Truth  in Lending, 73  Fed. Reg.  1672,  1674 (proposed Jan.  9, 2008)  (to be codified
at  12 C.F.R.  pt. 226).
214  See CAGAN,  supra note 25, at 69-70 (focusing on ARMs  originated between 2004 and
2006).  Cagan's  estimates  are  sensitive  to  projections  about house  prices  and  the index
(LIBOR)  that determines the magnitude of the reset.  His 12 percent foreclosure  estimate
is  based  on  house  prices  and  the index  level  in  December  2006.  Id.  Specifically,  lower
market interest rates  mitigate the  negative impact of a loan reset, while lower house prices
exacerbate  the  negative  impact of a loan  reset.
2t5  While  resets on escalating-payments  contracts are commonly blamed for triggering
default and foreclosure, the evidence supporting this allegation  is not conclusive.  But even
studies that fail to identify substantial adverse effects of resets in the current data anticipate
such effects  going forward.  See Mayer  et al.,  supra note  33, at  28  (noting studies showing
that "borrowers with hybrid mortgages  appeared more likely to refinance  and prepay their
mortgages  around  the  first  reset  date  but  were  not  necessarily  more  likely  to  default
around  that time" while  suggesting that "[m]ortgage  rate resets  may yet  cause difficulties
going forward").  Shane  Sherlund observed:
House  price appreciation  seems to  be the  primary determinant  of default
and  prepayment  behavior.  Borrowers  with  subprime  mortgages  could
more easily prepay when house price appreciation  was high  (almost regard-
less of the initial credit quality of the loan),  but found  it more difficult  to
prepay once  house  price  appreciation  slowed  and turned  negative.  New,
stricter underwriting further limited the ability of many borrowers with sub-
prime  mortgages  unable  to  refinance  or  even  sell.  Many  are  then  faced
with  the decision of default.  With this in mind, mortgage rate resets could
have  an effect on  defaults going forward,  even  though  they have  had only
limited effects  in  the data  to  date.  Prepayment  is much more  difficult for
many borrowers, so their ability and willingness to face mortgage rate reset
may now  be an issue.  Short-term  interest rates  have  declined  recently, so
these  borrowers  are  not  currently  facing  drastically  higher  mortgage
payments.
Sherlund, supra note  133,  at  11.
216  Bernanke  March  2008  Speech,  supra note  77.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
sure  losses  equal  to  37.5%  of a loan's value  estimates  total subprime
foreclosure  losses  on  loans  originated  between  2004  and  2006  at
nearly  $29  billion.217  Substituting  Bernanke's  50  percent figure  for
the  37.5  percent  assumption,  the  estimate  of foreclosure  losses  in-
creases  to $38.7 billion.  Of this $38.7 billion, the  10 percent (or $7.7
billion)  in  transaction  costs-the  "legal,  sales,  and  maintenance  ex-
penses" that Bernanke  referred to-are clear welfare costs.218  The re-
mainder  is  partly a welfare  cost and partly  a welfare-neutral  transfer.
The  transfer component  is the  "foreclosure discount," the  difference
between  the  market  price  and  the  price  received  for  a  foreclosed
property.219  This  price  discount, while  a  loss to  the lender and bor-
rower,  is  a benefit  to the  buyer of the foreclosed property.  The wel-
fare-cost component  is the social loss incurred when a property is left
vacant-until the foreclosure sale and often even after the foreclosure
sale.  In a declining real estate market, these vacancy periods are quite
long.  Another  category  of welfare  costs, not included  in  the preced-
ing estimates,  is  composed  of the  negative  externalities  that foreclo-
sures  impose  on neighborhoods  and  cities.220  The  FRB  noted  that
"[w]hen  foreclosures  are  clustered,  they can injure entire  communi-
ties by reducing  property values  in surrounding  areas."221  Finally, to
the  extent that foreclosures  contributed  to the real  estate  slump and
217  CAGAN,  supra  note  25,  at 69-71.
218  See Paul  S. Calem  &  Michael LaCour-Little,  Risk-Based Capital  Requirements for Mort-
gage Loans 12  (Bd.  of Governors  of the  Fed.  Reserve  Sys.,  Fin.  & Econ.  Discussion  Series
Paper No. 2001-60, 2001)  (assuming it costs 10 percent of the unpaid balance to dispose of
the foreclosed property and  that foreclosure  transaction  costs amount to 5 percent of un-
paid balance).
219  See CAGAN,  supra note 25,  at 70 (arguing  that foreclosed properties sell at a discount
of up to 30  percent).
220  See Vicki  Been, Dir., Furman Ctr. for Real Estate  & Urban Policy, Testimony Before
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee  on Domestic Policy:  Ex-
ternal Effects  of Concentrated  Mortgage  Foreclosures:  Evidence  from New York  City 4-5
(May  21,  2008)  (reporting that,  in  New  York, properties  adjacent  to  recent foreclosure
filings  sell  at a  1.8  percent to  3.7  percent discount);  see  also WILLIAM  C.  APGAR  &  MARK
DUDA,  HOMEOWNERSHIP  PRES.  FOUND.,  COLLATERAL  DAMAGE:  THE  MUNICIPAL  IMPACT  OF To-
DAY'S  MORTGAGE  FORECLOSURE  BOOM  (2005),  available at http://www.995hope.org/con-
tent/pdf/ApgarDuda-Study-Short-Version.pdf;  CTR.  FOR  RESPONSIBLE  LENDING,
SUBPRIME  SPILLOVER:  FORECLOSURES  COST  NEIGHBORS  $202  BILLION:  40.6  MILLION  HOMES
LOSE  $5,000  ON  AVERAGE  (2008),  available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/issues/
mortgage/research/subprime-spillover.html;  FAMILY  Hous.  FUND,  COST  EFFECTIVENESS  OF
MORTGAGE  FORECLOSURE  PREVENTION:  SUMMARY  OF FINDINGS  5  (1998)  (noting  foreclosure
costs of around $7,000 for borrowers,  $2,000 for lenders, and additional costs of $15,000  to
$60,000  on  third parties);  STEIN,  supra note  99, at  11-13  (detailing  externalities  such  as
declines  in  neighboring property  values and  increased  crime  rates  (citing  U.S. DEP'T  OF
Hous. & URBAN  DEV.  & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,  CURBING  PREDATORY  HOME MORTGAGE
LENDING  25  (2000)));  Engel  &  McCoy,  supra note  47,  at 2042  n.12;  Gerardi  et  al.,  supra
note 29, at 1 n.1  (citing Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith,  The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage
Foreclosures  on Neighborhood Crime, 21  HOUSING  STUD.  851  (2006)).
221  Truth  in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,524  (July 30, 2008)  (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).
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to the credit crunch,  staggering macroeconomic  costs should  also be
considered.
Focusing  on borrowers,  delinquency  and foreclosure  imply sub-
stantial  hardship. 222  First, borrowers  will  face  higher rates  for other
credit  transactions and  reduced access  to  credit.223  Second, borrow-
ers  will  lose  some  or  all  of  their  accumulated  home  equity  if  the
lender forecloses. 224  Finally, the borrower will have  to bear the trans-
action  costs  of relocating  to another house  or apartment.
Delinquency  and  foreclosure  also  impose  costs  on  lenders.  In
particular,  if the  net proceeds  from  the  foreclosure  sale are  smaller
than the outstanding loan balance, the lender will suffer a loss.  Lend-
ers  partially  compensated  for  this  risk  by  increasing  the  interest
rate.225  Much  of this risk, however, was not priced.  The sheer magni-
tude of the  ex post losses-as  reflected  in the hundreds  of billions  of
dollars in subprime-related  write-offs  by financial institutions226-sug-
gests  that the  risks were  not fully accounted for  ex ante.
In measuring  the social cost of foreclosure,  it is important  to dis-
tinguish  between  costs  borne  by  borrowers  and lenders  on  the  one
hand  and  costs  borne  by  third  parties-neighbors,  neighborhoods,
and cities-on  the  other hand.  Focusing  on borrowers  and lenders,
to the extent that the transacting parties were rational, the ex post cost
of foreclosure represents  a sour realization  of a mutually beneficial  ex
ante gamble.  Accordingly,  we  need  to  worry  only  about  the  imper-
fectly rational parties who did not secure  a positive  ex ante value.  Now
consider the costs  borne by third parties:  these costs-negative  exter-
222  Id. ("The consequences  of default are severe  for homeowners, who face  the  possi-
bility  of foreclosure,  the  loss  of accumulated  home  equity, higher  rates  for other  credit
transactions,  and reduced  access  to  credit.").
223  Id.
224  Id.  Consider a  borrower with  20  percent equity  in  her home  and a loan  balance
equal to 80 percent of the market value of the  home:  If the net proceeds from the foreclo-
sure sale-the discounted  sale price  minus the  transaction costs-are less than 80 percent
of the market value, the borrower will  lose all the equity that she has accumulated.  Only if
the net proceeds exceed  80 percent of the market value, the borrower retains part, not all,
of the  equity that she  has accumulated.  The  Center  for Responsible  Lending  projects a
total  equity  loss  of  $164  billion  between  1998  and  2006,  or approximately  $75,000  per
borrower  (given  the  2.2 million  foreclosures  that  CRL  projects).  See SCHLOEMER  ET  AL.,
supra note  143, at 2-3, 11,  16.  These projections are conservative  on some dimensions, but
liberal on  others; specifically, the projections presume  that total equity  exceeds the cost of
foreclosure,  but for many borrowers this may not be the  case.
225  See Demyanyk  & Van  Hemert,  supra note  1  (manuscript  at  28-29)  (finding  that
high  loan-to-value  borrowers  increasingly  became  high-risk  borrowers  over  the  past  five
years, in  terms of elevated delinquency and foreclosure rates,  and that lenders were  aware
of this and adjusted mortgage  rates accordingly  over  time).
226  See Bethel et al., supra note  12,  at 21,  81  tbl.2 (citing one estimate of $150  billion in
writedowns  as  of February  2008  as  well  as  a  forecast  that  this  amount  will  more  than
double, and summarizing the tens of billions of dollars worth of subprime-related  write-offs
by banks);  Press  Release,  Standard  & Poor's, supra note  16.
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nalities  imposed  by  the  loan  contract-translate  into  a  social  cost,
even  when both contracting  parties  are fully  rational.
D.  Distributional  Concerns
Contractual  design  can  also  have  distributional  effects.  While
wealthy borrowers  were not generally part of the subprime  and Alt-A
markets, there was still substantial heterogeneity  in  the wealth of sub-
prime and Alt-A borrowers.  Given the complexity of these  contracts,
wealthier borrowers who could  afford  to seek out expert advice  were
likely to do better than borrowers who could not afford such advice. 227
Moreover,  the  inverse  correlation  between  borrower wealth  and con-
tractual  complexity-wealthier borrowers generally  got simpler prime
loans and poorer borrowers generally got more complicated subprime
or Alt-A loans-raises another distributional  concern.
Evidence  that "subprime mortgages  [were]  concentrated in loca-
tions with high proportions of black and Hispanic residents, even con-
trolling  for the  income  and credit scores of these  Zip  codes"22 8  also
raises  distributional  concerns.  Disparities  in financial  sophistication
and in the ability to effectively  comparison shop-if only because mi-
nority  borrowers  had  fewer  options  to  compare-led  to  substantial
price variations. 229  A recent study found that black borrowers paid an
additional $415  in fees and Latino borrowers paid an additional  $365
in fees.230  Nonprice  terms  likewise  reflected  variations.  Specifically,
"black homeowners  are significantly  more  likely to  have  prepayment
penalties  or balloon payments  attached to their mortgages  than non-
black  homeowners,  even  after controlling  for  age,  income,  gender,
and creditworthiness.
' "
2 3 1
Gender disparities  have  also been identified.  Women  as a group
have a relatively poor understanding of credit terms and are less likely
227  See Bar-Gill & Warren,  supra  note 18, at 64 ("Richer  consumers are also less likely to
make  mistakes,  if  only because  they  can hire  experts who  will prevent  them from making
mistakes.").
228  Mayer  & Pence,  supra note  148,  at 2.
229  See Michael  S.  Barr, Sendhil Mullainathan  &  Eldar Shafir, Behaviorally  Informed Home
Mortgage Credit Regulation, in  UNDERSTANDING  CONSUMER  CREDIT  (Eric S.  Belsky & Nicolas P.
Retsinas  eds.)  (forthcoming 2009)  (manuscript at 11, on file with author)  ("[L]ow-income
and  minority  buyers  are  the  least  likely  to  shop  for  alternate  financing  arrange-
ments  . . . ."); Jinkook  Lee  & Jeanne  M.  Hogarth,  Consumer Information Search for Home
Mortgages:  Who,  What,  How Much, and What  Else?, 9  FIN.  SERVICES  REv.  277,  283  (2000).
More generally, subprime  borrowers  are less likely  to search  for  the best loan  terms.  See
Courchane  et al.,  supra note 54 (reporting findings from  a survey  study);  see also Zywicki &
Adamson,  supra note  1],  at 55-56.
230  WOODWARD,  supra note  199, at  ix.
231  Michael  S. Barr, Jane  K. Dokko & Benjamin J. Keys, Who Gets Lost in the Subprime
Mortgage Fallout?  Homeowners  in Low- and Moderate-Income  Neighborhoods  2-3 (Apr.
2008)  (unpublished  manuscript),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121215.
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to shop for credit.232  These findings imply that women  will get infer-
ior mortgage  products.  Socioeconomic  status  also  plays  a role.  Bor-
rowers  with  less  income  and  education  are  less  likely  to  know their
mortgage terms, implying greater underestimation of deferred or hid-
den  costs  and  a  diminished  ability  to  effectively  shop  for  better
terms.2 33  Indeed, there is evidence  that better-educated borrowers re-
ceived  better terms  on their loans.234
VI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
I  argued  that  borrowers'  imperfect  rationality  explains  several
contractual  design  features in the subprime mortgage  market.  I have
also  argued  that  the  imperfect  rationality  of  borrowers,  especially
when coupled  with contracts designed in  response to  such imperfect
rationality,  produces  substantial  welfare  costs.  Since  market  forces
have  proven to be  too slow to respond  to these problems, legal inter-
232  See John  Leland,  Baltimore Finds Subprime Crisis Snags  Women,  N.Y.  TIMES, Jan.  15,
2008, at Al; see also ALLENJ.  FISHBEIN  &  PATRICK WOODALL,  CONSUMER  FED.  OF  AM.,  WOMEN
ARE  PRIME  TARGETS  FOR  SUBPRIME LENDING:  WOMEN  ARE  DISPROPORTIONATELY  REPRESENTED
IN  HIGH-COST  MORTGAGE  MARKET  1  (2006),  available at http://www.consumerfed.org/
pdfs/WomenPrimeTargetsStudyl206O6.pdf  (finding that women are more likely  to receive
subprime  mortgages  than  men  and that disparity  between  men  and women  increases  as
income  rises);  NAT'L  CMTY.  REINVESTMENT  COAL.,  HOMEOWNERSHIP  AND  WEALTH  BUILDING
IMPEDED:  CONTINUING  LENDING  DISPARITIES  FOR  MINORITIES  AND  EMERGING  OBSTACLES  FOR
MIDDLE-INCOME  AND  FEMALE  BORROWERS  OF  ALL  RACES  12-14  (2006),  available at http://
www.ncrc.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=344&Itemid=76  (finding
that women received  37 percent  of high-cost  home  loans in  2005,  compared with just 28
percent of prime loans);  PRUDENTIAL  INS.  Co.  OF AM.,  FINANCIAL  EXPERIENCE  &  BEHAVIORS
AMONG  WOMEN  7  (2006),  available  at  http://www.prudential.com/media/managed/
2006WomenBrochureFINAL.pdf  (finding  that  "a majority  of  financial  and  investment
products  are unfamiliar  to  almost  half of all  women");  Annamaria  Lusardi  &  Olivia  S.
Mitchell,  Planning  and Financial  Literacy: How Do Women Fare? (Nat'l  Bureau of Econ. Re-
search,  Working  Paper  No.  13750,  2008),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1087003
(finding that older women  display  much  lower  levels  of financial  literacy  than  the older
population as a whole);  Women in the Subprime Market, CONSUMERS  UNION,  Oct. 2002, http:/
/www.consumersunion.org/finance/women-rptl002.htm  (attributing some  of the dispar-
ity both to the  instability in women's  credit status that results  from divorce or family medi-
cal emergency  and to  the fact that women  have  less wealth  than  men).
233  Bucks  &  Pence, supra note  170, at 3,  20-21,  26.
234  See WOODWARD,  supra note  199  (finding  that offers  made by  brokers  to borrowers
without  a  college  education  are  $1,100  higher  on  average);  Thomas  P.  Boehm  &  Alan
Schlottmann, Mortgage Pricing  Differentials  Across Hispanic,  African-American, and White House-
holds: Evidence  from the American Housing Survey, 9 CITYScAPE: J.  POL'y DEV.  & RES.,  No. 2, at
93,  105  (2007)  (finding a  negative correlation  between  education  and interest rates); An-
namaria Lusardi, Financial  Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed Consumer Choice? 10  (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper  No. 14084,  2008),  available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1149331  (citing a 2003 study by Danna Moore showing that low-literacy borrowers
are more  likely  to  purchase  high-cost mortgages).  Individuals  with  little  education,  wo-
men, African-Americans,  and  Hispanics display  particularly  low  levels of literacy.  Id. at 1.CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  94:1073
vention  should  be  considered. 235  I focus  on disclosure  regulation.  I
do  so not because better disclosure  can  cure  all  the ills of the  mort-
gage  market but because  disclosure  regulation  is  the  right  place  to
start.  First, optimally designed  disclosure, while not a perfect fix, can
make a significant  difference. 2 3 6  Second,  disclosure  can  help less-so-
phisticated  borrowers  without  significantly  restricting  the  choices
available  to  more-sophisticated  borrowers.237  Third,  as  a  practical
matter, disclosure  has proven  to be  the most politically  feasible form
of regulation  in  consumer credit markets. 238
A.  The  Great Promise  of the APR Disclosure
Perhaps  the most important reason to focus on disclosure regula-
tion is that an existing disclosure mandate seems to provide, at least in
theory, an effective  response  to  the  behavioral  market failure in  the
subprime and Alt-A mortgage markets.  I am referring to the APR dis-
closure,  which  lenders  must  provide  under  the  Truth  in  Lending
Act.
2 39  The APR is a normalized  measure of the total cost of credit.  A
lender  is  required  to  sum  all  the  different  prices  and  fees  that  the
235  The FRB, when proposing its recently adopted TILA amendments, endorsed a sim-
ilar approach,  stating:
The  market has  responded  to the  current problems  with  increasing atten-
tion to loan  quality.  Structural  factors, or market imperfections,  however,
make  it necessary  to consider  regulations  to  help prevent a recurrence  of
these problems.  New regulation can  also provide the market clear 'rules of
the road'  at a time  of uncertainty, so  that responsible higher-priced  lend-
ing, which  serves a critical  need, may continue.
Truth in  Lending,  73 Fed. Reg.  1672,  1675  (proposed Jan.  9,  2008)  (to be codified at  12
C.F.R. pt. 226)
236  See  generally LACKO &  PAPPALARDO,  supra note  104  (showing  that better-designed
disclosure can  make a significant difference).
237  See Colin Camerer et al., Regulation  for Conservatives:  Behavioral  Economics and the Case
for "Asymmetric Paternalism",  151  U. PA.  L. REv.  1211  (2003);  Cass R. Sunstein  & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian  Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70  U.  CHI.  L. REV.  1159  (2003).
238  See generally Bar-Gill,  Seduction, supra note  18.  Since  the  abolition  of usury  laws,
disclosure requirements have been the centerpiece  of the regulatory scheme governing the
mortgage market.  See Eskridge, supra note 24 (describing the  history of mortgage-contract
regulation  in  the  U.S. and specifically  the  shift from  usury laws  to disclosure  regulation).
The legislative  and regulatory reaction  to the recent  crisis has focused  on disclosure.  See,
e.g.,  Truth  in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg. 44,522,  44,524-25  (july 30,  2008)  (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226); see also, e.g.,  Housing and Economic Recovery  Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
289, §§  2501-2503,  122 Stat.  2654, 2855-57.  The Housing and Economic Recovery  Act, as
well  as other legal  responses to  the  crisis,  includes  important loss-mitigation  components
that are  unrelated  to  disclosure.  But these  are  not rules  that will  govern  the  mortgage
market going forward.  Among forward-looking legal interventions, disclosure  is dominant.
The FRB  regulations  go beyond  disclosure  on several  important dimensions,  such  as re-
quiring creditors  to evaluate  borrowers'  ability  to repay;  limiting the scope of permissible
prepayment  penalties;  and  requiring  creditors  to  establish  escrow  accounts  for  the  pay-
ment of property  taxes and premiums for specified insurance  products.  See Truth  in Lend-
ing,  73 Fed.  Reg.  44,522.
239  SeeTruth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321,  §  107, 82 Stat.  146,  149 (1968)  (codi-
fied  as amended  at  15  U.S.C.  §  1606  (2006))  (defining  the APR);  Truth  in Lending Act
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borrower  is required  to pay under the  loan contract  into a single  ag-
gregate  amount,  the  "finance  charge,"  and  disclose  this  dollar
amount.  Then,  to  facilitate  comparison  shopping  between  different
credit products, the lender is required  to translate the finance charge,
which  is a dollar amount, into an annual percentage rate and disclose
this figure  as well.
240
The APR should serve as  a powerful antidote  to the effects of im-
perfect  rationality.  First, the APR would seem  to offer an effective re-
sponse  to  the  complexity  and  multidimensionality  of the  subprime
mortgage  contract.  Lenders  are required  to calculate  the  total  costs
associated  with  their loan product and  disclose  that total to  the  bor-
rower.  With  this common  metric at hand, borrowers  should  be able
to compare  the total cost of two different complex loan contracts.  By
collecting  all the rates and fees and folding them into a single  aggre-
gate  price, the APR should render the  limits on borrowers'  cognitive
abilities-limited  attention,  limited  memory,  and  limited processing
ability-irrelevant. 241  Second,  the  APR  should  provide  an  effective
remedy  to  the  myopia  and  optimism  that give  rise  to  deferred-cost
contracts.  Since the APR is  a composite of short-term and long-term
interest rates,242 capturing both long-term  costs and short-term bene-
fits, it should  reveal  the false allure  of deferred-cost  contracts.
By overcoming, or bypassing, the imperfect rationality of borrow-
ers,  the APR disclosure  should  also  discourage  many  of the contrac-
tual  design  features  studied  above.  Consider  complexity  and
specifically  proliferation  of 'junk" fees.  Adding  nonsalient  fees  was
beneficial  to  the  lender  because  imperfectly  rational  borrowers  ig-
nored  them.  But if these fees are included in the APR and borrowers
shop  for  low  APRs,  then  the  incentive  to  pile  up  more  fees  disap-
pears.243  Similarly, cost deferral  was an attractive strategy  for lenders
because  myopic  and  optimistic borrowers  placed  insufficient  weight
on  the  long-term  costs.  If borrowers  look  to  the APR for guidance
and the APR calculation affords appropriate weight to both short-term
§§  121-31,  82  Stat. at 152-57  (codified  as amended at  15  U.S.C.  §§ 1631-49  (2006))  (re-
quiring disclosure  of the  APR).
240  See Renuart & Thompson, supra note 24, at 217  ("Congress designed  the APR  to be
the single number  that consumers should  focus upon  when shopping for credit.").
241  See id. at 214 (arguing that a comprehensive,  fee-inclusive  APR will help imperfectly
rational  consumers  who cannot aggregate  the multiple fees  on  their  own).
242  12 C.F.R.  §  226.17  (2008);  Official  Staff Commentary § 226.17(c) (1)-(10)  (2008).
243  See BD.  OF GOVERNORS  OF  THE  FED.  RESERVE  SvS.  & U.S.  DEP'T  OF  Hous.  &  URBAN
DEV.,  JOINT  REPORT  TO  THE  CONGRESS  CONCERNING  REFORM  TO  THE  TRUTH  AND  LENDING
AcT AND  THE  REAL  ESTATE  SETTLEMENT  PROCEDURES Acr  9  (1998),  available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/general/1998/19980717/default.htrm  ("[T] he  APR
concept deters hidden  or junk'  fees to  the extent  that the  fees must  be  included  in  the
APR calculation.").
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and  long-term  costs,  then  lenders  will  have  no  incentive  to  defer
costS.
2 4 4
There  is  evidence  that  the  APR disclosure  can  work.  Many bor-
rowers  know to  look for the APR and comparison shop based on the
APR  disclosure.245  This  has  led  to  enhanced  competition  and  re-
duced  rates.246  There  is  even  evidence  that  the  APR  succeeded  in
fighting  imperfect  rationality.  Specifically,  Victor  Stango  and
Jonathan  Zinman show that the most biased consumers-that  is, con-
sumers who  substantially underestimate  the APR  corresponding  to a
given  payment stream-do  not overpay for credit when borrowing  in
markets  where TILA disclosures are  made reliably; yet, such consum-
ers pay 300-400 basis points more in interest compared to less-biased
consumers  in  markets  where  TILA  disclosures  are  not  made
reliably.
247
244  To clarify, it is  not that lenders will be indifferent to the choice between deferring
cost  or not deferring  cost or between  adding nonsalient  fees  and not adding  such fees;
lenders  will have  an affirmative  reason  not to defer costs  and not to add 'junk" fees.  The
reason  is that any such  deviation from  the  optimal contract design will  increase  the total
cost of the  loan and  thus the disclosed APR.
245  See Lee  & Hogarth,  supra note  229, at 286  (finding that 78  percent of homeowners
who refinanced their homes  report comparison shopping on  the basis of the APR); Lee &
Hogarth,  supra note  198,  at 74  (reporting  that more  than  70  percent  of the  population
reports using the APR to shop for closed-end credit); Renuart & Thompson, supra note  24,
at  189  ("TILA  disclosures  have been  remarkably  effective  in educating  consumers  to pay
attention  to the APR as a key measure of the cost of credit.").  The "finance charge" from
which the APR is derived can be viewed  as an example  of a life-cycle cost measure.  Empiri-
cal evidence  suggests that life-cycle cost disclosures affect consumer behavior.  See Matthias
Deutsch,  The Effect  of Life-Cycle  Cost Disclosure on Consumer Behavior (unpublished  Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Univ. of Md.,  2007),  available at http://hdl.handle.net/1903/6794  (finding that
shoppers who received  "life-cycle  cost" information  chose cooling appliances and washing
machines  that used  less  energy);  see also Matthias  Deutsch,  Life-Cycle  Cost Disclosure, Con-
sumer Behavior, and Business Implications:  Evidence  from an Online  Field  Experiment, in  SUSTAINA-
BLE  CONSUMPTION  AND  PRODUCTION:  FRAMEWORK  FOR ACTION  391,  406  (Theo Geer Ken  et
al.  eds.,  2008)  ("Disclosing estimated  life-cycle  costs  to shoppers  makes  them opt for wash-
ing machines  with,  on  average,  0.83%  less  specific  energy consumption  and  0.74%  less
specific  water  consumption.").
246  See S.  REP.  No. 96-368, at 16  (1979),  reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.  236, 252 (credit-
ing TILA with  increasing consumer  awareness of annual  percentage  rates and with  a sub-
stantial  reduction  of the market share of creditors  charging  the highest rates);  Randall  S.
Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve  Sys.,  Speech at the George Wash-
ington  University School  of Business  Financial  Services Research  Program  Policy Forum:
Creating  More  Effective  Consumer  Disclosures  (May  23,  2007),  available at http://www.
federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Kroszner2007O523a.htm  (stating that TILA  disclo-
sure  requirements  and specifically  the APR disclosure  "are generally  believed  to have  im-
proved competition and  helped  individual  consumers"  (citing  BD.  OF  GOVERNORS  OF  THE
FED.  RESERVE  Sys.,  ANNUAL  PERCENTAGE  RATE  DEMONSTRATION  PROJECT  (1987))).
247  Victor  Stango &Jonathan  Zinman,  Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation and Credit Mar-
ket Outcomes 5  (Tuck Sch.  of Bus., Working Paper  No.  2008-42,  2007),  available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1081635.
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B.  The  Failure  of the APR Disclosure
Despite the aforementioned  achievements  of the APR disclosure,
there  is  broad  consensus  that  the  APR has  not lived  up  to  its  great
potential and that the current disclosure  regime has failed, especially
in  the subprime and Alt-A markets. 248  Why has  the APR failed?  Why
did it not protect borrowers and ensure an  efficient market?  The an-
swer lies in several defects that prevented the APR from living up to its
great promise.  First,  the APR  was  often disclosed  too  late.  Lenders
were  not required  to  disclose  a  binding APR-that  is,  an  APR  that
they cannot  change after  the disclosure-until  consummation  of the
loan  transaction  (closing).249  In  purchase  loans,  lenders  were  re-
quired  to  disclose  a good-faith  estimate  of the APR  three  days after
receiving a loan application.  But lenders were not bound by this esti-
mate,  and  thus  borrowers  could  not rely  on  it  when  shopping  for
loans.2 50  Moreover,  in  some  cases,  the  estimated  APR was  provided
only after a substantial application fee was paid, and so borrowers who
were  reluctant  to  pay  numerous  application  fees  could  not  use  the
estimated  APR  for  comparison  shopping.  The  situation  was  even
worse with  refinance  loans, where lenders  were  not required  to  pro-
vide  any  disclosure  before  closing.251  Disclosing  a binding  APR only
at closing discourages APR-based  comparison  shopping.  Few borrow-
ers  would reach  the closing  stage and  then, after finally learning the
APR,  refuse  to  sign  the  loan  documents  and  start shopping  again.
(Note that to  compare the APR on one loan with the APR on a com-
248  The  evidence showing  the  success of the APR is  limited to  the prime market.  See
supra notes  245-47;  see also Patricia  A. McCoy,  Rethinking  Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based
Pricing,  44  HARV. J.  ON  LEGIS.  123,  126,  138-39  (2007)  (noting robust  competition  in  the
prime  market  and  that TILA  disclosures  effectively  facilitate  this  competition).  On  the
general failure of the TILA disclosure  regime in the nonprime segments, see, for example,
GAO  AMP  REPORT,  supra note 43, at 21  (noting that current disclosure  requirements "are
not  designed  to  address  more  complex  products  such  as  [Alternative  Mortgage  Prod-
ucts] "); Paulson, supra note  2; Edward  L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the
Truth-in-Lending  Act, 80  CEO.  L.J.  233, 236  (1991)  (noting that shopping for credit  is  lim-
ited to "upscale  consumers who would manage perfectly well without  [the]  benefit of [the
TILA  disclosures]").  Secretary  Paulson  highlighted  the  need  for  more  and  better
information:
We  need simple,  clear, and understandable  mortgage disclosure.  We must
identify what information  is most critical for borrowers  to have  so that they
can  make informed  decisions.  At closing,  homebuyers get writer's  cramp
from  initialing pages and pages of unintelligible and mostly unread boiler-
plate that appears  to be designed  to insulate  the originator or lender from
liability rather than to provide useful information to the borrower.  We  can
and  must do better.
Paulson,  supra note  2.
249  See McCoy, supra note  248, at  141.
250  See id.
251  See id. at  137-43;  Willis,  supra note 4,  at 749-50;  FrC Comment, supra note  66,  at
11-12.  The exception  is HOEPA  loans, where  binding early  disclosures are required.  See
McCoy,  supra note  248, at  141.
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peting loan, the borrower would have  to  reach the closing stage with
the second  loan as well.)
2 52
Second,  while  purporting  to  provide  a  total-cost-of-credit  mea-
sure,  the APR  excludes  numerous  price  dimensions,  such  as  title  in-
surance  fees,  title  examination  fees,  property  survey  fees,  appraisal
fees, credit report fees, document preparation fees,  notary fees, flood
and  pest inspection  fees,  seller's  points,  prepayment  penalties,  and
late fees.253  By excluding these price dimensions, the APR underesti-
mates the total cost of the loan.  Moreover,  this exclusion invites stra-
tegic pricing by lenders.  When certain price dimensions are excluded
from  the  APR,  lenders  will  benefit  from  shifting  costs  to  these  ex-
cluded  dimensions.254  These problems  undermine  the  effectiveness
of the APR:  since  the APR  does  not measure  the total  cost of credit,
borrowers are less likely to focus on the APR; borrowers who neverthe-
less use the APR for comparing loans may well end up with a product
that, while boasting  a lower APR, costs  more overall.
Third, the APR disclosure fails to account for the prepayment op-
tion255-an  option that has critically  affected the values  of subprime
and Alt-A loans in the  recent mortgage-lending  expansion.  The pre-
payment option can have  a substantial  effect  on  a loan's value,  even
252  See McCoy,  supra note 248;  Willis, supra note  4,  at 749-50.
253  See COMPTROLLER  OF THE  CURRENCY,  TRUTH  IN  LENDING:  COMPTROLLER'S  HANDBOOK
98  (2006),  available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/til.pdf  (showing APR does not
include late fees,  title insurance fees,  title examination fees,  property survey fees, appraisal
fees, credit report fees,  document preparation fees,  notary fees, flood and  pest inspection
fees, and seller's  points); Eskridge,  supra note 24, at 1165-66; Willis,  supra note  4, at 744,
747, 750 (noting APR includes origination fees and points, but not interest rate escalations,
prepayment  penalties, late fees,  title insurance, and  application, appraisal,  and document
preparation  fees).
254  Elizabeth  Renuart and Diane Thompson,  both former members  of the Consumer
Advocacy  Council to  the Federal  Reserve  Board, made  note of this possibility:
The Board's "fee-by-fee" approach encourages  all lenders to "game" the sys-
tem by unbundling the cost of loan  originations into an increasing number
of fees  that are excluded from  the  disclosed  finance  charges ....  Absent
mandatory,  comprehensive,  and  simple  pricing  disclosures,  lenders  have
perverse  incentives to create  complicated  pricing structures,  including dif-
ferent  rates  on  different  balances,  multitudinous  fees,  variable  rates,  and
payment options.  These  products, by their design,  obscure  the true  price
of credit.  Unsurprisingly, lenders have responded to the current regulatory
environment  by evolving ever more complex and profitable  products.
Renuart  & Thompson,  supra note  24,  at 185,  221.  Regulation  has focused  on "the  most
obvious, transparent  and important terms,"  Zywicki  & Adamson,  supra note  11, at 71,  such
as interest  rates,  points, and  closing  costs, causing  substitution  to less  transparent  terms,
such as  prepayment penalties and LTV ratios.  Such a focus "makes it more difficult to for
borrowers  to easily shop  and compare  terms."  Id.
255  See HUD-TREcASURV  REPORT,  supra note  11,  at  66  (noting that "the  APR  does not
account for an  early  payoff").
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for  traditional,  prime  loans.256  The  effect  on deferred  costs  of sub-
prime and Alt-A loans that were taken with intent to prepay before the
end of the  low-rate  introductory  period  can  be  much  greater.  Con-
sider a 2-28 hybrid for $150,000  with  a monthly payment of $1,000  for
the first two years and a monthly payment of $1,500 for the remaining
twenty-eight  years.  The  APR on  this loan,  ignoring  the  prepayment
option,  is  10.74  percent.  Assuming  that  before  the  2-28  mortgage
resets, the borrower can refinance into a thirty-year FRM with a $1,000
monthly payment, the effective  APR is  7.19 percent.257  The  effect of
an attractive  prepayment  option  is  substantial.
Moreover,  since the prepayment option affects different contrac-
tual designs  differently, an APR that ignores  the  prepayment  option
can skew the comparison  among different loan products.  The prepay-
ment option  might render the APR  disclosure  misleading  even  with
simple loan contracts.  Comparing two loans, Loan A and Loan B, the
APR  on Loan A  can  be  lower,  reflecting  a  lower  total  cost of credit
absent prepayment.  But with  prepayment,  the  total  cost  of Loan  B
may  well  be  lower.258  This  problem  is  exacerbated  when  complex
contracts  include  a  set of varying  terms  that interact differently with
the prepayment option.259
The  term that most obviously  affects the value of the prepayment
option  is  the  prepayment  penalty.  Many  have  expressed  concerns
about prepayment  penalties, and the FRB's new mortgage regulations
256  See Agarwal  et al.,  supra note  120,  at  28  (calculating  a 26.8  percent  impact on  a
$100,000 mortgage for using the wrong rule  to make prepayment decisions;  the impact of
ignoring the prepayment  option altogether  may well  be larger).
257  The actual  (no prepayment) and effective  (with prepayment)  APRs were calculated
using APRWIN  (Ver. 6.1.0).
258  The following  example  is  illustrative:
To see  how the  APR  can  be  misleading, suppose  I give you  the choice  of
borrowing  the  $100,000  at either an  8%  rate  and the  $1,000  fee with  the
360 payments of $733.76,  or a 8.125%  rate and a fee of $100  and 360 pay-
ments of $742.50.  The APR for  the 8%  rate and $1,000  fee  is 8.11%,  and
the APR for the 8.125%  rate and $100  fee is 8.14%.  Most consumers would
think that the 8%  rate is a better deal  because the APR is lower.  However,
this is only true provided you do not pay  off the loan early.  For example, if
you were  able  to  refinance  and payoff the  loan  after 3 years,  with  the  8%
rate you would have  paid a total of $27,415.36  (36 payments of $733.76  plus
the  $1,000  fee).  With  the  8.125%  rate you  would  have  paid $26,830  (36
payments of $742.50 plus $100),  so the 8%  rate was  actually $585.36  more
expensive,  even though  it had a  lower APR.
Reed Mortgage Corp.,  Annual Percentage  Rate (APR),  http://www.reedmc.com/APR.htm
(last visited  Mar. 13,  2009).  More generally, by ignoring the  prepayment option,  the APR
underestimates  the importance  of origination  fees  (those  that are included  in  the  APR
calculation)  that accrue  at closing;  no such  underestimation  afflicts  interest charges that
accrue gradually over the  life of the loan.  See Renuart & Thompson, supra note  24, at 231.
This may provide  another explanation  for the proliferation  of origination fees.
259  Compare  the value  of the prepayment  option  on an  FRM  without  a prepayment
penalty to the value of the prepayment option on a negative amortization option ARM with
a CLTV of 100 percent  and a substantial prepayment  penalty.CORNELL LAW REVIEW
restrict their use  in higher-priced  loans.260  The fear is that, since pre-
payment penalties are not incorporated  into the APR, borrowers  will
underestimate their effect on the total cost of the loan.261  These  con-
cerns, while valid, address only one aspect of the problem.  Those crit-
ical  of prepayment  penalties  focus  on  the  penalties  that borrowers
actually  pay  and  on  borrowers'  underestimation  of these  payments.
They ignore  the effects  of prepayment  penalties  on the value  of the
prepayment  option.  Moreover,  prepayment  penalties  reduce  the  ex
ante value  of the prepayment  option even when they are  not paid  ex
post.
An APR that ignores  the prepayment  option will play  a reduced
role  in  the  shopping  decisions  of perfectly rational  borrowers.  Fur-
ther, it will play an even more minor role in the shopping decisions of
imperfectly rational borrowers who overestimate  the value of the pre-
payment option.  Moreover,  this  flaw in the APR  calculation  enabled
even honest brokers  and loan officers  to deflect  borrowers'  attention
from  the APR disclosure.  For example,  the APR  on  a  deferred-cost
loan could be much higher than the initial teaser rate.  Loan origina-
tors wanted borrowers  to focus on the low teaser  rate and not on the
high APR.  These brokers  and loan officers  could  truthfully  tell bor-
rowers that they are likely to prepay and exit long before  the nominal
thirty-year  loan period ends  and that they should  therefore  pay little
attention  to  an APR that assumes thirty  years of loan payments.
The APR disclosure  failed.  Because  the APR was often disclosed
too late, borrowers could not use the APR to choose between different
loan  products.  Moreover,  the  APR,  by  excluding  numerous  price
dimensions and by ignoring  the prepayment option, failed to live up
to  its  declared  purpose  of providing  an  accurate  total-cost-of-credit
measure.  As a result, borrowers  abandoned the APR, and it ceased to
be the focal point of comparison  shopping in the subprime mortgage
260  Truth in Lending,  73 Fed. Reg. 44,522, 44,551  Uuly  30, 2008)  (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 226).
261  See id. at 44,525  ("Subprime loans are also far more likely to have  prepayment pen-
alties.  Because  the annual  percentage rate  (APR) does not reflect the price of the penalty,
the  consumer  must both  calculate  the size  of the penalty  from  a  formula  and assess  the
likelihood of moving or refinancing during the penalty period.  In these and other ways,
subprime products tend to be complex for consumers.");  see also Truth in Lending, 73 Fed.
Reg. 1672, 1694 (proposedJan. 9,  2008)  (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226)  ("The injuries
prepayment  penalties may cause consumers are particularly concerning  because of serious
questions as  to whether borrowers  knowingly accept the risk of such injuries.  Current dis-
closures  of prepayment  penalties,  including  the disclosure  of penalties  in  Regulation  Z
§ 226.18(k),  do  not  appear  adequate  to  ensure  transparency.  . . . It  is  questionable
whether consumers  can accurately factor  a contingent  cost such  as a prepayment  penalty
into the price  of a loan..  . .").  Moreover, an FTC report  concluded, based on consumer
testing, that even  an improved  disclosure of the prepayment  penalty left a substantial por-
tion of the prime and subprime  consumers  interviewed without  a basic understanding of
the penalty.  LACKO  & PAPPALARDO,  supra note  104,  at 110.
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market.  The resulting cost to borrowers and to society more generally
was substantial.  As explained above, the APR has the potential to ame-
liorate  the  effects  of imperfect  rationality,  but  it  can  effectively  re-
spond  to  the  imperfect  rationality  of borrowers  only  if imperfectly
rational  borrowers  rely  on  the  APR;  many  borrowers,  however,  did
not.
262
C.  Fixing the APR Disclosure
Given  the potential of the APR disclosure  to  compensate for the
imperfect  rationality of borrowers,  it should  be  a priority for policy-
makers  to  fix  the APR's  problems.  In  fact, the  timing problem  has
already  been  addressed-and  partially  solved-by  recent  legal  re-
forms.  In particular,  the new FRB regulations  require lenders  to dis-
close  an  APR  within  three  days  after  the  loan  application  has been
submitted and before any fees are charged for both purchase and refi-
nance loans.263  Further, the recently enacted Housing and Economic
Recovery  Act  requires  lenders  to  disclosure  an  updated  APR  three
days before  consummation of the loan  transaction,  in case  the  previ-
ously disclosed APR  "is no longer accurate.
'264
These recent  statutory and  regulatory responses reduce  the  tim-
ing-of-disclosure  problem, but they do not solve it.  Two issues remain:
First, lenders can still disclose a low APR after receiving an application
and  a higher  APR  later  on.265  Borrowers  will  be  wary  of using  the
application-stage  APR  for comparison  shopping,  since  this  APR  can
change.  And  three  days  before  closing,  the  time  when  an updated
APR  is  provided,  may  already  be  too  late  for  effective  comparison
262  See 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,525-26.  As noted by the Federal Reserve  Board  in its recent
revision  of its Truth  in Lending  regulations:
A consumer  may focus  on  loan  attributes  that  have  the  most obvious and
immediate  consequence  such  as  loan  amount,  down  payment,  initial
monthly  payment, initial  interest rate, and  up-front fees  (though  up-front
fees  may be more  obscure when added  to  the loan amount, and  'discount
points'  in particular  may be  difficult for consumers  to understand).  These
consumers,  therefore,  may not focus on terms that may seem  less immedi-
ately  important  to  them  such  as  future  increases  in  payment amounts  or
interest  rates,  prepayment penalties,  and negative  amortization.  . . . Con-
sumers who do not fully understand such terms and features, however,  are
less  able  to appreciate  their risks, which  can  be significant.  For example,
the payment  may increase  sharply  and  a  prepayment  penalty may  hinder
the consumer from refinancing  to avoid the payment increase.  Thus, con-
sumers may unwittingly accept  loans that they will have  difficulty  repaying.
Id.
263  See id. at 44,590-92;  see also Housing  and Economic  Recovery  Act of 2008,  Pub. L.
No. 110-289,  § 2502(a),  122 Stat. 2654, 2855-57  (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.  § 1638(b)  (2)).
264  Housing and  Economic  Recovery  Act of 2008  § 2502(a).
265  See Kathleen  C.  Engel  & Patricia  A.  McCoy,  A  Tale of Three Markets: The Law  and
Economics of Predatory  Lending, 80 TEx.  L. REv.  1255,  1269  (2002)  (noting that lenders face
no liability for errors  in  the Good Faith  Estimate  (GFE),  including  the GFE of the APR).
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shopping.266  Second,  the  enforcement  of these  improved timing-of-
disclosure  rules  is  imperfect.  Specifically,  several  appellate  courts
have interpreted TILA's civil liability section 267 as precluding statutory
damages  for timing-of-disclosure  violations.26 8  The  borrower  would
thus have  to claim actual  damages  and prove  detrimental  reliance-a
substantial  barrier  to  recovery.  While  Congress  and  the  FRB should
be  commended  for reducing  the  timing-of-disclosure  problem,  still
more can and should be done: disclosure  of a binding APR should be
required at an earlier time, 269 and the civil liability provisions of TILA
should be strengthened.
The  second  problem,  underinclusiveness,  has  not  been  ad-
dressed.  The purpose of the APR was to provide a uniform total-cost-
of-credit measure.  The current APR excludes numerous price dimen-
sions and thus fails to present the total cost of credit.  The  analysis in
this Article  lends further support to  proposals, most recently by Eliza-
beth  Renuart  and  Diane  Thompson,  to  create  a  more  inclusive
APR.270  Several  price  dimensions  that are  currently  excluded  from
the APR definition can be easily added.  Others can only be added at a
cost.  Specifically,  adding  the  price  of truly  optional  services  to  the
APR would generate  several  APRs for  a  single  mortgage,  potentially
confusing rather than assisting borrowers.  Adding contingent prices,
such  as late fees and prepayment  penalties,  imposes  a different cost.
These prices can only be incorporated  into the APR by estimating the
average  probability  that  the  fee-triggering  contingency  will material-
ize.  An APR based on  this estimated average  would be inaccurate for
many borrowers.  Of course, the current APR, which in effect assumes
a zero  probability of triggering these contingent fees, is similarly inac-
266  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  from  the  language  of  the  statute  that lenders  cannot
change  the APR again between  the  time of the updated  disclosure  (three days before  clos-
ing)  and consummation.
267  Truth  in  Lending Act,  15 U.S.C.  §  1640  (2006).
268  See,  e.g., Dykstra  v. Wayland  Ford,  Inc.,  134 F.  App'x  911  (6th Cir. 2005); Baker  v.
Sunny Chevrolet, Inc.,  349 F.3d 862  (6th Cir. 2003);  Brown v. Payday Check Advance, Inc.,
202  F.3d  987  (7th  Cir.  2000);  In re Ferrell,  358  B.R.  777  (B.A.P.  9th  Cir. 2006).  Other
courts  have  adopted  a more  expansive  interpretation  of TILA's  civil  liability  provisions.
See, e.g.,  Bragg v. Bill  Heard Chevrolet, Inc.,  374  F.3d 1060  (lth  Cir. 2004).
269  See HUD-TRE.AsuRY  REPORT,  supra note  11,  at 67  (proposing that originators be re-
quired  to  provide  an  accurate,  within  a  prescribed  tolerance,  Good  Faith  Estimate  of,
among  other things, the APR).  It should be  recognized,  however,  that locking in  an APR
at an earlier time  would place  greater interest rate risk on  the lender and that this added
risk would  be, at least partially, passed on to borrowers.  Borrowers who  need the APR as a
focal  point for comparison  shopping should be willing to accept these consequences.  Cf
McCoy, supra note  248, at 138  (arguing that similar rate lock-ins  are common  in the prime
market even  though  lenders are not required  to disclose  a binding APR).
270  Renuart & Thompson, supra  note 24; see also HUD-TREASuRY  REPORT,  supra note 11,
at  69  (proposing  that the  law be  amended  "to  require  that the  full  cost  of credit be in-
cluded  in the APR");  Eskridge,  supra  note  24 (proposing a more  inclusive APR more  than
twenty years  ago).
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curate  for many borrowers.  While a more inclusive APR is warranted,
for  some  price  dimensions  the  inclusion  decision  requires a  careful
cost-benefit  analysis.
The  third  problem-the  ignored  prepayment  option-also  has
not been addressed  by policymakers.  This problem has  even escaped
the attention of commentators.  When borrowers  expect, rationally or
irrationally,  to  avoid  high long-term  costs  by refinancing  their mort-
gage,  they will  ignore an APR that does not include the  prepayment
option.  It  is,  therefore,  useful  to  consider the  possibility of incorpo-
rating the  prepayment  option into  the APR  calculation.  To  be sure,
accounting  for the  possibility of prepayment  is  a  nontrivial  exercise.
The likelihood and timing of prepayment would have to be estimated
and  so would  the  expected  terms of the refinance  loan.  These  esti-
mates  would need  to be  based on projections  of future  house  prices
(for each Metropolitan  Statistical  Area)  and  interest rates.  These  fu-
ture  market  conditions  would  then need  to  be  combined  with  esti-
mated borrower  and loan  characteristics,  such  as future  FICO score,
future income,  and future LTV,  to  estimate  the refinancing  options
that would be available  to  the specific  borrower.271
These  estimates and projections would  necessarily be  based on a
series of assumptions.  While the use  of assumptions is not new to dis-
closure regulation, 272  it should be recognized  that some degree  of ar-
bitrariness  in  the  choice  of assumptions  is  inevitable  and  that  the
chosen  assumptions  will  not perfectly reflect  the situation  of all  bor-
rowers. 273  However, the difficulties  of generating accurate projections
should not be  exaggerated.  The  mortgage  industry already  employs
sophisticated valuation  algorithms  to arrive at projections  tailored  to
specific home and loan characteristics. 274  An APR disclosure that uses
these  projections  to account for the  prepayment  option will  thus  re-
271  Estimating  the  future  LTV  is  particularly  complicated.  This  estimate  would  be
based  on the  current LTV,  the  contractually  specified  payment stream,  the  prepayment
penalty-which  would need  to  be  financed  by  the  new loan-and  the  projected  future
house value.
272  Note,  for example,  the  assumptions needed  for calculating  the  total  payment pe-
riod for credit card  debt under BAPCPA.
273  Sophisticated valuation algorithms can be used to more closely tailor predictions to
specific homes and specific  loans.  See CAGAN,  supra note  25, at 5  (describing the valuation
algorithms).
274  Projections and forecasts are commonly used in the industry.  See,  e.g.,  CAGAN,,,  supra
note  25; Sherlund, supra note 133,  at 11  ("I draw house price, interest rate, and unemploy-
ment  rate  forecasts  from  Fannie Mae's  and Freddie  Mac's June  2008  monthly  economic
outlooks ....  ");  cf.  W.  Miles,  Boom-Bust Cycles  and the Forecasting  Performance of Linear and
Non-Linear Models of House Prices, 36J.  REAL EsT.  FIN.  & EcoN.  249  (2008)  (comparing the
power of competing models  to predict house prices).  Futures markets can  be used to help
predict  price trajectories.
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duce  the  information  asymmetry  between  lenders  and  borrowers. 275
More  importantly,  this disclosure  could restore  borrower confidence
in the APR and  thus harness  the potential  of the APR  to counteract
the effects of imperfect  rationality.27 6
It  is worth  reminding  ourselves that even  an optimally  designed
APR  will  not be  perfect.  It is  impossible  to  fully  capture  the  mul-
tidimensionality  of a mortgage  loan  in  a  one-dimensional  metric. 277
This  inevitable  limitation,  however,  does  not detract from  the  social
value  of the APR  disclosure.  Sophisticated  borrowers  who  can  deal
with the complexity and multidimensionality will not rely solely on the
APR.  Those  who  rely solely, or mainly,  on  the APR  will  be  the  less
sophisticated borrowers who, absent the APR disclosure, would rely on
an even  less accurate  proxy.278
CONCLUSION
Subprime  and  Alt-A  mortgage  contracts  are  complex,  mul-
tidimensional  contracts  that often  defer  costs  into  the  future.  This
contractual  design  can be explained  as a market response  to  the im-
perfect rationality of borrowers.  The welfare  costs of this market fail-
ure  are  substantial:  Competition  is  both  hindered  and  distorted,
resulting in an inefficient allocation of resources.  Default and foreclo-
sure  rates  increase,  imposing costs  on  borrowers,  lenders,  neighbor-
hoods, cities, and the economy at large.  And distributional  concerns
are  raised.
275  Did lenders really have superior information during the subprime  expansion?  The
multibillion-dollar  losses  that lenders  have  been  incurring since  the  collapse  of the sub-
prime market  suggest  that their algorithms  may well  have been  off the mark.  Still,  it  is
hard to imagine  that lenders, including the Wall  Street firms that financed them, had the
same  information  as  the  average  subprime  borrower.  Moreover,  at least some  of  these
lenders  made a knowing bet that turned out sour.  How many borrowers made  a knowing
bet?
276  The proposed disclosure would  also assist rational borrowers.  Currently, these bor-
rowers  must calculate  the value of the prepayment option  (or the probability of facing  an
attractive prepayment option) on their own.  This is a costly exercise.  And some borrowers
may decide  to forgo the exercise.  The proposed disclosure would save the calculation costs
or, for those  borrowers  who would  forgo the exercise,  reduce uncertainty  about  the pre-
payment option.
277  See Barr et al., supra note 229  (manuscript at 9)  ("The need for simplicity conflicts,
however, with  the goal of producing comprehensive  disclosures that permit consumers  to
comparison  shop based  on the real  price  of multi-attribute  loans.").
278  The  limits  of the  APR, even  when  optimally designed,  warrant  consideration  of
supplementary  approaches.  For example,  the FRB  could sponsor a  web-based  mortgage
search tool.  This tool would  ask the borrower for information  relevant to loan underwrit-
ing and then provide  a list of best options  (from the best lenders),  where the best options,
or at least  some  of them,  would not  necessarily be  picked  solely  by  the  APR.  Cf JOHN
LYNCH,  CONSUMER  INFORMATION  PROCESSING  AND  MORTGAGE  DISCLOSURES  (2008),  available
at  http://www.ftc.gov/be/workshops/mortgage/presentations/LynchJohn.pdf  (propos-
ing a "personalized  screening  agent website  for best alternatives in  region").
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In  this Article,  I argued  that the  outcome  in the  subprime  and
Alt-A  markets  can  be  improved  by  revitalizing  the  APR  disclosure.
The  APR,  by  providing  a  common  total-cost-of-credit  measure,  can
serve  as  an  effective  antidote  to  imperfect  rationality.  The APR can
serve this important role, however, only if borrowers  focus on the APR
when choosing among different mortgage products.  In the subprime
and Alt-A markets,  borrowers  have largely abandoned  the APR.  This
can  change.  Borrowers  will  again  rely on  the  APR if it  is  disclosed
early enough-that is, earlier than what recent reforms require-and
if it is  redesigned to provide a comprehensive  total-cost-of-credit mea-
sure.  To  this end, Congress  and the FRB should minimize  the num-
ber of price  dimensions  that are  excluded  from  the  APR  definition
and consider  incorporating the prepayment option into  the APR cal-
culation.  These  proposals,  if successful  in  restoring borrower  confi-
dence  in  the  APR,  will  allow  the  subprime  and  Alt-A  markets  to
benefit from the APR's unique ability to combat imperfect rationality.CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:1073 1152